October 
25. 1917 
LAND & WATER 
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JS^eet 
The TvfOON SOUND 
The small craft got away to the north, and it is the mention 
nf this fact b\' both the Russians and the Germans which has 
-'ivcn an erroneous impression of what occurred, for the 
-cape of these sm.alliT vessels is alluded to in very vagrie and 
,cneral terms, such as " the remainder of the fleet," etc. • 
The fact that only the smaller vessels could have got away 
is clear enough from a glance at Sketch II, where it will be 
een that the northern approach to Moon Sound all the way 
uom the northern coast of Moon Island to the main land is 
>* blocked by a ridge, the western half of which is called the 
Kumorsky Reef, and the whole crescent of which forms a 
complete barrier against entry or exit In- the north, save 
for vessels drawing less than fifteen feet of water- indeed 
considerably less than tliat draft, for this amount of water is 
only found in very few variable points. 
ft is true that the level of the Baltic here rises slightly 
when there is a combination of strong westerly winds and of 
melting snow and ice inland, biit the present moment is a 
>ea.son of nearly the lowest water with easterly winds and the 
rivers low. Moreover, even when there is the greatest 
diftercnce of level, it hardly adds anotlier three feet. 
It is to be noted that the operation has taken place while 
there are still before the enemy several weeks of open 
water. The shores oi the Baltic here, and the Gulf of Riga in 
particular, freeze in a very changeable manner. The Irbcn 
Channel was open the whole winter during four of the eleven 
years 1893 to 1903, and though ice forms, of course, much 
earlier in the rivers and is discovered on the shores before it 
creejis outwards, it is a very earh" year, in which navigation is 
interrupted before winter has well set in. January to ]\Iarch 
is a sort of normal i)eriod of interruption, though the ice lias 
stopped na\-igation in the ports two months earlier and two 
months later than those normal dates in exceptional yeaas. 
The Zeppelin Raid 
The Zeppelin raid with its astonishing .sequel, hardly 
falls within this department of I^.anu & \V.\ter, but it is too 
remarkable a passage to leave quite uncommented. 
So far as the evidence stands at the moment of writing, 
it seems that eleven Zeppelins left (Germany on the Friday. 
Of these three got back hs the direct eastern route which all, 
obviously, must have been under orders to follow. But of 
the remaining eight, all were in some fashion damaged in 
various degrees or thrown out of their course or lowered 
by loss of gas, and were condemned to reach home as best 
they could after a bad deflection southwards. Of these 
eight three may have landed in Germany, with what losses 
we do not know. Vive are accounted for by the French 
observers : one captured entire, three brought down, and one 
blown out to sea over the Mediterranean, half wrecked. 
Though one has nothing but conjecture to guide one, the 
fust thing that will occur to anyone who considers the main 
facts is. that the fleet must in some way have got crippled — ■ 
or, at any rate that part of it which drifted over France. 
Whether it was crippled by gunftre in this country or, as 
has been suggested in some quarters, by unexpectedly severe 
frost suftered at a great height ajter engines had been stopped, 
or by both these agencies, or whether perhaps there may 
not have been added to such causes a violent northerly 
gale at the great heights in which these craft were operating, 
we have not yet been told. But it is entirely incredible that 
they merely lost their way. 
It is not incredible, but it is highly improbable that such a 
fleet should have any intention of travelling even over northern 
l-rance during daylight — and it was largely due to the fact 
that they were caught by daylight that the Zeppelins suffered 
so hea\ily. The one which had the worst luck was the one 
that came down at St. Clement, near Luneville, south of 
Nancy, quite close to the opposing lines. Those which were 
• accojihted for in the south must, in the nature of things, have 
been out of control and at the mercy of the northerly current. . 
Yet another drifted out to sea over Toulon at the end of the 
day, and apparently has been lost in the Mediterranean. 
But the most extraordinary part of the whole series, and 
that on which we shall most eagerly expect details, is the 
.capture of one of the Zeppelins intact with her crew unhurt 
apparently, and in full working order near the little watering 
place of Bourbonne on the high ground between Langres and 
the Upper Moselle V^alley. , 
There must be remembered in this connection a verj' striking 
point illustrative of more than one of tlie enemy's 'methods. 
The crew of this captured Zeppelin— L 49— used (we are told) 
parachutes. The crew of the Zeppelins, unlike the observers 
in a kite balloon, have not been, I believe, furnished with 
pafachutes before. Regulations of this severity work both 
ways. They tend to the conservation of material to the last 
moment, but they ^Iso tend to exasperation in a moment of 
crisis and, when the limit of endurance is reached, to ill judg- 
ment and perhaps to mutmy. The rule seems to have beta 
changed, perhaps, as a concession. 
The Conditions of Victory— III 
TIIF last and third part of the enemy's propaganda, 
to which the first two parts lead up, is the demand 
that the Allies should state specific terms of peace. 
The suggestion being that the enemy is too strong 
to be decisively defeated and that negcjtiation rinist be 
resorted to (a suggestion the falsity of which was 
shown here ast weel<) it is concluded that no reasonable 
man would deny the advantage of stating particular 
terms. 
Now even if all the rest of the enemy's propaganda were 
triie, even if the absurdit\- of an innocent (ierman people 
writhing under a hated tyranny, or the other flatly ctm- 
tradictory absurdity of an unconquerable (ierman people, 
were possible in the real world, this third contention for a 
d-tailed negotiation of peace before victory is utterly un- ■ 
tenable in the present circumstances. 
The main reason for this is the nature of the issue between 
the two camp-i : Its mignitude and its simplicity. If it 
b<; true that the enemy's armies are uuconi.iuerablc.then much 
the simplest thing is to admit defeat ; to say, "We intended to 
safeguard our future and that of Europe, We have failed in 
the attempt. We will stan«! back where we were before and 
in the futiue the struggle must be renewed." It is the strong- 
est and the Ix-st tiling for anyone to say who once desired 
victory but has come to Ix'lieve it impossible. 
Per-ionally. 1 do not believe that there are any men on the 
.\llied siile to-day who at once desire victory and believe it to 
be imiiossibie, 1 think that those who .ire talking of the impos- 
sibility of a decisive victory are men who desire to save 
<iermany from the moral consetpiences of her acts. But I 
say that if there are men who h(.)nestly desire %ictory and yet 
believe it impossible of achievement, then it is far the jjest thing 
for them to admit defeat. It was the attitude of the French 
l)ati-iots in 1871. They saii : " We are compelled by mere 
t<)rce to cede what the victor has no moral right to. We know 
that this thing is only a truce, and sooner or later the issue 
must l-)e fought out again. " 
To-day the issues are far greater than they wore in 1871. 
