LAINU & WATER 
Deccnihcr ij, if)i/ 
Thatamonnt. of tonnage prc^^upposes the ix>wo. ■ «i -^"^N " 
...nintainiuK th. lorcc statirally, but also clyna.n.ca 1 tha 
-" ihe uermnual stream ol,'recniitnu>nt to repair wastage tan 
; oVuratv well indetin'itelv. the reservoir of nnin-powcr 
MZ'^hL,. for the purposes ,.f this war. "-;; '^'"r^ ^^^ 
In other words, though the constant of one "i' '•'^y"^^> 
maintained the actual numbers emploved throughout a gnei 
:S served Uv no n.ore tonnage will be, -cord.ng to the 
length of the peri.xl. a million and a half or three-quarters or 
two million and so forth. It is an important ponit. ^'nipk as 
,t is. because when people first hOar ol the hm.tat.ons mipose 
upon Anierican numbers in l- urope. they nearly alwav.ng.nd 
this as a fixed figure independent of the e emeiU ot tunc 
The next factor to our advantag<> .s the fact that die adven 
of the l-nited States gives us (subject agani to the power oi 
earning') . an additional material advantage. 
. Hx^re.comes in a criticisn> which 1 liavo otten heard inadc, 
and whirl, is partiallv, but onh- partially true Men will sa> 
(and the enemy press has been saying it for a long tune past) 
that the material resources of the Umtod States were alread> 
at the dis.H.sal of the Allies in the shape of a neutral market 
from which thev could draw, and that, therefore, tho industrial 
.-ttort our new allv couhl make in our favour would not he 
much more than tlu- same effort which he might have made 
as a commercial client whose services were obtained by way ol 
exchange and credit. • 
This criticism is a useful reminder to those who argue as 
though the Allianci' meant in material what it would niean in 
.the case of a doubtful Kuropean neutral, and as though forces 
hitherto refused or husbanded were suddenly let loose iipon 
cur side when the United, States entered the war. It is not 
so \ great part of American i)roductive power has been at 
our disposal for a long time past through (uir command ol the 
^ea But the opposite idea, that the States entry into war 
is tiierefore no new material advantage is subject to two very 
impor an modifications. The first is in the word credit. 
• The A li :s have more and more been obtaining material Irom 
the Uri cd States, not in exchange for existing goods, nor even 
metal, Init in exchange for the promise to produce such goods 
in the future. In other words, the supplier Jiave more and 
more depended upon a credit. , ,. , , 
Xow, there is all the difference between a credit estabhslietl 
through the mere play of commerce and the mere degree of 
confidence or delay, which t>rivatc firms extend, and the same 
not onlv backed by the national government, but fostered by 
it, and if necessary, supplemented by it. ^ _. . , . , 
riie second modification is equally important. The malonal re- 
sources of the Tnitcd States can and will, now that the (ioverii- 
ment of the country is in Alliance with us, be co-ordinated for 
the purposes of \var. Pliere can, and will be a common 
direction, dependent U]ion a single motive wliere before there 
had been no more- than the resultant of separate commercial 
forces An example of this is the programme of ship-buiIding. 
,Vou would never have had such a programme and you never 
could have had it with the I'nitcd States still neutral. 
' The last point in our favour is less definite, but to be noted, 
none the less. It is tlie advantage which America gives us 
in what may be called "Special Services," that is, in the 
factor of brains and mechanical skill as distinguished from 
mere quantity of production. How far this factor is increased 
by the fact that the United States is at war is a question whicii 
cannot be answered accurately, because there is no way of 
measuring these moral forces, but it certainly is largely in- 
creased. Those elements which do not require very great 
numbers in comparison with the whole army are now specially 
at the service of the Allies, and art' little hampered by the 
difficulties of communication. This is true of the ^Medical 
Service and numberless other auxiliary elements, and it is 
oartly true of the Air Service, thouglj, of course, the proportion 
('if this to the whole'is now-a-days considerable, and the pro- 
blem of transjiort enters into it very largely. 
We shall not forget, in conclusion (for the popular press has 
made everybody familiar with it) the exceedingly important 
I'lement of blockade. ^ t- i- i 
During all tlie criticism of tlie Foreign Ofifice, English 
critics omitted the essential wint th.at the United States was 
a neutral. Tliis was the great governing difficulty in the whole 
affair. It was treated jiatiently and skilfully,, and partly, but 
only partly, overcome by a number of devices each of which 
in turn tended to provoke friction, and nearly all of which had 
to be modified after they had been put into practice. But 
the moment that tlie neutrality of the United States ceased 
the nature of the blockade went through a revolution in our 
favour. It became' as nearly as possible absolute, and what 
every member of our Administration had desired it to be from 
the beginning. Such, in a brief summary, would seem to b" 
the main points for and against us in this very critical moment 
when the enemy has found so much new strength through the 
anarchy in Russia and the Allies are awaiting the development 
of American aid. ii- Bi-i.i.o: 
M. Malvy and His Judges 
By J. Coudurier 
FOR a man who loves his country to allege even the 
possibility that one of his compatriots has betrayed 
that most sacred thing, la patrk, is eytremely pain- 
ful, the more so when the citixen accused of this 
heinous crime is not only a man of good education and 
easy circumstances, but also an elected representative of the 
])eople in Parliament, and a Minister entrusted in time of 
war with the safety of the country. Moreover, I am dis- 
cussing this painful suliject in a foreign countrv", in a foreign 
paper. In ordinary times I should have declined to do so. 
but to-day I consider that England and France are one, 
that during our common struggle against the common foe 
no distinction should be drawn between us. 
This is why I have already written in L.\nd & W.vtek 
what 1 knew then 'to be the tnith about that great I'renchman 
and patriot Leon Daiidet, at a time when his name was un- 
known in England and held in contempt and hatred by a 
great number of his compatriots. To-day I have the melan- 
choly satisfacti(?n of knowing that every word I wrote on his 
admirable' campaign against the traitors who were jeopardising 
our cause, has been proved true. ■ 
But there were other I'renchmen as brave as Leon Daudet, 
whose leader in Parliament was M. Clemenceau. He it was 
who on July -.3211(1 denounced at the tribune of the Senate 
the deplorable attitude of M. Malvy, to whom he said before a 
full h(Mise : " ^■ou are betraying the interests of the nation." 
l.t'on Daudet went further in L'Aclion I'raiicaisc when he 
repeatedly called M. Malvy a common traitor, who was bought 
by the (iermans and represented them in the Councils of the 
(■loyernment. 
Howiver much I admire Leon Daudet, 1 cannot bting nnsolf 
to believe that M. Malvy actually betrayed his country by 
selling set ret documents to th(' (iermans. or by giving them 
information of a military or a political nature. The word 
" traitor " means many different things. You can betray 
your country by being negligent in the fulfilment of your duty 
iis a ])rivate or a public man. A Minister, for instance, may 
sunouild himself, as M. Malvy is alleged to have done, with 
unworthy coUabi.irators. (.)r he ina\- adopt a weak policy 
de Ghassaigne 
towanls anarchists like Sebastien Faure, and destroy, as M. 
Malvv did according to the same allegations, political docu- 
ment's concerning anarchists in order to win over to his side 
their benevolcnt^ieutralitv. This in itself is a crime which 
will entail for M. Malvy, "if these accusations an- proved in 
Court, the heavy penaltr of several years' hard labour. 
But to this last charge M. Malvy will doubtless reply that in 
so doing he was act:uatcd by political motives, and not by any 
l)ersonal interest. And in invoking the raison d'Etfit, he would 
most likely find many parliamentary colleagues ready to 
absolve him. 
At the start ^I. Malvy's nerveless policy appears to have 
been fairly successful, biit in the long run it became evident 
that to favour the scum of the population, and to grant 
excessive facilities to revolutionaries of all descriptions, had 
merely given the country a fictitious tranquillity. Whatever 
liis object was in doiiig so, M. Malvv became the protector 
and friend of \'igo-Almercvda, of Landau, of Pai.x-Seailles, 
and of all the pacifist traitors who, with Bolo and his accom- 
]>liccs, did their licst to prepare the success of the pro-German 
nianceuvres which were to pave the way for a premature 
peace. At the same timb, he gave his full confidence to liis 
l)rivate secretary Lcvinarie, whose dealings with Bolo's 
partners and other German agents have led to his being ofticially 
accused of trading and communicating with the cnenu'. 
This same Leymarie ought to have been turned out of all 
official positions, and arrested, as soon as the Minister of the 
Interior became acquainted with the behaviour of his sub- 
ordinate in the case of the Duval cheque. M. Malvy not only 
did not do so, but promoted M. Leymarie to the responsible 
post of Dircclcur de la Siircie ■ Gineralc ! And there he re- 
mained until under pressure of public opinion he was obliged 
to relinquish a post' which had made him one of the most 
important wh.-^els in the whole French administrative ma- 
cliinery. I only quote these incidents, and 1 might, alas, draw 
u)) a much longer list, tij show the heavy responsibility which 
>I. Malvy incurred as Minister of the Interior since the 
war began. 
Possibly one might hnd extenuating circumstances in the 
