lO 
LAND & WATER 
November 8, 1917 
Minister. It was undoubtedly a considerable improvement 
on their predecessors. But the rising tide, influenced by the 
revolution in Russia and America's entr\-in the war, was too 
strong. The Social Democrat leader Brantmg raised the 
constitutional question, demanding extension of the franchise 
to thelUpper Chamber, which would break down thc.donuna- 
tion of the Conservatives there and thus introduce Parha- 
mentary Government. Signs of unrest appeared m many 
places, mainly on account of the food policy ; large masses 
of people demonstrated threateningly outside the Parliament 
and the Castle in Stockholm ; there was even serious collision 
between them and the pohce and mihtary. In several garri- 
sons there were signs of disaffection, and worse things might 
have happened but for Branting's assurance that order would 
be maintained if provocatorv' mihtary measures were 
not taken and the demonstrators justifying the trust Brantmg 
had put in them. The new Government, however, refused 
the demand for constitutional reform, but the Premier 
referred to the approaching General Election as the best way 
for the country to decide. 
The main points in the Democratic Party's election pro- 
gramme were the demand for franchise extension as a necessary 
preliminary to the institution of democratic Government, 
resting on "the majority will of the people, and condemnation 
of the Hammarskjold' trade policy and general conduct of 
State afitairs with its appea,rance of partiahty towards the 
different groups of belligerents. The extreme section of 
the Conservatives, those who had been called pronounced 
" Pro-Germans," and who had supported the " Activists,'" 
raised the cry of danger to neutrality, should the Left and 
particularly Branting and his party get into power, as 
they would then drag Sweden into the war on the Entente 
side and submit to Us extreme blockade demands. 
But the opinions of the electorate were too firmly held to 
be greatly influenced by these scares. The great bulk of the 
population had never "any real leaning towards Germany. 
It was only the position within the State machinery of a small 
section, its aggressive methods and the initial force of the 
German propaganda and the Russian menace which made 
it outwardly appear at first as if there was a strong Pro- 
German opinion in Sweden. Even in the first months of the 
war there was a bitter social struggle between ' Tro-Ententists" 
and " Pro-Germans." A large portion of the press has con- 
stantly worked against German influences, and papers like 
Socialdemokraten have been accused of extreme Pro- 
Entente leanings. 
The result of the elections was never in doubt. The 
Luxbnrg revelations added fire to popular resentment, but 
they did not much influence the voting, as this was already 
completed in many divisions. It should be emphasised that 
the English Press has not done justice to the deep indignation 
in Sweden at the disclosure of German cyplier messages 
being sent through a Swedish Legation. The only real defence 
was that the practice had grown up gradually an4 without 
suspicion from small beginnings, and the Foreign Minister 
and the Government were by public opinion freed from any 
knowledge of the real nature and extent the practice had 
assumed. It was, however, their duty to know, as they 
were responsible, and in face of this they were further strongly 
attacked for lacking a clear conception of the gravity and 
the consequences of the matter, manifested in casuistic ex- 
planations, instead of an open and frank statement. 
The result of the General Election was : Social Democrats, 
86 ; Liberals, 62 ; Conservatives, 58 ; Extreme Socialists, 12 ; 
two new Peasant Groups, 12. The state of Parties before 
the Election was : Conservatives, 86 ; Social Democrats, 
72 ; Liberals, 57 ; Extreme Socialists, 15. The Parties of 
the Left thus obtained a clear majority even in the com- 
bined voting of both Clmmbers, which is necessary for certain 
important decisions. 
As a consequence the Swartz Government resigned, despite 
attempts from the Reactionaries to inveigle the Crown again 
into party strife. This Government received the testimony 
from their opponents that they had done their best to 
correct the faults of the Hammarskjold policy, but at the 
same time it was claimed that the Foreign Minister, Lindman, 
could not possibly retain a post in which he had been formally 
responsible for the Luxburg telegrams, which had so seriously 
compromised Sweden. 
The King attempted to form a Coalition Government with 
th? view of maintaining a united front externally and of re- 
establishing the party truce. The plan received sympathy 
from all Parties, but it fell through because the Conservatives 
would not risk their existence as a Party by acceding to the 
demand for immediate reform of the franchise. 
{To he continued.) 
The Power of the People 
By L. P. Jacks 
IN what does the " power of the people " consist and how 
can we ascertain whether it is on the increase or on 
the wane ? 
We might begin with statistics of population and wealtli. 
But these by themselves prove nothing. A community may 
increase in population and yet become degenerate ; it may in- 
crease in wealth and become corrupt. As everybody knows 
the Roman Empire was losing power at the very time when it 
was increasing in population and in wealth. It will be agreed 
that we must look for other signs. 
Shall we fall back then upon success in war and take that as 
our test ? But this again proves nothing, or nothing to the pur- 
pose. To begin with, the '" power " to which conquest bears 
>vitness is power of a special kind which may co-exist with 
marked weakness in otiier directions ; and is hardly what wc 
have in mind when the power of the people is in question. 
But waiving that, success in war does not prove that even the 
special kind of power which war requires is on the increase. 
It might be that this power was declining in all the nations 
together, but declining less rapidly in the nation which con- 
quers than in the others. To beat your enemies in war it is not 
necessary that you should increase in warlike power ; it is 
enough if you decrease less rapidly than they. 
Let us try for another test. What shall we say to the ex- 
tension of the franchise ? That people, we might argue, is 
growing in power which is giving to its members a larger share 
in the business of government, the greater the number of per- 
sons who possess a vote the greater will be the power of the 
people. This at first sight looks more promising ; but un- 
fortunately the promise is damped by further consideration. 
What looks promising is that the people, all of whom we will 
assume now possess the vote, have the power to get what thev 
want. What damps the promise is that the people seldoiii 
know what they want. Shall we keep Mesopotamia or siiall 
we give it up ? Some of us are for the one, some for the other. 
Shall we establish Home Rule or trj' something else ? Some 
of us are for the one, some for the "other. Consequently the 
people break into parties or factions, and instead of con- 
centrating their power on a prompt settlement of Ireland ur 
Mesopotamia, waste it in a war of minds which goes on for a half 
century and generates so much bad temper that the ques- 
tions at issue become almost insoluble. Is that a sign of 
power ? 
But we are not yet at the end of our tether. Instead of 
thinking of the questions on which the people seem unable 
to make up their mind let us turn to those which by one means 
or another do get themselves settled. Let us judge by accom- 
plished results, by the legislation actually turned out, by the 
elaboration and the efficiency of the government machinery, 
of one kind or another, which an enfranchised people sets up 
for the purpose of defending its house and keeping the in- 
mates in order. 
There are the Army and Navy, equipped with all that science 
and skill can devise. There are the Constitution, the lawrs, 
the rules of Parliamentary Procedure, the Courts of Justice, 
the jails, the police. Behold this vast organisation, and as it 
develops and extends and imposes its rules on ever widening 
circles of the normal life may we not say that the people, 
whose will it represents, is growing in power ? 
At last, then, we seem to have discovered a sound test by 
applying which we can ascertain whether the power of the 
people is increasing or the reverse. The test is organisation, 
as revealed by the laws enacted and enforced- 
But even this test is not infallible. Unless the greatest 
care is used in its application it may lead to mischievous con- 
clusions, and has in fact done so already to an extent which is 
alarming. It may give us an inflated notion of the power of 
the people. And it may blind us to their weakness. 
We must ask not merely how much organisation there is, but 
what is its purpose, what is it for ? Suppose that the greater 
part consists of laws and rules for compelling people to do 
what they ought to do for themselvef; without compulsion — 
for example, keeping their promises, or providing for their old 
age, or educating their children, or behaving themselves 
decently in the streets. Should we not now begin to draw 
conclusions contrary to those to which our first impressions 
led us ? Should we not say that all this governmental 
machinery which scenis at first sight to speak of nothing but 
