December b. 1917 
LANU & WATEK 
which is now so lamiliar to all of ns. The second pliaso has 
been that of considerable, but localised, enemy counter- 
attacks, organised with the special object of recapturiiifi 
liourlon Hill, in which (jbject they failed. But all during 
this second pha-^e. which had lasted the better part of a week, 
and which ended in two da\s of lull, the main concentration 
was going on for the tliird and \'ery serious phase opened on 
Friday last, November jotii. 
It was just after daybreak, of Friday last. November joth. 
that a vast counter-attack on a scale altogether different 
from those which had jireceded it was launched. 
The enemy advanced at 8 o'clock from Vendiuiile to Crevo- 
cceur on the soutliern limb of the salient. He was rapidly 
obtaining on this line a success >vhich threatened to develoj) 
In a very disquieting fashion when, i in the calculation that 
the British w«uld ylready have withdrawq men from the north 
to meet this southern pressure, he further launched exacth- 
two hours after, a correspondingly heavy blow against tin- 
northern limb. This Friday was not only the fir;it but also 
tiie critical day of the wliole operation. The enemy was 
throwing in men upon such a scale as had not e\en been seen 
at Verdun, lor 1 think there was no one day at Verdun when 
a concentration of ten divisions was being used at once. 
The first two hours of the southern attack were a continued 
story of success for the enemy. He went on his extreme 
right down the Scheldt Valley, and got behind Masnieres. 
He carried the high point of Lateau \Vocxl. where the fork 
of the main roads is, and went on beyond that to 
La Vacquerie. He rushed GonneUeu and to the left Gauche 
Wood. At about ton o'clock some of his men liad got into 
and beyond Gouzoaucourt. Meanwhile, the attack from 
the north aimed at crossing the high road south ol 
Moeuvres joining hands with the southern attack somewhere 
by Havrincourt Wood and so cutting off all the British in 
the salient. , 
By 10 a. rill it was half done. The enemy had got 
well through the old entrenched line wliich liad been held 
for months before the last advance. Gouzeaucourt was 
nearly two miles behind it. And he was then well past 
Gouzeaucourt to tlie west, wiiile the great southern attack 
drawn from Moeu\-res towards Ha\Tincourt was in full progress. 
. The position was clearly t.-.Kceedingh' serious. But it was 
partially restored almost immediately. Before noon the 
southern attack was check<xl, and the enemy spent the mid-day 
in tr\'ing vainly to entrench himself upon this new line. Tlie 
early afternoon saw the British counter-attack in this region, 
(iouzeaucourt was recovere<J, so was Gauche Wood, and at 
tlie end of the day he stood here en the lino Gonnclicu and 
Villcrs Guislain. He was no longer astride of the railway 
(i) (i). (Not in use, of (fourse, but a convenient mark for 
following the line here). To the north ho retained his hold 
upon tlie fork of the roads at Lateau Wood and the high, 
point at X, which dominates all tlie valley to the north, 
and the outskirts of the ruins of La Vacqwcric hamlet. But 
lie was beaten back out of the soutliern subtirbs of Masnieres 
and the British still held the crossing of the. Scheldt at that 
point. If tliis crossing could have Ix'cn 'maLntained it would 
liave been a matter of some importance, for though the hill 
beyond Ktimilly (Hill <)6) hides Garabrai, dominates the valley 
below and has been constautlj- in German hands, yet the 
bridgehead at Masnieres was an opportunity for further 
advance whenever this might be possible. It overcame the 
obstacle of the canal and of the stream of the Scheldt bv its 
siile. 
With this situation on tlie southern limb clearly in niuul, 
let ns turn to what was going on on the northern. Here the 
attack was timed to coincide with the southern success; 
It counted half the forces engaged, live whole divisions, ^nd 
of these three, the main weiglit of the hammer, were cro\\2ded 
on to the e.xtraordinary narrow front of 5,000 yards bet'iv'Jei' 
Bourlon and McuuvrfS — a whole di\ision to less than eacl: 
mile ; and such a weight of men came on in wa\'es all day 
to push thnxigh and join hands with their comrades to the 
south. Thev failed. 
The storm diii not abate until darkness set in. At it? 
height the most advanced bodies of the assault seemi to have 
reached as far as the main rjiad, but they never held any 
point beyond. , 
The enemy issued a claim at the end of the da.y to some 
4,000 prisoners and Oo guns. The summary of his whole 
effort was that he luid carried a belt about 2,000 yards 
which, on tlic southern limb, gravely threatened the railw.'iy 
supplying the salient c»n this side, and, most important of all, 
perhaps, firmly ?ei-zed upon the height of Lateau Wood which 
dominates all the valley to the east and north. This occupa- 
tion compelled the Bririish to evacuate the important bridge- 
head of Masnieres in a little more than 24 hours. A corre- 
s])onding success on the* north \\ould ha\'e given him a great 
victory. Luckily no such advantage was gained. On the 
north he obtained nothimg but small indentations of the line 
between Bourlon Hill arut Ma;u\Tes, lost very heavily indeed 
in men, failed in his main object, which was the cutting off 
of the salient and failed a bo to carry Bourlon Hill. A sub- 
sidiary but important point : For, so long as Bourlon Hill is 
in British possession^ the communications of Cambrai arc out 
of use. 
During Saturday the pressure was relieved save in the 
neighbourhood of .Masnieres. the suburbs of which village were 
again entt'red by the enemy before the retirement was ordered 
from that placi-. There was also detached fighting near La 
Vacquerie and l^ourlon, but the battle as a whole marked 
time. But Sunda\- saw the renewal of it in its fullest activity. 
The enemy attacked with especial strength again on the 
south : the line was mahitained everywhere against him 
except at La Vacquerie and just east of Marcoing ; south of 
the latter little town the enemy broke through at one point, 
but only for a moment. And at this point, with the result 
not decided, our information ceases. The enenij''s last 
claim was to 6,000 prisoners and 100 guns, the latt-er item 
including, of course, whatever shattered pieces he found on 
whatever part of his advance, and further including -^eces 
recovered by the British in their counter-attacks. 
It is, unfortunately, impossible to draw any conclusion in 
this stage of the action. All we see is the failure of the 
enemy to fight an encircjing battle capturing the British 
in the Cambrai salient, and his present dctcrmiuation at least 
to drive the British out of thiit salient in.4lie battle which is 
still continuing. 
Soldiers v. Critics 
There are certain lust, principles,, running all through 
military histor\' which it is the busihes.s of soldiers to 
study, and which soldiers do study and i)ractice. It is 
the business,' also, and in part the recreation of mere 
students to master these elementary principles, for if tliey 
did not they could not foUcuv military historj- and under- 
stand it, either in the past or in the present. Those principhs 
are simple enough. It is their^ execution in detail and in 
practice which is ditlicult. .And the. m^n of genius in this. 
as in every otlur branch of human effort. i> not the man who 
sees obvious thin.gs. still less the man who contrives ingenious 
ones. It is the man who combines the power to make a good 
plan rapidly with thl^ power to execute it in the viateruil 
with ivJiiih he lias to deal. It is all summed up in Napoleon's 
maxim tHat any fool can draw u]^ a strategical plan, and that 
the test of military power is in its execution. 
There has been (juiti- recently in the Press and on the plat- 
form, a perfect orgy of amateur advice upon the war, which 
had for its main character —almost for its only character —a ' 
perfectly amazing ignorance of these elementary principles. I 
iiave the right to use the word "amazing" in tin- 41st month 
of thi'war. Thure are. by this time, witliout cxa^^gc ration, tens 
I 'f thousands ol mi'U wlio have been taught ^urh ei<'mentary 
Jhings since lUi \. and it wrcounl those who Jjave instiniAiv»|^v 
lilH)Hici;itcrl till III Mill iilL'li t akin. ■_: 11. lit ill " :ir i-vr'n I li. ,ii."ii i liiv 
have had. no special instruction in such principles, there are 
millions."' 
These ^ thousands and thicse millions are in uniform, and 
neither .speak' nor write. It would do no hari^i if a few of 
them were spared to give some simple lectures to the com- 
paratively small riuirib'er of ci\'ilians who pretend to set the 
soldiers right in their own trade. There is hardly anyone 
upon service.jfor example, who does not know at least \\])at 
is meant by sii/>/ily; and yet our amateur strategists leave 
out that factor in strategy as airily as though movement 
upon the globe were like the moving of a pencil upon the map. 
By way of a counter-offensive against this deluge, which 
always comes after an unexpected reverse, and ^A-hich 
was let loose by certain journalists and politicians, during 
.what may be called "the Italian fortnight," a fe\v \i-eighty 
and sober articles have appeare<l. most of them from tlie pL-ns 
of Soldiers and none of them better worth reading than thosc> 
which were ])rintedin the Mornini; P(ys/ in succession a littU- 
time ago. '["heir example will. I ho])c, prove a sufficient excuse 
if I recapitulate here certain elementary points common to 
the whole of military history. Their appreciation can only 
ha\-e a negative effect upon civilians But it seems from ;. 
recent experience that such a negative effect would be still 
worth attaining. 1 . 
rh<' first leading principle is this. No one can judge ol a 
