12 
LAND & WATER 
^eptemDcr 20, 1917 
o» the German Intellectuals. Imperial Germany there 
proclaims through the mouths of her finest thmkers her poli- 
tical and social superiority over all. the rest of the world. And, 
in this alleged superiority she sees the product of her very 
ImptMialism. Tiiat constitutes tor her the foundation of her 
ritfht It is in the name of lu^r imperialist superiority that 
she claims hegemony, and calls upon democracy to submit 
in order that mankind may rise to the level of German per- 
fection If the democracies refuse, Germany summons 
them to the arbritrament of the sword. German ^warfare 
is pedantic : it assumes the character of a demonstratiom 
It is not enough for the weaker to acknowledge himself 
defeated ■ he must confess that he had been mistaken, that 
his constitutional principles did not permit lum to assure 
himself of that security without which civilised existence is 
impossible. He has no option but to enter the school of 
the victor. , , ■ xi 
Since the United States joined the coalition, and since the 
revolution in Russia, the allied democracies make up a popula- 
tion nearly three times as large as that of the Central Powers, 
without reckoning their colonial populations, which give 
them important co-operation. Their wealth is inhmtely 
greater than that of their adversaries, and their industiy 
more potent. We have had three years in which to mobilise 
our resources. The sea is ours, despite the submarines. \\ e 
possess marked numerical superiority on all the fronts, pre- 
ponderance of artillery on nearly all the fronts, and the advaa- 
tage in material of all kinds. If in these circumstances 
democracy were unable to triumph over the Emperor, it would 
be the most appalling confession on her part of impotence, 
incapacity and <veakness. She would vanish from off the 
face of the earth like other unfit creatures eliminated in the 
struggle for existence. Ncvei" fias the inevitable necessity 
of victory been imposed more imperatively. This is a case 
of victory or death. 
A Moral Victory 
Even if, despite the improlxibility of any such hypothesis, 
Germany, whose armies still occupy unbroken lines in hostile 
teriitory, renounced all ideas of indemnities and annexation, 
if she ceased to demand any of these economic or military 
" guarantees " of which her Chancellor talked last April, 
if she agreed to the admission of Poland into a nominally 
independent unity, and to the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine 
to France, but still retained her Emperor with his preseYit 
power unimpaired, I contend that this would be the most 
signal victory for German imperialism.. 
A moral victory, to begin with : for it would have been 
demonstrated that by virtue of its essential pi inciple it was 
capable of withstanding forces three times superior to its own, 
and compelling them to accept a compromise. 
An economic victory, in the next place : the most elementary 
acquantaince with things Russian would convince anyone 
that, reinforced by the prestige accruing from its victorious 
resistance to a coalition of the world, it would speedily impose 
German commerce upon Poland, and at any rate, all the 
western provinces of the former empire of the Tsars. It 
would recover and increase the hold it previously had upon 
the Balkans, and upon the Ottoman Empire. And it would 
realise, in the most favourable conditions, the ambitious 
projects indicated in the construction of the Berlin-Bagdad 
railway. 
.\nd, finally, a political victory, for, all the world over, 
political influence follows in the train of commercial conquest. 
Sooner or later the Middle- F.urope Confederacy would be 
constituted, and the equilibrium of the world would be 
definitely destroyed. 
Among the Stockholm party there are many people who 
recognise as we do the imperative necessity of breaking the 
power of German Imperialism, but who think that it may 
be awaited as the result of an internal revolution in (Germany. 
They rely upon the German socialists and democrats. At 
the outset, it is well to agree about the meaning of words. 
Who are the democrats upon whose courage reliance is to 
be placed ? 
Arc they the Deputies who a few weeks ago voted the "Motion 
of the Majority " in the Reichstag ? The event has proved 
already how much their sincerity was worth, and what the 
. concessions with which they arc satisfied amounted to. 
Are they the Socialists of the Majority ? The Emi^ror has 
had no more zealous supporters. It is through their agency 
that he keeps the people in submission. Everyone remembers 
the manifesto in which they implored the people to remain 
submissive when it was manifesting some unrest. 
Are they the Socialists of the Minority ? Everyone ac- 
quainted with the facts recognises their excellent intention, 
rather after the fair though unfortunately it was. We 
raise our hat to their courage, and if (iermanycan be renewed 
from within it is assuredly their influcDce that will do it. 
But is not that precisely the argument which rnust persuade 
Western Socialists to refuse all compromise and all 
common action at Stockholm with the Majority Socialists ? 
These are men with w hom the sincere democrats of Germany 
have recognised it is impossible to act in concert, and with 
whom they have abruptly broken off relatio^is. Arc we, 
who are separated from the (Jerman Majority^by many other 
points of disagreement and by many other offences of theirs, 
to go and resume relations which arc repudiated by the 
Minority in Germany ? Arc we to go and recognise as 
representatives of German democracy men who are denounced 
in Ciermany as traitors to the cause ? Are we to assume 
the task of rehabilitating them ? Surely a singular way of 
assisting in the emancipation of German democracy ! 
It is important not to give way at this point, either to 
idle scepticism or to childish trustfulness. No one is justi- 
fied in maintaining that Germany will for ever be incapable 
of realising her own democracy. There exist to-day nc 
peoples marked out for servitude by a kind of irremediable 
predestination, just as there exist to-day no elect peoples. 
But, above all, no one is justified in regarding this process of 
dcmocratisation as inevitable and imminent, and in basing 
his politics upon that dangerous hypothesis. 
The Russian Revolution 
It has been said that the Russian revolution made the 
German revolution imminent. Perhaps it would do so, 
if the Russian revolution were to triumph both at home 
and abroad. But, if the revolution is defeated, if its armies 
take to flight, if it is unable to avert anarchy or economic 
paralysis from the country, what then ? After spending 
two months in Russia in close study of events, and after 
careful examination of the situation in Germany, I have 
no hesitation in saying that up to the present the events in 
Russia have contributed to spoiling the chances of a revolution 
in the dominions of the Emperor William. 
It has been declared that, if we were to make peace with 
the Emperor to-day, democracy would triump'.i to-morrow. 
History teaches us,"^ however, that it is not victorious Ctesar 
who is overthrown, but Ca:sar vanquished. If the German 
people are to be detached from their T^mperor, they must 
first be convinced that William, like Napoleon before him, 
has become the public enemy, and that the nation has not 
only nothing to gain, but everything to lose from linking its 
destiny with that of the t;. r int. 
Before concluding I must say a word about a last class 
of advocates of the Stockholm Conference : those who would 
go there, not with the object of paving the way for a peace 
by compromise, but for some other reason, as, for example, 
in order to arraign the German Majority Socialists, or to 
lay the case for the \^'estern Allies before the Neutral Powers 
and Russia. Their intention is most laudable. But it is 
not b\- their intentions that political actions must be judged, 
but by the results to which they logically- lead. Unless I 
am veVy much mistaken, the results irom Stockholm would 
be deplorable. 
Is the atmosphere of a Peace Conference very favourable 
to an arraignment ? In oppositioij. to our friends who desire 
to proceed with the Conference, there would be in Sweden 
•the German and Central delegates, who have no intention 
of standing their trial, the Neutrals, who desire at all cost 
to prevent the prolongation of a war into which they are 
in danger of being drawn, and the Russians, who have de- 
clared most audibly that it was for the express purpose of 
effecting peace with despatch — and consequently, by com- 
promise— that' they were so insistent upon summoning the 
Conference. Moreover, in opposition to them would be 
an important section oi Western delegates, who would re- 
prei^ent, in numbers wholly disproportionate to their strength, 
the pacifist elements of France, England, Italy, America 
and other countries; What good could come of an arraign- 
ment of which the first etiect was to group all these dispaiate 
elements into an artificial coalition ? 
At Stockholm, as at all Conferences of this kind, it would 
not be the speeches which would have any efl'ect. The 
thing that matters is the temper created by the convocation 
itself, by , the indentions proclaimed by the organisers, and 
by the 'adherence won to their projects. Now, whether 
■we like it.qr.not, tlie Conference has been announced as a 
. Pea,ce Conference, ^nd it,>vas held up before the peoples as 
the sr/mbol, of the approEvching cessation of hostilities. To 
attend, itii^ to gjv,e eredeJWe to the idea that that peace is 
; possible, .and, to ^ousc;. dangerous hopes which would be 
■ disappointccl. ■•■-.<. ■ ■■ 
1-ook at > Iius.iia. : I know nothing is farther from the 
thoughts of the Soviet than a separate peace, than fraternisa- 
tion on the battle front, than abandoning positions before 
the enemy. N'e.vertheless the Russian soldiers who fought 
like lions' under the old regime and whose valour is above 
