Movember i, 1917 
of the Russian armies. I took very numerous prisoners. 1 
inflicted very heavy casualties. 
'■ As a result, I obtained — though I certainly did npt expect 
it— a certain pohtical effect which ha all 'th^ value of a 
military decision. The Russian State fell to pieces. What 
had been its armies could no longer be used. The event 
was of the same military value as though 1 had succeeded in 
1915. and had destroyed in battle the organisation of the 
Russian forces. I had caused them, though onl\- indirectU 
and after a political fashion, to dissolve. This lesson I there- 
fore draw : Blows sufficiently heav>- delivered against any 
people" whose political tenacity is uncertain will result in the 
internal or domestic collapse of that people and the corre- 
sponding dissolution of their armies. The policy has succeeded 
against what was once the Russian Empire. It shall be 
directed against what is still the Italian Kingdom." 
It is to be presumed or hoped that the enemy's calcula- 
tion here is false. The political unity of Italy is recent. 
But the temper of an old civilisation threatened by barbarism 
is not a temper which the German understands as he under- 
stands that of the Russian peasant and town worker. The 
extreme of peril hardly dissolves a country the inliabitants of 
which have long and great traditions far superior to those of 
the in\ader. It is on the contrary, as a rule, peril in highly 
civilised countries which acts as the cement of the defence, even 
thougli that defence prove ultimately incapable of success. 
But whether the enemy be wh»ng or right (and we who know 
our ancient civilisation better than he does, think him wrong) 
that is certainly the enemy's calculation at the present 
nioment. He is calculating on an ultimate count out of 
Italy in the forces opposed ' to him, and he make; of 
it in his mind something parallel to his former good fortune 
in the matter of Russia. 
Let us clearly giasp all these points. Upon them the 
last phase of the war will turn, and with it the future of our 
race. , 
With so much said let us tiun to the details of this great 
action. 
Let me first premise that we have no accurate infoimation 
upon the numbers either 'of gims ■»r of men wliich the enemy 
has concentrated for his present efiort in the foot lulls of the 
Julian Alps. There has not been tim"^ or opportunity 
during such a disaster for a full identification, and the vaeue 
LAND & WATER 
10 Mies' 
estimates sent us are too imperfect to merit analysis. We 
must confine ourselves to the very meagre geographical 
details available at the moment of writing. 
The story, as based upon the slight evidence so far avail- 
able, would seem to be somewhat as follows : ' 
On Wednesday last, October 24th, after a preliminary 
bombardment of great violence, the main infantry attack of 
the enemy was launched upon a front of about 20 .miles, 
extending from the northern edge of the Bainsizza Plateau 
northward, say, from St. Lucia, south of Tolmino to the 
Rombon ^Mountain above Plezzo. The enemy had a bridge- 
head over the Isonzo at St. Lucia, an important meeting of 
road and river valley just south of Tolmino. He used this 
bridgehead and here pierced the Italian line first, though 
almost simultaneously he secured his crossing twenty miles 
to the north of Plezzo, just under the mountain just men- 
tioned called Rombon, which dominates the little enclosed 
Plain of Plezzo and the Isonzo valley by just under 6,000, 
feet. 
There is no doubt that the Italian front in these two points 
gave way on Wednesday last. The Une having given way at 
the two river crossings at either end of its length, the centre 
was lost and everywhere the foremost positions of the Italian 
second army were crushed in against the river and destroyed. 
The enemy claimed by the Wednesday evening no less than 
10,000 prisoners. 
We were told at the time that initial successes of this kind 
could always be gained by any determined modern offensive, 
if it chose to suffer the necessary expense, and with this com- 
ment opinion was apparently lulled. But the comment was 
inaccurate and the suggestion false, for much worse news was 
to come. , 
On the next day, Thursday last, the 25th, retirement from 
the recently conquered Bainsizza Plateau was imposed upon 
the forces of our Allies by the advance of the enemy on the 
north outflanking them. Though a simultaneous attack 
was taking place to the southern end of the Itahan line in front 
of Gorizia and upon the Carso, this was probably only with the 
idea of containing the Italian forces there. Meanwhile in the 
north the overwlielming success of the enemy's surprise con- 
tinued. He crossed the Isonzo everywhere, the thrust in the 
early morning of that Thursday up the mountain slopes 
beyond, swamping the defence. He seized the summits 
and already cn'erlooked the plains. 
There was a general retirement of what was left of the Italian 
second army on to the frontier line all the way from Auzza to 
the ^fonte Maggiore, and by the e\ening of that day, Thursday,' 
the enemy claimed 30,000 prisoners and 300 guns. 
On h'riday the movement continued and the news became 
\'ery grave indeed. The summit of the Monte Matajur 
had already been captured with the other summits on the 
Thursday in the morning. 
Now the Monte Matajur witli its twin peak the Monte 
Mia overlooks the Coporetto-Cividalc road which runs between 
them by a low pass. By Friday he commanded that road 
and was pouring down it towards the plains. It is not yet clear 
at what exact moment the heads of the enemy columns 
succeeded in debouching upon the plain — an iijct which w-as 
the consummation of the whole affair. He was, at any rate' 
the master of the watershedby that Friday night, and at that 
