November 29, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
the British were on to the railway and beyond at the hour 
mentioned. Lastly, the Ulster troops advanced down the 
spurs which fall to' the left bank of the Canal du Nord, and 
went on up along that vast cutting northwards towards 
Moeuvres. 
At about this hour of eight or nine o'clock, therefore, 
the advance would seem to have reached some such line as that 
indicated on Map I. by the first dotted line. Whether there 
was any definite separation between the first and second 
phase of the advance on this day, the despatches do not tell 
us, but the next message carries the advance forward very 
considerably. 
Under breaking weather and the beginning of what was to 
be a continuous heavy rain, the important crossings of the 
Scheldt Canal at Masnieres (no less than 5,000 yards beyond 
the wood of Lateau) were secured ; to the left of these the 
country town of Marcoing (which had also been a railway 
junction of some importance to the enemy) was occupied, 
while the West Riding troops, which had already passed 
through Havrincourt, went right for\vard to Graincourt and 
even reached and occupied Anneux — a further advance of 
5,000 yards, and a total advance since dawn of more than 4^- 
miles. Meanwhile, the Ulster troops upon the left of the canal 
liad cleared all the country up to the Bapaume and Cambrai 
road and were crossing it. 
At the close of Tuesday's operations, therefore, it would 
seem that the British line ran somewhat as does the second 
dotted line upon Map I. A great wedge has been thrust 
into the enemy's positions ; the very strong defensive system 
known as the Hindenburg line has been broken through 
upon some seven miles of its course and the last elements, its 
third line, reached in several places. 
This first day, Tuesday, was the day of complete surprise, 
in which the enemy had not time to organise his resistance ; 
but there began, of course, from the first news of the British 
success, the most intense efforts at counter-concentration by 
the enemy. Troops were being hurried forward all that 
Tuesday noon and afternoon by all the roads and railways 
which converge on Cambrai ; he began to dig especially just 
south of Bourlon Hill, the crux as we shall see of the new 
positions, and the effect of this concentration was first to be 
felt the next ""day and with increasing force on the days 
following. Meanwhile, very heavy rain was falling on that 
Tuesday evening and continued all night, a circumstance 
adverse to the offensive and especially to the work of the 
cavalry, which had already begun ; for mounted troops, in 
numbers which were considerable, but on which we have no 
precise information, rapidly followed up the advance and 
were at work in the country cleared by the day's success. 
Early in the morning of Wednesday the 21st, the fringes 
of tlie wedge thus driven in were slightly extended. Two 
lines of trenches and a portion of the third system of the 
Hindenburg line were carried somewhere upon, or close to, 
the canal in front of Crevecceur. More important, the village 
of Noyelles, more than 2,000 yards in front of Marcoing, and 
only a couple of miles from the suburbs of Cambrai was 
seized ; the Scotch took its neighbour Containg and advanced 
somewhat down the spur beyond : reaching La Folie Wood. 
The troops of the West Riding reached the Bapaume Road 
beyond Anneux just south of Bourlon Wood, while on the 
extreme left the Ulster troops crossed the road and entered 
Moeuvres. By evening even the point of Fontaine, on the 
other end of Bourlon Hill, was reached, and that village 
ficcupied, b(it the line so drawn was the extreme limit of the 
first effort and could not be entirely maintained. 
One of these counter-attacks had already developed in great 
strength with the troops of the 107th enemy division brought 
back some little time ago from Russia. This was on the right 
in front of Masnieres, and constitutes the operation in which 
the enemy speaks of the British failing to advance on Rumilly, 
though there is no definite information from either side that 
this village was either occupied or lost. Other very strong 
counter-attacks were launched against Bullecourt far away 
to the left, to create. a counter-pressure there and to attempt 
the recovery of a certain amount of ground which had been 
lost to the Irish regiments in that region. While upon the 
following morning, Thursday the 22nd, Fontaine was re-taken 
by the enemy ; jhe got back La Folje Wood, and he appeared 
also in great strength before MfJeuvres and reoccupied that 
village into which the Ulster troops had penetrated. His 
action here was obviously based upon the importance of main- 
taining the Bourlon Wood. 
This day, Thursday the 22nd,, began to mark a clinch in 
the operations of lx)th sides, the preparation of further work 
to come. The British were consolidating the line they had 
r ached and following up the advance with material and, where 
necessary, repairs ; the Germans were continuing to pour 
men down upon the threatened region. 
On l-'riday, tlie 2Trd, therefore, the news was meagre from 
both sides. The British evening despatch of that day contains 
no more than these words : " Operations were continued by 
us to-day against the enemy's positions west of Cambrai'; 
latest reports show that they are developing satisfactorily." 
While from the enemy's side came a message, apparently sent 
earlier in the day, even more brief and very vague, to the 
effect that " the renewed English attempt to break through 
south-west of Cambrai has been shattered with most severe 
losses for the enemy." 
Saturday,[the 24th, was taken up the whole day long with 
the effort to occupy Bourlon Hill and Wood and the corre- 
sponding enemy defences, a fluctuating action to which more 
attention must be paid in a moment. On Sunday Bourlon 
Hill was thoroughly occupied, its height secured and the 
northern reverse side held also after two days of fluctuating 
and very heavy fighting. Bourlon village, at its foot beyond, 
was only held for a time, and by Sunday was in the enemy's 
haiids — but the hill above it, the essential position, was clearly 
maintained. 
Such are the details of the successful advance begun on the 
20th of this month, the Tuesday of last week. Now let us 
examine the meaning of the operations. 
The first thing we note is that, as has been already remarked, 
the attack was made directly in front of Cambrai itself. What 
was the reason of this ? 
To understand the strategic importance of the Cambrai 
sector, we must first of all see where Cambrai stands in the 
old line (now broken) and next appreciate how all the means of 
communication centre on Cambrai. 
Cambrai, in its relation to the old line, is exactly the half- 
way house between the sea and the point where it turns a 
sharp corner in front of Laon to run thence eastward past 
Rheims to Lorraine. Cambrai, therefore, merely as a geo- 
graphical point, is the centre of the northern limb of the 
(ierman defensive angle ; and a grave weakening of that 
point would destroy the whole northern limb more effectually 
than at any other point. But if the northern limb goes the 
eastern limb goes too. The situation may be very simply 
followed on the elementary Sketch II. 
"MiSes so 
"Noncy^ 
There are two great limbs, the meeting place or corner of 
which is at X, where the French had their big success with 
11,000 prisoners and 200 guns the other day in front of Laon. 
A successful stroke at Cambrai takes the northern limb exactly 
in the middle, and if it succeeds divides that northern limb, 
shattering it more effectually than it could be shattered at any 
other point. 
Already the big bulge produced in front of Ypres up to 
Passchendaele had drawn heavily upon the enemy's resources ; 
a blow of a different kind, far more rapid, quite unexpected 
and much less expensive, against Cambrai, completed the 
design, the final results of which we have yet to watch. 
But Cambrai was much more than the mere middle of the 
northern limb. It was also, and has been since the beginning 
of history, the nodal point upon which met?every kind of com- 
munication, not only for itsown region, but fornorthern France- 
as a whole. Map III. will make this clear. Though I leave 
out in this sketch the waterways which have an importance 
of their own even to-day (and it was these which in primitive 
times gave Cambrai its importance) the roads and railways 
alone suffice to show what a knot of supply the place is. 
The great Roman roads (many of which" still survive in 
modern form) radiate from it like the spokei of a wheel, so do 
all the modern roads. Of these, six great main roads con- 
centrate upon the town ; three of tliem, those to the west, 
supply the front of what was until the other day, the un- 
broken Hindenburg line covering the city, to wit (i) that part 
of the Arras road still remaining in German hands ; (2) the 
