Movember 8, 1917 
LAND & WATER 
At any rate, whatever wa^ the concentration in men on the 
Upper Isonzo, there was a great concentration in guns, and 
these in their turn must mainly have come from the East, 
where in the enemy's judgment they were no longer needed. 
After a very heavy but short preliminary bombardment the 
attack was launched in the small hours of \\ednesday morning, 
October 24th, three blows being delivered by three picked 
bodies of two divisions each — exactly assat Verdun. All 
these si.x divisions were German. It is perhap the fact that the 
spear heads to the attack consisted of these six divisions that 
has led to the idea that only six extra (ierman divisions were 
present. The three points of attack were, leading from south 
to north: (i) That launched imm the bridgehead of St. 
Lucia, just south of Tolmeno, which bridgehead over the river 
the Austrians had consi.-tently held throughout the recent 
operations. At this point there is ample supply behind the 
enemy down the Baca valley, which has an excellent main 
road and a railway, and a second road coming in froni Idria. 
(2) The second atta.ck was opposite ("aporetto in the very 
heart of the Isonzo gorge, and was delivered with the object of 
establishing a bridge there, because Caporetto is the door to 
the only easy pass tlu-ough the mountains to the Italian Plain. 
(3) The third attack took place at Plezzo also with two 
divisions, and took place there because Plezzo is the first stop 
north of Caporetto, where you get elbow room in the shape 
of a plain down which the mountains recede from the river. 
Of these three attacks that from St. Lucia was the decisive 
one, corresponding to the launching two divisions against 
Douaumont in the \'erdun business. It cut off the second 
army from the third and at once threatened Caporetto and 
made the crossing there possible, for the enemy moved north- 
word from St. Lucia up the river bank. TJie twin attack 
corresponding to that from St. Lucia was the attack at Plezzo ; 
Caporetto, tlie third and central point, was but the conse- 
quence of the other two. l-'rom Plezzo in the north and St. 
Lucia in the south Caporetto was threatened, and a contem- 
poraneous direct attack on it rushed the mouth of the pass. 
The next task of the enemy was to master the heights 
immediately above the Isonijo to the west, dominating the 
pass to the plains. The long spur running down the Monte 
Maggiore called the Stol, and the great mass of the Mattajur 
are of the same height within 160 feet (that height about 
5,000 feet above the river), and stand like guards above 
the Isonzo and the Caporettit-Cividale Road. They were 
mastered 28 hours after the first blow had fallen. That is, 
in the early morning after daybreak of Thursday the 25th, 
and after that the succe.ss was complete. The centre of the 
Italian second army was thoroughly l)roken aiid this centre 
corresponded t<> the easy road through the mountains to the 
Plain, the first town on the edge of which is Ci\idale. 
This sweeping through the Second Army involved immediate^- 
retirement of the Third Army to the south. The remnants of 
the Second Army, the Headquarters Staff, and all its machinery 
situated at Udine : the Third Army as yet intact between 
Gorizia and the Sea, fell back upon the line of theTagliamento. 
There are two permanent established avenues of retirement 
through the I'riuli Plain. Kacli is marked by a great high • 
road ; each is marked by a railway, antl each has a permanent 
bridge across the Tagliamento. The first is the avenue from 
I'dine to Pordenone ; the second is the avenue from Mon- 
falcone to Portogruaro. For the withdrawal of such an 
immense numl)er of men. such an exittuity of communications, 
especially in the matter of bridges, was a great drawback. 
For between the old front and the Tagliamento (a distance of 
from 20 to 30 miles, according to the point from which the 
retreat of each unit began) there are a number of parallel 
streams cutting the roads and adding to the difficulties of , 
retirement. It is true that apart from these main roads and 
railways there are a number of country by-roads and that 
temporary briiiges must (one hopes) have l)een established 
across the Tagliamento itself and tlie smaller streams parallel 
to it to the east. Hut the main of the wheeled traffic, all the 
heavy guns, and pretty well all the petrol traffic must have 
gone by the two roads and the two railways. 
The northern or Pordenone road crosses the Tagliamento 
by the long wo(jden bridge Napoleon established, and this 
bridge is called from the name of the nearest village (two or 
three miles off) the Bridge of Codroipo. To the south of it 
an equally long railway viaduct leads from one bank to the 
other of the enormously broad and usually three-quarter 
dry bed of the Tagliamento. The southern road and railway 
crosses the Lower Tagliamento at the point of Latisana, a 
village standing upon the eastern bank. 
When the retreat of the Third Army (still intact) began, 
the advanced bodies of the enemy were at the same distance 
from the crossings of the Tagliamento as was the main bulk of 
the Third Army. It was tlie obvious maureiuvre of the enemy 
to wheel round southward, that is to the left, and cutoff the 
Third Army if he could, before it had made good its escape 
by the bridge of Latisana ; and for three critical days, during 
which we heard not a word from either side upon this essential 
matter, the thing hung in the balance. It seemed from the map 
even chances either way. But in the event those chances 
went, upon the whole, against the enemy. Not that the Third 
Army got away intact ; the last divisions were cut off and it 
lost a very large proportion of its guns ; 60,000 men and no less 
than 500 pieces fell into the enemy's hands. By the fifth 
day enough of the remnant of the Second and of the bulk of 
.the Third Armies, formerly constituting the Isonzo front, 
liad got away behind the Tagliamento to re-form a line while 
reinhjrcement was coming up from behind, and while the 
enemy, who had ])ushed forward advanced units at great speed, 
was more slowly bringing up his main forces and his heavy 
material. When the full tale of liis captures was announced 
I>y the enemy at this close of the first phase in the new Italian 
business, tlie figures he gave were 200,000 njen and no leSs 
than 1,800 guns. 
The Tagliamento is, as was pointed out in these columns 
last week, an insufficient militarv' obstacle. It fills with 
water only after heavy rains or during the thaws of the 
snows in the mountains, and all its middle and upper course it is 
no more than a very broad torrent bed "cut up" (as the name 
suggests-) into a network of tiny shallow rills. It so happened, 
however, that during the retreat of our Allies there fell for 
36 hours continuous and heavy rain and the whole bed of the 
river was filled with a flooding torrent. We cannot expect 
it to last long, and the true defence of the Tagliamento 
line will lie, not in its value as an obstacle, but in the number 
and ((uality of the troops which will hold the long prepared 
trenches upon its eastern bank. , 
It is clear from the map that the Tagliamento line can 
easily Ix" turned from the north. But what has not been per- 
haps sufficiently emphasised is the advantage the enemy here 
has through his main railway across the Pontebba Pass. If, 
in the Italian retirement, there was time for a proper destruc- 
tion of works upon this mountain line, these may take some 
few days to repair. But we may take it that eitlier immediate- 
ly or in a siiort time this railway can amply supply the enemy 
in the lower foothills of the Alps u])on the Upper Tagliamento, 
that is in the region of Tolmezzo, \'enzone and Gemona. 
Where the valley of the Fella falls into the Tagliamento there 
is an open space quite large enough for the manoeuvring of 
considerable troops and a blow struck there successfully, or 
just on the edge of the foothills where the railway crosses 
the river, would turn the Tagliamento line. Now if the 
Tagliamento line is lost—and for an army pressed hard after 
a heavy blow, it is an insufficient obstacle to defend— there 
is no really good short and strong natural line to hold till one 
reaches the .\dige — the historic barrier of the Italian plain 
against the north-east. But the line of the-Adige uncovers 
Venice— and we are in the fourth year of the war. The line 
of the Piave is in its upper part a mere torrent, and in its 
whole contour lengthy and unsuitable. Of course trenches 
can l)e dug anywhere, but so far as natural obstructions are 
concerned, the Piave is a bad line. 
There is no need to say more. - There lies before the Allies, 
before Western civilisation and its fortunes, a more severe 
ordeal than any it has yet had to face. To face it the civilian 
populations of all the Allied nations will need to call upon 
all their tenacity, and above all upon all their clearness of 
vision- -and the test may be upon us very soon, because 
there may be restored in the Venetian plain the changing 
and rapidly decisive factors of a war of movement. 
That. other milttary newfi of the week consists in the slight 
