beptember b, 1917 
LAND '& WATER 
13 
The "Nine Million" Effectives 
By Hilaire Belloc 
Mr. Bdlcc, who is away on a kcliday but will resume his 
military article next week, contributes this analysis of 
German Effectives in reply to the Idlers he has received, 
from many correspondents. 
I HAVE been written to by many people about Mr. 
Gerard's expression " Nine Million Remaining German 
Ett'ectives " appearing in the memoirs lie is now publish- 
ing. I should like to say in the first place, that the 
criticisms I have to advance against this expression in no 
way detract from my appreciation of the excellent work 
which Mr. (ierard has done as a public witness in this grave 
trial of all Europe. 
Why must we regard this one phrase " Nine million re- 
maining German cftectivcs " as wholly inaccurate ? 
Befoie answering that question let me remind the reader 
of the way in which we naturally receive any impossible state- 
ment made upon high authority. 
If a man highly placed in the Hydrographic Service of some 
Government writes of the Straits of Dover : " The deepest 
soundings are but loo fathoms or so," we do not, whatever 
the repute of the writer or his special opportunities of know- 
ledge, accept the statement. We know that it is, as it stands, 
nonsense ; we cast about for some explanation. We say to 
ours(?lvcs, there may have been a slip ot the pen ; if the infor- 
mation is in type, we may refer it to a printer's error ; or we 
may find that the Straits intended to be mentioned were not 
the Straits of Dover at all, but some otjier deeper channel, 
and that the word " Dover " came in by some error in writing 
or dictating, or in correcting proofs. A mass of long-known 
official statistics, to wit, the numerous soundings taken in the 
Straits over centuries, make us perfectly certain that the 
sentence as it stands is meaningless : no part of the Straits of 
Dover is within much more than a third (fi the depth stated. . 
Now that is just what a ma'n whose business it has been to 
follow the statistics of this war feels with regard to the state- 
ment that " German effectives are still nine million in num- 
ber." The German cftectives — hi the sense of combatant 
units- are perfectly well known. They are somewhat 
over tl.ree million (at the most .j^), organised in divisions 
and lesser units, the numbers and positions of which have 
been ascertained and are followed minutely as the war pro- 
ceeds. Ik'hind these effectives is an organised reser\e power 
ol men in depot, now very considerably l(!ss than half a 
million (at wiiich figure it stood ten weeks ago), but to be 
increased in a very (cw weeks by the greater part of class 
101 y and before the end of the year by nearly the whole of 
that class. 
Combatant Effectives 
When we read, therefore, that " The remaining German 
effectives are nine million," we cast about for seme explanation 
of how the statement could have got into print— what sort of 
typographical or other error, explains it. 
The word " cttectives " is generally used to mean the men 
organised in units for combatant service- the actual fighting 
ffjrce. For instance, when you are told by ^ military his- 
torian that " Napoleon had a difficulty in keeping lip his 
cftectives in 1814," the phrase refers to difficulties in the up- 
keep of combatant forces in the field— the filling of gaps 
resulting from death, capture, sickness and wounds on active 
ser\ice. It is not a word of that precise scientific or 
technical value which words often acquire after long service, 
and one can easily conceive that one source of error in the 
remark wc are criticising might be the loose or double use of 
the word " effective " : first to mean mobilised men in general, 
and next to mean of active ser\'ice alone. " 
Whether the word " effectives " has been used first loosclv 
and then technically, thereby creating a confusion, oi*whetlieV 
it has been used throughout to mean the fighting forces alone, 
is of little consequence to a true statement of the position. 
The statistics of this are well known. There' is no debate 
upon them save with regard to comparati\-ely small margins 
of error. A few weeks only of further fighting have modified 
a position which, towards the beginning of July, stood some- 
what as follows : 
(i) Total ration strength of the German Armv about five 
and a half millions (or a little under) : To show upon what 
points doubt exists, I may mention that the lowest estimate 
1 have seen is (or 5,4.55,000 (which is that of a high Erench 
authority), and the highest but just under 5. ('(10,000. It is 
clear that a slight differenic in date, or th»; inclusion of one 
very doubtful category (say, the ladies who are on the ration 
strength doing typewriting), by one authorit}' and their 
exclusion by another, would be sufficient to account for these 
small differences. At any rate, if we put the present ration 
strength of the (German Army at 5.1 millions, we are probably 
just a little over the right figure at the present moment. 
(z) Of this lar^e body, the only part which counts in our 
calculation of fighting strength is the organised combatant 
active force, and is about or perhaps at the present moment 
a little under three and a quarter millions. This is what 
would normally be called the " effectives." 
(3) Of the balance of somewhat over tw'o millions, and 
perhaps nearly two million and a quarter, the great bulk arc 
made up either of men who are used to garrison, to supply, 
etc., but are too old to be used in the field (save a few excep- 
tionally here and there), or of men so affected by war in the 
way of wounds and illness that they can only be used for 
similar auxiliary purposes. These last do not count among 
" definiti\e " losses, that is, they arc not out of the army 
for ever as are tlie dead, the prisoners and the discharged 
from very bad wounds or illness ; but then, neither are they 
capable of active service in the future. 
Depot Strength 
The only part of this balance between the total ration 
strength (5i million) and the army in the field (^j million) 
that counts in the active strength of the enemy is the number 
Germany has in depot ; that was in June last under half a 
million- — excluding class 1919. By some British accounts this 
reserve is by this time so depleted that the first of class 
iQici have begun to appear in the battle — but they are barely 
due, and it is probable that prisoners of igiq are volunteers. 
This class was expected rather in the beginning of September 
than at the end of August, and they will probably dribble in 
during autumn — to the extent of 350,000 or thereabouts. 
This is not the whole of class 191Q. The remainder of it, to 
the extent of 140,000 or a little more, were put back as im- 
mature for later training, and most of them will presumably 
appear in the winter. 
Such is, in rough figures, the situation of the enemy as 
regards effectives, that is, in combatant numbers. There is 
no mystery about it. The figures are perfectly well known 
and generally dealt with all over Europe by those who concern 
themselves with close and rational study of the campaign. 
They are based, of course, upon t!ie convergence of many 
different kinds of information, all grouped under the Intelli- 
gence Department of the various belligerents. 
Twenty-one German classes were put into the field in the 
first months of the war — classes '14 to '94 inclusive. They 
included the young men in their twentieth year and up to 
men in their fortieth year. These classes 1914 to 1894 inclusive 
came from men born during the course of 1874, during the 
course of 1894, and during the course of the intervening years. 
Apart from these, five older classes from 1893 to 1889 in- 
clusive, that ib, men from their forty-first to their forty-fifth 
year^ inclusive, were summoned as liable to military service, 
but not used in the field save in exceptional circumstances 
and in small numbers. 
The total number of men bom from 1874 to 1894 inclusive, 
and still alive when Germany declared war was, omitting 
figures under a thousand. 10,757,000. Of the youngest 
class, under normal conditions, about three-quarters are fit 
for service. The elder, of course, as one approaches forty, 
tail oft' rapidly and conie down through less than five-eighths 
to little more than half. The total number normally a\'ailable 
for active use, within the zi classes, was over seven, but rather 
less than seven and a half millions. Of these, a c(?rtain 
proportion, probably about a million and a half, were not 
mobilised in the first months, but kept back for civilian work. 
\\ ith the second year of the war, or rather a little before 
the beginning of the second year (^f war, what is called 
" abnormal " recruitment began in Germany — as it did 
somewhat later elsewhere. 
It took three forms, (i) The combing out of what could 
possibly be spared from civilian occupation among the fit ; 
(z) the calling of the youngfr classes ; and (3) the combing 
out of tho" unfit," that is, of those who under normal re- ' 
cmitment are rejected: 
The first process was largely aided, some months lat r. by 
the beginning ofjthe slave raids organised by the enemy in the 
territories lie occupied. 
The second, which was begun in October 1915. could not 
in the nature of things yield any very large body of men, 
though, as the pressure increased with every passing month. 
