August 23, 1917 
LAND &, WATKK 
made with the object of deceiving the German public and 
maintaining the moral of civilians. But we must remember 
that our own despatches are read in Germany freely three or 
four days after the event, and that the description given of 
the further fighting will show even a superficial German 
student of the war how the line actually stands. Perhaps the 
puzzle cannot be solved, and we can only leave it where it is 
until we have some better information of the method in which 
these bulletins are collated and sent abroad. 
Meanwhile, it is clear the enemy depends for the checking 
of this serious and. continued deepening of the breach in his 
lines and of the consequent cumulative effect of such succes- 
sive blows— now far more e.\pensi\e to him than to his 
■ assailant — upon the following method : 
If the reader will turn to Map I, he will see that the nine 
miles of the enemy s present defensive front-. in the shape 
of a crescent — have on the extreme south (the enemy's left) 
a body of high land astraddlcof the Menin Road and just in 
front of the ruins of Gheluvelt ; while on the enemy's extreme 
right ornortii. just behind his present line, is the big wood of 
Houthulst. Running in a deep curve from one to the other 
goes the gradually declining ridge of Paaschendaelc. 
The enemy clearly regards the two horns of the crescent, 
the wood of Houthulst and the heights of Gheluvelt, as strong 
pillars upon which he can rely to maintain either end of 
his defence, while if his centre is pressed further back he can 
at last repose upon the ridge of Paaschendaelc. 
This is the natural defensive line of the region, and now 
y,t understand why he has been fighting so desperately to 
retain the southern pillar, the heights near Gheluvelt. If 
the reader will here look at Map II, he will see the nature of 
these heights and the extent of the enemy's success and failure. 
I show on this map in detail the contours of the district. 
The dominating hummock is an oval rather more than a mile 
long, lying, as I have said, astraddle of the Menin Road and 
marked by the 60 metre contour. The best Belgian maps are 
contoured to a metre, that is, every yard of ascent is shown, 
and I have within this hummock of land marked the four 
metre contours which lead one to its summit. That summit 
stands just on the road at 64 metres, and is known in the 
military discussions of the ground as " Hill 64." The British 
soldiers have called it " Clapham Junction." 
On the north of Map II the reader will see the tiny hamlet 
of West hoek,. lying just above the 40 metre contour — that is 
some 70 feet or a little less below Hill O4 and distant a mile 
and a half from it. He will further note just to the east of 
W'esthoek a little isolated hummock marked 48, the highest 
ground in that neighbourhood. Lastly, he will observe how 
tangled and difficult the coimtry is-made with woods. Now 
the whole fighting in this region- the southern pillar of the 
(ierman defensive scheme — is to maintain point 48, point 64 
and the highest levels of ground running between the two ; 
and the swaying to and fro of the battle in this district marks 
the great efforts the Germans have made to prevent them- 
selves being dislodged from that defensive line. 
In these efforts the woods have been their mainstay. The 
difficulty of the British advancing through the splintered 
woods supported the Germans during their long struggle to 
