12 
LAND & WATER 
September 27, 1917 
The Two Presidents: Poincare and Painleve 
By J. Coudurier de Ghassaigne 
THE situation in France is anything but clear, even to 
I-rriichmen used to the intricate.; of I'fench pohtics. 
1 sometimes wonder liow Enghsh people understand 
as well as thev do, the swing of the political pendulum 
in mv countrv. Perhaps under the present circumstances 
it mav interest them to take a peep behind the scenes at the 
complex mechahiim of our constitutional machine. 
First let me remind mv readers of the im.portant part 
plaved bv the President of the Republic during a Ministerial 
crisis, in time of peace as well as in war. The President is not 
as many imagine, a mere d-corative figure placed at the head 
of the State to register the decisions of Ministers or of Parlia- 
ment. His dutv is not only' to agree to what they decide; 
and to put his" signature to the most important measures, 
laws and decrees, though, of course, this secondary part of his 
functions takes up a' great deal of his time. But, before 
everything, the President embodies the permanency of the 
Executive Power. He it is who really has his hand on the 
helm of the good ship he has to steer through calm as well as 
through stormv political weather. 
\\'hen a Ministry resigns, he remains in power. The ex- 
Ministers simply carry on the every day business till their 
successors are appointed, but meanwhile. Parliament is only 
represented in the Executive by the President of the Republic. 
He it is who has to send for" the politician whom he is going 
to entrust with the task of forming the new Ministry. 
It is true that the Head of the State always consults the 
Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, and 
generally takes action after having come to an understanding 
with them. But there is nothing to prevent his making up 
his own mind and taking a decision contrary to the advice 
offered by the Presidents of the two Legislative Assemblies. 
This formality over, the President of the Republic then 
summons to the" Elysee the politician who for various reasons 
seems most likely to be acceptable to the majority of the two 
Chambers. He "is not. however, invariably able to gauge 
correctly the sentiments of Parliament. Only a few months 
before the war, M. Poincare asked M. Ribot to take the reins 
of Government, with the result that three days after he had 
accepted the task, he was roughly dismissed by the Chamber 
of Deputies at the very first sitting. Of course such a thing 
would be impossible in England on account of the Party 
system. In French politics, howevej, parliamentary majori- 
ties are not made up of panties but of group combinations. 
It is therefore perfectly possible that a majority should sud- 
denly withdraw its confidence in a Prime Minister and still, 
after a very slight shuffling of groups, be prepared to accept 
as his successor another star of the same political colour, 
lender these circumstances the task of the President of the 
Republic requires tact, perfect knowledge of currents and sub- 
currents, as well as great strength of character in 'crises. 
Forming a Cabinet 
An example of this occurred only the other day when .M. 
Poincare called upon M. Ribot to form a Cabinet, and the 
latter felt liitnself obliged to decline the honour, not because 
the Socialists refused to join hands with him, but because M. 
Painleve declined to enter a Ministry which did not contain 
representatives of the Socialist Party. M. Poincare then 
turned to M. Painleve.'who agreed to tr\' his luck with the 
help of the Socialists, but he too failed to achieve his object 
and proffered his resignation. But the President of the 
Republic, who evidently did not think the moment propitious 
for a Socialist government, insisted on M. Painleve con- 
tinuing his negotiations without the help of the Socialists. 
The consecpience was the formation of a Ministry very similar 
to that in which he had refused to serve under M. Ribot. And 
to-day the Painleve-Ribot Ministry — for M. Ribot remained 
in it as Minister of Foreign Affairs — reminds one of the 
situation created two years ago when a Briand-\"iviani Cabinet 
succeeded a ^■iviani-Briand Ministry. 
In short, as long as the French Parliament remains a con- 
gregation of small groups, the fonnation of a Ministry is more 
a question of persons than of principle. It is tberefore easy 
to understand that the President of the Republic — who is the 
maker of the Cabinet -plays through the President du 
Conseil (who is known in England, as Prime Minister) 
a most active part in all political evolutions, not only 
as the executor of the will of the Parliament, but also as 
the powerful instigator of all political changes. 
When a Ministry has received the approbation of the two 
Chambers, the role of the President of the Republic is far 
from ended. He it is who presides at the sittings of the 
Cabinet— that is at all the important sittings. Now and then 
Ministers may meet to discuss under the Chairmanship of the 
President du Conseil questions of secondary import . But 
v/henever there is to be what we might call a Grand Council, 
where vital decisions are to be. taken, the members of the 
Cabinet assemble at the Elysee under the presidency of M. 
Poincare. On these occasions he does not sit at the head 
of the long green table, facing the President du Conseil, 
simply to hear what the Ministers have to say. He takes on 
the contrary his full share in the discussion, sums up the 
delicate points and plays very much more the part of an Eng- 
lish Prime Minister than the President du Conseil himself, 
(who in English newspapers is always referred to astlie Prime 
Minister). Without making a further study of. the powers 
which the constitution confers upon the Head of the State,.! 
have said enough to show that he possesses the means Of 
making his influence felt in all decisions taken by the 
Prime Minister whom he has himself chosen. 
Definite Limitations 
There are however very definite limitations to hir, powers, 
especially when the President happens to be a man of such 
high moral standing as Poincare. It has been my privilege 
to have long private talks with him on matters relating to 
Home and F'oreign Affairs, and that up to a few months 
before the outbreak of war. What struck me most in these 
conversations was the extraordinarily impartial attitude of a 
man who possessed, as no other, profound knowledge of all 
political subjects. Here and there it was easy to see, when he 
analysed the situation, where his personal preferences would 
ha%'e led him had he been an ordinary citizen. F"c«- the 
chief among M. Poincare's great qualities are his perfect 
frankness, his innate honesty, and liis sound judgment 
which enables him to see things exactly as they are. But 
he is not a mere Member of Parliament, free to follow whatever 
course he deems wisest, even when the interests of his country 
are at stake. He is before everything the elect of Parliament 
and the faithful servant of the I'rench Constitution as it is, not 
as it might be. Though his quick legal mind realizes to an 
iota all the imperfections inseparable from any human system, 
the President of the Republic has not, as his real duty, to modify 
the laws of France, but to see that they are carried out to the 
best advantage. He is in fact the guardian of the Con- 
stitution, though he possesses the power to dissolve the 
Chamber of Deputies, with the consent of the Senate, and appeal 
to the people if in a moment of great emergency he dis- 
agrees with Parliament on an issue vital to the country. 
Such a situation has, however, only once occurred in the history 
of the third Republic, and it was fatal to Marshal ^IcMahon who 
then occupied the Presidential Chair. 
I cannot conceive the possibility of M. Poincare's taking 
any revolutionary step of that nature, and I am convinced 
that he would rather sacrifice his life than do violence — not 
to the letter — but even to the spirit of the law. Whether this 
extreme respect for the constitution is a good characteristic 
in a war-time President, must be left to the judgment of the 
future. 
M. Poincare's recent reference 'to the Almereyda scandal 
is an admirable illustration of the restrictions imposed upon 
his office. As long as a President du Conseil is in power, he 
and his colleagues alone are responsible for the government 
of the country. The President of the Republic can therefore 
only express publicly in a vague and general way his personal 
desires and opinions regarding the policy of the Ministry. 
]\I. Ribot trusted M. Malvy, who was answerable for the 
too lenient attitude of the police towards Almereyda and his 
associates. Under pressure of public opinion, M. Ribot was 
obliged to part company with his Minister of the Interior, and 
that long dela\^ed separation finally brought about the fall 
of !\I. Ribot 's government. This gave M. Poincare his con- 
stitutional opportunity of stating what the policy of the next 
government should be in the interests of the nation. It is 
quite evident that M. Ribot, when he accepted the task of 
reforming a Cabinet, and after him M. Painleve, had to satisfy 
the President of the Republic that the line of conduct to be 
adopted by the new Minister of the Interior should be very 
different from the course followed by the late one. We can 
rest assured that M. Poincare is as strongly anti-German and 
as determined an adversary of the secret German agents 
still lingering in France, asM. LconDaudet or M. Clemenceau. 
But his official character does not permit him to proclaim 
his opinions, or to enforce them, otherwise than within the 
rather narrow limits of his constitutional functions. 
It is thereafter the turn of the President du Conseil, whose 
dutv it is to put into execution the general policy upon which 
