10 
LAISU & WATER 
Movember i, 1917 
Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhinegold— II 
By Philippe Millet 
I ENDEAVOURED to show in my last article (Land 
lS; Water, October 25th) that the huge iron deposits of 
Lorraine, a sort of modern Rhinegold, are the steppmg- 
stones of Prussian Imperialism. Two-thirds of the iron 
ore which Germajiy extracted from her soil before the war 
came from Lorraine ; the same mines have provided during the 
war (with Luxemburg) 80 per cent, of the ore used for manu- 
facturing German guns and munitions. There is, therefore, 
no exaggeration in saying that Prussia will keep her claws 
uncut cither for waging a new war or for competition in the 
industrial field, as long as she will not have been compelled to 
surrender Alsace and Lorraine. 
" It is all very well," some may say, " to give back to 
France the treasure Prussia stole in 1871, but can we be sure 
that by giving back to France that ominous possession we 
will not endanger the future peace of the world ? An eyi) 
spell has evidently been cast upon Lorraine, over which 
Germany and France have now been fighting for centuries. 
Suppose France attempts to starve Germany industrially 
by refusing to let her have a share in the treasure, is there no 
practical certainty that Germany will be more or less com- 
pelled to resort again to all sorts of tricks, including wa.r, in 
order to wring the Lorraine ore from her old enemy ?" 
These are perfectly legitimate questions. My answer 
is that by enforcing a certain economic policy, the Allies 
have the means of removing the curse attached to the wealth 
of Lorraine. Roughly speaking, this policy ought to consist 
both in allowing Germany a fair share in the ore extracted 
from the soil of Lorraine and in opening Lorraine to the 
whole world. Moreover, such a plan is commendable equally 
from the point of view of French interest and of British 
tradition. 
Looking first at the matter from a purely French stand- 
point, the danger is not so much that France might 
be induced to starve Germany of the Lorraine ore as that, 
unless she takes certain steps, the possession of Lorraine may 
reduce her to a state of economic dependency in regard to 
Germany. The reason for this is that you cannot manufactiu-e 
iron and steel without coal. Now the position of France a^- 
regards coal was already a difficult one before the war, as 
out of about 80 million tons of coal she consumed every year, 
she had to import 21 from abroad, including ten from Great 
Britain and seven from Germany. Once Lorraine is again 
French, the coal problem will be more critical still. Of 
course, France may make a better use of some of her natural 
resources, such as water-power. The coal deposits of the 
Sarre valley will also somewhat relieve the pressure if France 
recovers her frontier of 1814. Taking all this into account, 
it remains, however, that an enormous increase in the output 
of iron ore will necessarily' correspond with an enhanced 
demand for coal. According to one of the best French experts, 
M. de Launay, France may have to import from Germany, 
instead of seven million tons a year, not less than 22 million 
tons of coal. 
In order to grasp the significance of this apparently harmless 
figure, let me quote again part of the secret memorandum 
which the German manufacturers submitted to the German 
( ancellor on May 20th, 1915 : 
Already, to-day, as the prohibition of the exportation of 
coal made by the English on May 15th proves again, 
coal is one of the most decisive means for exerting political 
influence. The industrial neutral States are compelled to 
submit to those of the belligerents who can pro\-ide their 
supply of coal. We cannot do it sufficiently at present, and 
we are compelled to resort to the production of Belgian coal 
in order not to allow our neutral neighbours to completely 
fall under the dependency of England, (the italics are mine) 
There is evidently some unconscious humour in such a 
statement. So far as Lorraine is concerned, the German 
manufacturers have been kind enough to give us in time a 
useful warning. Supposing Lorraine remains entirely de- 
pendent on Germany after this war for its coal supply, what 
would be the consequences ? In the first place, the monopoly 
enjoyed in that vital part of France by German coal-owners 
wouid enable them to exert over the whole of the French 
metallurgy what they call " a political influence." 
Fortunately, there is one way out of the dilemma. Up 
t6 now, Lorraine, owing to the cunning policy of Prussia, has 
been secluded from the rest of the world. British coal could 
not reach it owing to the cost of transportation. Things 
would, however, be very different if Lorraine were connected/ 
with the open sea by mea ns of convenient waterways. Two 
measures are necessary for that object. The rivers Moselle 
and the Sarre must first be deepened from the industrial 
region of Lorraine down to the Rhine : an easy undertaking, 
the aggregate cost of which would not, according to German 
calculations, go beyond the trifling sum of 67 million marks. 
The second measure would be of a diplomatic nature, and 
would consist in making the Rhine a free waterway for the 
ships of all nations. Once those two things were done, it 
would become possible for a British barge to take a load of 
coal from Newcastle to Thionville and come home with a 
corresponding load of Lorraine ore. The spell would then 
be broken. The Westphalian manufacturers would still 
buy a good deal of French ore in exchange for their coal and 
coke. They would cease, however, to enjoy a dangerous 
monopoly. A kind of industrial balance would be created 
for the common benefit of France's Allies and friends as well 
as for her own. 
A Free Rhine 
There is no doubt that France intends following such a 
course. Already before 1870-she had started canalising the 
Moselle, and it was not her fault if Prussia did not abide by 
the clause inserted in the Treaty of Frankfort by which she 
undertook to proceed with that canalisation on German 
territory. Moreover, although the industrial problem of 
Lorraine has been much discussed during this war, there has 
not been one voice raised in France against the resumption of 
the old French pol icy. Suppose even the free navigation on the 
Rhine cannot be enforced in the peace treaty, the opening of 
Lorraine will be undertaken in another direction, by means of * 
canals dug across the north of France. Politically as well as 
industrially, France's obvious interest is to free the Lorraine 
ore from the German bondage by making it accessible to other 
nations and, before all, to Great Britain. 
But not the least interesting feature of this economic plan 
is that it is in close agreement with one of Great Britain's 
own traditions. Very few people seem to be aware that it was 
England who first raised the question of free navigation on 
the Rhine. The matter was debated in 1815 at the Congress 
of Vienna. Curiously enough, while the French delegate, 
the Duke of Dalberg, and the Prussian delegate, Baron von 
Humboldt united their efforts in obscuring the issue, an amend- 
ment was drafted on February i8th, 1815, by Lord Clancarty, 
the British delegate, with the object of making it plain that 
henceforth an equal treatment on the Rhine was to be granted 
to all nations, and not only to neighbouring nations. The 
amendment was defeated. In spite of that, England's in- 
terpretation of the Vienna Treaty was^that the Rhine was a 
free European waterway. Holland having in 1819 put high 
customs duties on the Waal, a diplomatic controversy was 
raised by England at the Vienna Congress in 1822 and went on 
for years, Prussia being of course most hypocritical. 
The question is : Will England be now as indifferent to 
the question of the Rhine as she v^as a century ago ? 
From the mere point of view of the Lorraine problem, this 
would be surprising. It can scarcely be disputed that one of 
the main causes of the war in which so many Britons have 
laid down their lives, is to be found in the industrial condition 
on the left bank of the Rhine. I hope I have proved that in 
order to do away with the future causes of friction between 
Germany and France, the best way would be to give to all 
nations free access to the iron deposits which will be soon 
restored to the French but which Germany will not cease to 
long for. The navigation of the Rhine is therefore more 
important than ever to England as well as to France. 
It may be said in conclusion that the industrial side of the 
Alsace-Lorraine problem affords the clearest possible illustra- 
tion of what the economic policy of the Allies ought to be in 
general. Many people who hacl never so much as read the 
ifamous resolutions voted by the Paris Conference in 1916, 
seem to have been for a time under the impression that the 
Allies, and more especially France, intended to wage a per- 
manent economic war against Germany. As a matter of fact, 
no sensible man has ever contemplated starving out Germany 
after this war, the only object of the Paris Conference having 
been to prevent Germany from resorting again to her methods 
of aggressive industrial imperialism. The same principles 
hold good for the Lorraine question. It would be mere 
folly on the part of France to decide that, once peace is declared, 
she will abstain from selling to Germany a single ton of ore 
or to buy from her a single ton of coal. On the other hand, 
it wouldfbe equally unreasonable to allow French metallurgy to 
be so closely tied up to the Westphalian coal owner that the 
iron deposits of Lorraine would be only nominally free from 
the Prussian yoi^e. A solution must be found which will 
enable France to prevent Prussia, if need be, from piling up 
again ammunition in view of ''the next war." That solution 
must have an international basis. 
