LAND & WATER 
October 18, 191^ 
throughout the nfgiit ana morning, and further action was, 
for the moment, impossible. „ , , ,.■ -^ 
It is clear that tlie weather conditions all further activity 
now in Flanders. We have reached the same time of year 
as that which imposed limits upon the battle of the Somme 
and for the same reason. The sun has no longer sufficient 
power to dry the ground even after moderate rain, and any- 
thing like really wet weather stops operations entirely. 
The Conditions of Victory— II 
I BEGAN this series of articles by noting that immediately 
upon the destruction of the enemy's offensive power in 
the West and his being thrown back upon an increasingly 
doubtful defensive, he had no chance of escape from ultimate 
defeat — in spite of the Russian collapse — save through some 
political manoeuvre. 
This political manoeuvre was the industrious propagation, 
first by his agents, next by his friends, and after that by their 
dupes, of three consecutive propositions. 
The first of these propositions was that the German people 
were not responsible for the war and its hitherto unknown 
atrocities : the character it has increasingly borne of breaking 
with every law, convention, and moral standard of civiliicd 
Europe. The war and its wholly novel abominations were 
due to a few wicked rulers from whom we had to free the 
innocent mass of the enemy. 
The two propositions following on this were, the second 
one, that the defeat of the Central Powers in the field was 
impossible and that therefore it was necessary to negotiate, 
and the third (to which these first two led up) that, as we had 
to negotiate at last, it would be well to lay down at once in 
detail the terms of a peace which the Allies could accept. 
I said that these three propositions, and especially their 
conclusion, were equivalent to a demand for parley ; that a 
demand for parley was a demand for truce ; and tliat a truce 
with an unbeaten enemy was the prelude to acknowledging 
his successful defence. I said, therefore, that what we had 
to do was to reject the whole scheme, after noting the false- 
hood of the arguments in its support, and to replace' it by 
considering our conditions — not of peace, but of victoiy. In 
other words, to consider what things were necessary to our 
future and to the stability of Europe as the fruits of our full 
military success : things which an unbeaten enemy will cer- 
tainly not give us, but which a beaten enemy will be compelled 
to give us. 
The first part of my task, then, is negative : I have to 
exhibit the falsehood of the arguments the enemy and his 
friends are using. After that only can I approach the positive 
part which is the statement of what the conditions of victory 
are. In this negative part I examine the triple proposition of 
the enemy and his friends. Last week I dealt with the first 
of his proposals. This week I will deal with the second, and 
the Week after with the third. 
Negotiation 
The second proposition put forward by the enemy's sup- 
porters and, for that matter, openly by his own statesmen and 
.soldiers, is the proposition that as a decision in the field is now 
impossible, there is nothing left but negotiation ; the mere 
prolonging of the struggle under such circumstances is a useless 
and terrible expenditure of life and subsistence, and threatens 
a common ruin to both parties. 
Eet us bring into relief the main fact about this proposition : 
it is advanced by the enemy. 
It originated with the enemy : first in a crowd of articles 
and suggestions which began to appear during the 'battle of 
the Somme, next in a definite and even urgent demand for 
peace which issued from Berlin in the second week of December 
1916, when the results of the Somme were fully known— 
but before the collapse of Russia. 
All that has followed since, whether from well-meaning 
neutrals or from men who had no nationality and to whom, 
therefore, the war was a meaningless tragedy, or from the 
direct agents of the enemy, has been but a development of 
the policy clearly originated in the summer of last year and 
publicly enunciated by the enemy himself at the ciid of last 
year's critical battle : A battle, be it remembered, which 
definiteh' proved to the enemy that his offensive power was 
at an end and even his defensive system doomed. 
If we do not bear in mind this capital fact that the sug- 
gestion of negotiation has come from the enemy we shall 
misunderstand the whole psychology of it. 
Of the various forces which were grouped for the mainte- 
nance of civilization against the Prussian menace of 1914, 
not one in the West lias made default. Of the forces that 
were grouped for the concjuest of Europe in 1914 all have made 
default. The Western Allies maintain their original position. 
Prussia and her allies are already giving way. That is the core 
of the whole matter. 
In July 1914 the attitude of the two sides was this : 
The Central Empires, organised under Prussia, proposed 
to do what they willed with the small nationalities of the 
Balkans, to control the route to the East through these, and, 
since the military power of France was their most serious 
opponent (though counting only a third of their numbers), 
they proposed early to destroy that military power in a brief 
and necessarily successful campaign. This done Prussia 
and her Allies would have been the unquestioned masters of 
Edrope. But there was more than this. It was oix-nly 
announced — and the announcement was carried out in prac- 
tice — that the old moral tradition of Europ)e, its conventions 
in war, the sanctity of neutral territory and the security of 
non-belligerents would be disregarded. We were told in so 
many words what countless writings and speeches had already 
led us to expect, that Prussia denied validity to tlie old inter- 
national morals of Europe and proposed to achieve hei 
aggrandisement by a contempt of them. 
When Great Britain entered the field, the military machine 
of the Central Powers was already well under way, no modifica- 
tion of its movements was then possible, and those who had 
deliberately challenged the civilization of Europe asserted 
(and believed) in spite of their evident annoyance at this 
accession of strength to their foe, that the rapidity and success 
of their overwhehning numerical power would decide the 
issue before blockade could come into play. As for a serious 
development of British military power by land, they did not 
consider it possible for one moment. 
There you have briefly stated the thesis of Prussia and her 
Allies in launching the war. Every other pronouncement 
than this has been an afterthought produced ultimately by 
the Mame. These afterthoughts have contradicted one 
another and have fluctuated back and forth with the fortune 
of arms. Tlie nearer defeat seemed the more generous or 
the more pitiful was the attitude of the original aggressors. 
Each accident postponing defeat led immediately to a different 
tone. 
Mastery of Europe 
The one thing that stands historically unassailable is the 
original motive and action of our enemies. They proposed to 
master Europe. They were certain of their power to do so 
and they affirmed in theory (and carried out in practice) 
the rapid achievement of victory by a contempt for alL the 
old traditions of Europe at war. There was no talk in those 
days, when the issue was clearly marked, of the war being 
an aggression on Prussia by England. That was merely an 
afterthought and a clumsy one. So far from its being true 
it is clear that the enemy believed up to the last moment 
that England would not enter the lists. There was no talk 
of the horrors of war. the pity of their continuance ; on the 
contrary they were proclaimed as a sort of good — because 
it was believed tliey would fall upon the opponents of Prussia. 
There was no talk of freedom of the seas or freedom of nations 
or races, or freedom of anything. There was a plain plan of 
conquest by methods admittedly devoid of morality. . 
On the other side there was an equallj' plain political 
thesis. Its base was the defence of all that had been known as 
European civilization. It stood for the maintenance of 
sovereign national rights, especially in the smaller sovereign 
States, for the observance of an accepted chivalry in war and 
for the saving of all our traditions. It was clear that the only 
means of doing this was to break the Prussian military ma- 
chine. In other words, to defeat it decisively in the field. 
Within the nations which successfully undertook this 
task were elements either favourable to the enemy or so igno- 
rant or so strangely enthusiastic that they did not under- 
stand the value of patriotism and the meaning of nationality. 
Those elements, from the beginning in France as in England, 
in Italy before she joined the war, as in the United States 
before that country entered, argued against the defence of 
Europe and in favour of yielding to the enemy. They were 
weakest in France because France was directly and physically 
menaced. They were strongest in the nations wlTj):h were 
either less directly menaced or stood out for some time from 
the struggle. We all know what those elements were. We 
all know who their leaders were. There has been no con- 
version and no change. Exactly the same people who talked 
Pacifist and internationalist nonsense, or who more soberly 
argued for the neutrality of their nations two years ago, are 
•jontinuing the work to-day. There has here been no 
