LAND & WATER 
The Tagliamento 
By Hilaire Belloc 
November 8, 19 17 
CRUCIALLY important as the Italian situation 
is, there is very Httle to say about it in the way 
ot reasonable comment, both because it is still 
so tragically simple and because the information we 
have upon it is so meagre. The essential thing for British' 
journalism as a whole at this moment is to insist upon the 
extreme gravity of the crisis and to make opinion face facts — 
if indeed that can be done. But this duty can be fulfilled in 
few sentences. There is no need for piling up rhetoric or 
for repetition. 
As to a retrospect upon what has iiajipencd, a fuller des- 
cription made possible by fuller news with which it would 
have been interesting to have begun this week's article, we arc 
unfortunately debarred from it by a continued lack of infor- 
mation. Sucli stones as have conie through ha\e hardly 
any militarv- evidence about them. They are mere descrip- 
tions of a hurried retirement and tell us nothing of causes or 
manoeuvres. If we put together all the really military evidence 
available we get sometliing like this : 
The enemy concentrated a certain (unknown) number of 
extra divisions, a very great (but unknown) number of ex'tra 
guns upon the northern part of the Isonzo front, that is in the 
mountains, against tlie Second Italian Army, which lield the 
line from North of Gorizia to the neighbourhood of the 
Predil Pass. These new divisions, some few of which were 
Germans, but most of which were Austro-Hungarians, were 
taken mainly from the Russian front or were formed of men 
taken from the divisions hitherto standing on the Russian 
front — at any rate the concentration was clearly made possible 
Ijy the view the enemy now takes of the Russian front. And 
if this were trui* of the concentration in men, it is still more 
true of the concentration in guns- wliich was decisive. 
Wliat that concentration was we simply do not know. 
The Press for some reason or other hrst obviously exaggerated 
it and. then as suddenly minimised it. But those who may 
be too liastily prepared to accept the smaller figures now 
suggested siiould reiuember that we have no real evidence 
upon the matter. There was no proper identification of 
cnemv forces before the attack began on the Isonzo front — 
that is quite clear. It is equally clear that the Russian front 
cannot now any longer send us accurate news of what is 
happening in and behind the enemy's lines opposing it. 
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