LAND & WATER 
October 25, 1917 
Germany in the Baltic 
By L. Cope Goroford 
GERMANY, in attacking the islands lying to the 
north of the Gult of Riga, presumably reckoned 
upon the inaction of the Russian Baltic Fleet ; 
and if she did, she was justitied by the event. 
There are few instances in history of a squadron covering, 
without being attacked, the landing of troops on hostile 
territory within some twelve hours steaming of a powerful 
hostile fleet. Bv all the rules such an achievement should 
lie impossible ; Init the rules do not provide for'thc complete 
immobilisation, due to secular reasons, of the aforesaid fleet. 
It does not appear that the t'rerman force consisted of more 
than ouf battle squadron with a large number of light craft 
and auxiliaries ; a force with which the Russian Baltic Fleet 
should be able elfectualK' to deal. .\pavt from the small 
and mLscellaneous Russian squadron stationed in the Gulf of 
Riga, the Russian Baltic Fleet for practical inirposes did not 
exist. , • • , 
A little more than two years ago, and again in 1910 
the German Fleet attempted to force the Gulf of Riga and 
was beaten off with sonie loss. Presumably the Irben 
Channel, the Strait leading from the Baltic into the Gulf, was 
subsequently mined ; and if it was mined, either the mines 
must ha\c been allowed by Russian neglect to go adrift, or 
the (;eiman minesweepers must ha\e cleared them without 
interference by the Russians. 
Control of the Gulf 
The result of the German naval operation, so far, is that 
the Germans occupy the whole or nearly the whole of the 
three islands—Oesef, Moon, and Dago, making the northern 
barrier of the Gulf of Riga. From Oesel they can establish 
communication with the mainland across the narrow and 
shallow channels running on either side of Moon Island, 
and thence to Hapsal, which is railhead. According to both 
(ierman and Russian statements, that proportion of the 
Russian naval forces in the Gulf which has not been 
wrecked, sunk, or destroyed, has retreated northwards ; so 
that the (Germans now control all the waters and the coasts 
of the Gulf of Riga. 
Germany can now supply her army in this region by sea 
through tiie ports of Riga and Pernau, both of which are 
railheads, and both of which are set at the embouchure 
of rivers. \A'ithin the Gulf the German Fleet can ride 
secure. The Irben Channel can be shut against both ships and 
submarines ; and Moon Sound is not practicable for ships of 
deep draught, and can be blocked. Indeed the Russians 
claim to have sunk the battleship Slara for that purpose ; 
although in keeping the German light draft out of the Sound 
thev also kept out their own vessels, and so severed com- 
munications with the Gulf of Finland. In the winter, the 
Germans can keep clear with icebreakers waterways from the 
Baltic to the Rjga ports. 
J'iegarded as a/'naval operation, the capture and occupation 
of the water anii the littoral of the Gulf of Riga was com- 
pletely successful. The feeble resistance of the weak Russian 
forces was speedily overcome. Ckrmany has long since 
dominated the J.^altic, and her most recent cnterpiise extended 
that domination. She has gained a \ahiable naval base at 
Riga, and a le>s important but extremely useful base in the 
shallow harbo'ur of Peinau. Germany now holds the whole 
line of the cou ununicatioii between Kiel and the Riga ports. 
it is too mi ich the fashion in this country to underrate the 
achievements of Germany ; nor does the fact that in the case 
under consif icration Russia could have prevented the in- 
vasion, aftec t the result. So long as the Russian Baltic Fleet 
is paralysed, the Cierman pr)sition in the Gulf and in the 
Baltic is sec ure ; and should the Russian Fleet be restored to 
discipline .i nd become tit to fight, it will find it much harder to 
get GerinaD y out of a fine natural harbour than it would have 
been to stop her entrance into the Gulf. That Germany 
should hai-e won additional naval bases is far from satis- 
factory to.' tli.ls country ; whose difticulties chiefly arise from 
the fact tiiat; (Germany cannot be ejected from the naval 
bases she a Ire ady possesses. 
NeverthelejR, it is not to be forgotten that while the Russian 
Baltic 1-lect i;emains undefeated, the control of the Baltic 
exercised by ( ierniany is conditional. It is also true, in the 
abstract, that io long as the Briti.^h Fleet remains undefeated 
Germany e.xer rises such restricted action at sea as she can 
compass upon conditions which cannot be permanent. But 
as matters stai id, it does not appear that the argument is of 
immediate pra ictical application. Moreover, the converse 
aspect is equal ly true : so long as the German Fleet is un- 
defeated, so long can it control the Baltic and also exert 
what is called ^a covering influence over submarine and com- 
merce-raiding operations. And no one has yet explained how 
to defeat a fleet which obstinately remains behind land 
batteries and minefields. 
The most recent information indicates that' the Russian 
navalff)rces in the Gulf of Riga were taken by surprise, fought 
a confused and losing action in which a battleship and a 
destroj'er \,vere lost, and then retreated. The Russians 
estimate the German losses at two battleships, one cruiser, 
twelve torpedo boats, a tr^insport and some mine-sweepers, 
but adduce no evidence in support of their statement. The 
only German losses actually ascertained to have occurred 
during the attack consist of six or seven torpedo-boats. 
But a despatch received from Petrogracl on October 22ncl 
records an attack made upon the German Fleet by a British 
submarine, in which a German battleship may have been hit, 
and a transport is stated to have been put down. In brief, 
the only substantial damage inflicted upon the German 
squadron was the work of a British submarine. There is 
naturally some speculation in this country as to the possi- 
bility of British intervention in the Baltic ; but it is obvious 
that no information on the subject can be made public. It 
is a question involving considerations of high strategy', with 
which the War Staff at the .Admiralty is alone competent to deal. 
The extended control of the Baltic by Germany is likely to 
affect the position of I'inland, where German influence is 
very active. Sweden is also directly menaced. Geimany 
now exercises her control right up to the Aland Islands, at 
the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, a zone which includes all 
the important Swedish ])orts. So far as Sweden is concerned, 
she is now wholly dependent upon Germany for the use of her 
sea communications ; a humiliating and a dangerous situa- 
tion, the inevitable result of permitting German influence to 
dominate the Swedish Government. There can be no 
neutrality in this war. Every country must be for the enemy 
of civilisation, who has violated all international law, or 
against him. And those who, by reason of force, or fear, or 
commercial greed, are for Germany, will cither be put under 
the feet of Germany, or share in her punishment. 
There can be no peace in Europe nor any security at sea • 
so long as fiermany holds the Baltic. 
It is not the purpose of this article to treat of the military 
aspect of the German pccupation of the Riga district. What 
has happened is that the German Navy has forced the back- 
door into Russia. Rcval can now be attacked from the land- 
ward side, and Kronstadt no longer defends Petrograd. How 
the German army propose to use their advantages is another 
question.^ 
The Political Aspect 
There remains the political aspect of the affair to be con- 
sidered. It has been said, with truth, that the Riga ex- 
pedition was partly inspired by the necessity of employing a 
mutinous navy. That the mutiny occurred is certain ; 
that it was much more serious than the German Minister of 
Marine would admit is certain ; and that it was due. not 
chiefly to the infection of J^ussian revolutionary ideas, as 
Admiral von Capelle told an incredulous Reichstag, but to the 
drafting of the sailors into the army, to short rations, and to 
monotonous work under remorseless discipline, is also certain. 
The date upon which the mutiny broke out has not been 
stated ; but the date of its announcement by the Minister of 
Marine coincided with the eve of the departure of the squadron 
to Riga. At that time, according to the Russian statements, 
the sailors of the Russian Baltic Fleet were diverting them- 
selves by holding revolutionary meetings at Helsingfors, and 
very likely they were hailing "the adhesion of their German 
brothers to the' sacred cause. The Soviet sent to them " an 
appeal " : but it was too late : and the next thing the Russian 
Fleet knew, the Gernian guns were bombarding Arensbourg. 
In war, what is required is iK>t an appeal but an order. A 
society in which there is no one either to give an order or to 
obey it, is ready meat for the destroyer. 
It is also doubtless true tliat after the mutiny it was 
.necessary to restore in Germany ' the highly dilapidated 
reputation of the Imperial Cicrnian Navy ; and to that end, 
an easy success in the Riga direction was indicated. The 
success" has been obtained, and probably the reputation has 
been mended. All these things worked together in a 
combination, together with the raid in the North Sea of 
October ijtli, and the attacks upon this country from the air. 
But the fact that an enterprise was partly inspired by 
