October 4, iqij 
LAND & WATER 
The Political Factor 
In the opening of this article I spoke of the enemy's 
Strategic and material position, including his position in man- 
power, and mentioned the effect of all this under the qualifica- 
tion of politics apart. But to that enormous qualification 1 
nlust return. 
The enemy's waning strength, the certitude of his de- 
feat, the preponderance over him of his opponents — all these 
are what they have been described not only in these columns 
but by every competent authority for some time past. But 
such calculations take for granted the permanence of the 
political situation ; it is precisely upon the break-up of that 
political situation that the enemy counts to-day in an especial 
manner. 
He has counted upon it, of course, in general, and has 
worked towards it, ever since the Marne ; but since the 
Russian Revolution, and especially since the effects of that 
Revolution, in the military collapse of Russia during the pre- 
sent summer, he is dependent upon the, political factor for a 
measure of success such as last year he never hoped to attain, 
and the whole of his action, not excepting the campaign by 
sea, turns upon political calculations. 
Let us tabulate these to see them more clearly. 
(i) The enemy counts upon the divergence of aims between 
the various Western Allies aind in this divergence of aims 
nmst be included the dift'erence in national characters,, tradi- 
tions and experience. 
(2) He counts upon the lassitude, ignorance and confusion 
of the civilian population as regards the war, apart from 
other domestic difficulties. 
(3) He counts very much upon internal divisions, especially 
in highly industrialised countries and districts where the 
quarrel between the wage-earning workers and the Capitalist 
owners was already acute l)efore Prussia and her Allies chal- 
lenged Eiwope to war. 
These are^the three main divisions of his political calcula- 
tion — and it is a formidable one, full of menace to our future. 
The Russian Revolution has given it a character it never had 
before, for the Russian Revolution has shown every one of 
these three points in a high light. It has shown how different 
were the national traditions and ideals of the East from those 
of the West. It has shown what enormous effect lassitude, 
ignorance or ccnfusion can be upon the population at home, 
and it has shown wliat can be done by the enemy when ho 
works upon domestic hatreds and divisions. 
If we do not appreciate these three main engines which are 
calculated to counteract his desjwrate military situation, we 
shall not understand either why the enemy is still so confident 
or what good grounds of confidence he has. We ,shall fail, 
therefore, to master his policy. : 
(i) The divergence between the various Allies, even between 
the various Western Allies, is clear enough. It is first appa- 
rent in the fnatter of aims. The French, for instance, are 
fighting in an old quarrel of theirs and for the recovery of 
territory which had been taken by force, colonised by the 
enemy and erected by him into a formidable eaonomic sup- 
port of his military power. The English are fighting for moral 
and material things necessary to their existence ; the respect 
of neutral territory in Europe, particularly of the North 
Sea Coast ; the security of supply by sea, and the prevention 
of one Power's arising to mastery upon the Continent. The 
Italians upon their entry fought for strictiv natkjnal aims; 
the retention of lands which wore morally Italian, and the 
historic claim that the Adriatic should be Italian in control. 
The Americans, when they entered, entered because their 
sovereign rights had been directly challenged by the German 
claim to sink their neutral ships without warning and to mur- 
der American citizens at will. 
These differences are quite clear and on the surface, but 
if we are wise we will consider other differences far more 
important, which are of national tradition, experience, tem- 
perament and even morals, which are too often glossed over 
in the natural desire to avoid friction. 
It is a matter of life and death, for European civilisation 
at any rate, that the war should be won, and it will not lie 
won unless we resolve thes<' frictions or at any rate understand 
their quality. Even as I write. 1 find in a'paper which has 
reacheil me from America, a Pacifist organ appealing to the 
academic classes of the Eastern States, and professing sym- 
pathy with Western Europe--77?f New RepnUic^im 
astoriishing jjlea in favour of the (ierman Empire remaining, 
not only strong after the war, but in full possession of Alsace 
I-<irraine, with the exception of the district round Metz. 
I open an English paper and r.ad of the debates in tlu- French 
Parliament exactly as though it were an institution like the 
English Parliament, aristotTatic in origin and deep-rooted 
in the popular tradition of France, in<;tead nf its being the 
recent and exreedingly unp<jpular experiment which it is in 
that country. It is a little as though a Frenchman were 
to write of the London County Council twenty years ago, 
in the days of Mrs. Ormiston Chant, as the political soul of 
London. I open a French paper and 1 note the Labour 
Party taken as the representative of the mass of the English 
wage earners, and the absurd Pacifists of that party as in 
some way representative of the English workmen. 
These are but a few obvious examples of the differences 
between the various Allies. The fact that the right of re- 
prisal is beingclebated in this country at all, is another example. 
The fact that one of the Allies has sufiered invasion still an- 
other ; the fact that London is frequently raided from the 
air, while Paris is nearly immune ; the fact that the whole 
weight of the submarine campaign falls upon this country 
and is only indirectly felt in others ; the fact that Great 
Britain is almost entirely industrialised, while France and 
Italy are largely agricultural States ; the fact that Great 
Britain depends so largely upon direct taxation for financing 
the war, compared with the postponement by our Allies of 
this burden — these and one hundred other contrasting points 
will occur to the reader. The mar\^el is not that so general a 
congeries of nations mustering something like half the strength 
of the world against the other half, should display tle^se 
differences, the marvel is rather that the Prussianised Ger- 
man, bv his bestial actions, and proclaimed anarchy in morals, 
should have called, such an Alliance into existence. 
Civilian Feeling 
[2) The lassitude, ignorance or confusion of the civil 
population includes, not only the natural weakness conse- 
quent upon thfee years of war, nor the ignorance in which 
one population may stand of the lightness of its losses, com- 
pared with those of an Ally, but also the inability of great 
bodies of men to grasp the lessons of the past. \Ve repeat 
constantly (in all the Press which counts in th is coimtry) 
that this war is a war of life and death. It is not a rhetorical 
expression. It is an expres.sion strictly true. Those who 
know upon what the greatness of England has been founded 
and what her position has now been for over 200 years in the 
story of the world, know that a negotiated peace is the beginning 
of a rapid decline for F'ngland as certainly as they know 
the laws of the physical universe. The mass of the population, 
especially in a Parliamentary country, is not only ignorant of 
such a past and of its causes, but has been, as a rule, misled 
with regard to them. Its in.stincts are none the less sound, 
but thjy are instincts alone, and if forces in favour of the 
enemy (or of a negotiated peace, which is the same thing) 
are allowed to play upon the popular ignorance, the con- 
sequences may Ix^ fatal. It is at this disarray of the popular 
feeling that the enemy aims. The petty bom bardments of 
London certainly have no other object, and even the campaign 
against shipping by submarine and mine is now mainly 
directed with this object in view. None of the directors of 
(ierman policy can by this time believe that the destruction 
of shipping will decide the war, however grievous its effect 
upon our comfort and sense of security. What they do 
believe is that its continuance may so affect civil opinion as to 
make a successful prosecution of the war ultimately impos- 
sible. In this category of lassitude and confusion one may 
properly put the enemy's dependence upon international and 
cosmopolitan finance. Not that this part is confused or 
ignorant. It is, on the contrary, very well informed, cunning 
and acute. But its impatience with the continuation of the 
war works along the same lines as all other forms of im- 
patience and misconception and indifference upon the arms 
of Europe. — ^ 
(3) Lastly, the enemy counts upon civil differences in 
domestic events within each Country and particularly upon 
the difference between the possessors and the wag" earners 
in the industrialised countries and districts. He has had 
here some measure of success. He counts upon a much greater 
measure. It is interesting to see by what methods he has 
himself checked though not destroyed similar tendencies 
within his own boundaries, llniversal conscription without 
exemption or with exemptions in rotation is one of these 
methods, but the most powerful of all ha*; been his policy of 
interfering as little as possible with the domestic habits of 
the people. I think it may be justly said that during the 
whole war there has not been in the Central Empires any 
restriction that was not imposed with the direct object of 
winning the war, and which was not so clearly connected 
with that object as to be apparent to all. The same cannot 
be said of ourselves. 
This brief review of the political forces upon which the enemy 
(U'lxnds for arriving at his object of a negotiated peace, is 
no more than a summary of their names. It pretends to no 
analysis of their causes or tiieir working ; still less to any con- 
structive remedy for the evils they threaten. One can only 
