Jnnuarj- 31, igiS 
LAND & WATER 
sn far as tlip first main aim of the raid was concernefl. But 
Irom this point on, things went aUogether wrong. An hour 
after giving up the attack on the monitors. Tigress and 
Lizard saw a large explosion " abreast of Breslau's after 
funnel." Two or three minutes later more e.xplosions took 
place and ten minutes later she sank. In the account pub- 
lished on the 22nd the Secretary of the Admiralty said that 
Rreslan was forced into one of our mine-fields. The fuller 
storj' says nothing about mine-fields, or of Breslau having 
been intentionaHy driven into one. Neither Breslau nor 
Goeben could have suspected a mine-field, for the later account 
tells us that on seeing Breslau sink, Goeben turned and circled 
round her once and then continued on her southerly course. 
Either Goeben must have made a very large'circle, or the mine- 
field must have been a very small one, or finally Goeben must 
have been extraordinarily lucky in not sharing Breslau's 
fate then and there. 
That both these ships should have struck mines in the 
course of the same adventure, opens up an interesting question. 
It has, I see, been taken for granted by several of those who 
liave discussed this raid, that the location of our mine-field 
must have been perfectly well known to the Turks, if only 
because mine-fields are distinctly visible to aircraft in the clear 
and well-illumined waters of the eastern Mediterranean. But 
is not this far too sweeping an assumption ? It will be 
remembered, for instance, that when the British and French 
battleships were sunk in the last attack on the Narrows forts, 
it was confidently asserted that they had all been sunk by 
oscillating mines that had been drifted down by the current. 
It was never asserted by anyone that these mines could be 
seen, or their presence in any way detected. It seems to 
me quite possible that there may be parts of the sea bottom 
of a colour that, if mine-fields are laid on it, will reveal their 
presence to overhead observers, and other parts, where the pre- 
sence of mines could be completely camouflaged. If this is 
so, then the enemy, finding some minefields, would naturally 
assume that there were no others. His aircraft, in short, 
might have been his undoing. 
However this may be, the idea that either Breslau could 
have been -" forced " into a mine-field by destroyers, she 
knowing tliat the mine-field was there, or that Goeben, 
threatened by aircraft, would have preferred the minefield 
as the lesser danger, seems to be quite untenable. This is 
not to say that Goeben was not forced to turn, for the final 
account distinctly states that she was, and there is no reason 
to doubt the accuracy of this view. But I think this must be 
taken to mean that she was forced to desist in the search for a 
second objective. She might well ha\e been content to 
balance the loss of Breslau against the sinking of Raglan 
and il/28, together with such sundr\' damage as might have 
been effected by the general bombardment administered to 
Imbros. 
There is, I think, another and a very strong reason for 
supposing that the Germans simply did not know of the 
existence of the mine-fields into whicli first Goeben and then 
Breslau ran, and it is that the Turkish destroyers did not 
take any part in the operations until an hour and a half after 
the main purpose of the raid had been accomplished. Had 
the presence of mine -fields been suspected anywhere near 
the course which Goeben and Breslau had to steer, either going 
to or returning from Imbros, the destroyers surely would have 
been sent ahead to sweep a channel. That they did not 
come out until an hour and a half afterwards seems to point 
to their presence being an afterthought. They were, no 
doubt, in readiness, perhaps waiting some little way up the 
Straits, and left to meet the returning victors in response to 
\vireless orders from the battle cruiser. Note that after 
Breslau was sunk, they still did not accompany Goeben, but 
when attacked by Lizard and Tigress, retreated incontinently 
to the rendezvous from which they had come. The conclusion 
is irresistible that this raid succeeded on all the points on 
which it was possible to get reliable information, and broke 
down at the point either at which no information was obtain- 
able at all, or at which such information as was got was mis- 
leading. 
Some of my confreres, I note, quote the fate of the two ex- 
X.erman ships as a warning to those who seem for ever to be 
* rging that the Grand Flpet should rush through the German 
mine-fields, bombard the German ports, and smash the German 
fleet by a coup de main. So far I have not been so fortunatt; 
as to run across any such heroic recommendations as these 
nor, if indeed they exist, should 1 have thought that there 
was the slightest danger of their being taken seriously, either 
by politicians impatient of results or by seamen anxious for 
action. It is surely by this time perfectly well imderstood 
that a sea-going fleet is built only for fighting other sea-going 
fleets, and could not be adapted to inshore fighting. For in 
such fighting two forms of attack are possible to the enemy 
which cannot be made in the open sea. The first, of course, 
is attack bv prepared mine-fields and the second, gunfire from 
invulnerable piarrnrms oy guns susceptible of far more accurate 
employment than are those which are mounted in ships. 
The essence of the kind of force needed for engaging shore 
ilefences and for survi\ing tlie perils which mines and sub- 
marines threaten in narrow channels or in shallow waters, 
has on several occasions been alluded to in these columns 
and need not he repeated now. 
Value of Monitors 
What would, however, be of great interest would be some 
definite information as to what this episode teaches us of the 
fighting value of monitors of the Raglan class. Of the value 
of the American 14-inch rifle there is, of course, no doubt at 
all, if we assume it to be rightly aimed and controlled. But 
the control of guns in a small monitor, which is not par- 
ticularly seaworthy and which in many conditions of wind and 
weather cannot keep a course for more than a minute or two 
at a time, presents difficulties much greater than the same 
problem in battleships. With everything in the monitor's 
favour then, she would not be likely to make so many hits 
per gun per minute as a battleship would make with equal 
artillery in similar conditions. A broadside of 10 guns in a 
sea-going ship would be expected therefore to make more 
than five times as many hits in any given time as the guns 
in a monitor. If, as I have suggested, Raglan was unable to 
open fire at all, the events of January 20th would necessarily 
throw no light on her fighting capacity whatever. But it 
should throw some light on her capacity to stand punishment, 
and if these monitors were built to engage either battleships 
or sea-coast forts, it is to be presumed that a certain capacity 
to stand punishment must have been contemplated. For 
in either event her opponent must have been expected to 
command the higher probability of more rapid hitting, so 
that unless the monitor could put up with a good many hits 
before being out of action, the chance of her damaging her 
enemy and hence being of any fighting value, must be slender 
indeed. .All we arc told is, that Raglan was " heavily " hit. 
That might mean half a broadside—or five broadsides. If 
one ii-inch shell sufficed to knock her out, then five would be 
verj- " heavy " hitting. 
The question is interesting because, while we have often 
heard of monitors being employed against Zeebrugge and 
other positions on the Belgian coast, the sinking of no one of 
them has yet been reported, nor with the exception of 
a small monitor .sunk by enemy submarine whilst co-operating 
with the army in Palestine have we ever learned of any one 
of the ships of this class even receiving a casualty in action. 
Have none ever been so exposed that they could be hit ? 
Or being hit, have they received the blows of the enemy 
without damage to themselves ? What was the difference 
between the conditions in which they had previously figured 
and those which were so disastrous for them last Sunday 
week ? It is obvious that an examination of the data of the 
fight at Imbros should" throw a very valuable light on the 
wisdom of the policy that gave these novel — but untried 
craft — to the British navy, at a time when the dangers of the 
submarine campaign seemed to call for nothing but con- 
centration upon the production of destroyers. 
An additional week's return of losses inflicted by sub- 
marine will be in the reader's hands on the day that this 
paper is published. Until this return is given to the public 
we know practically nothing of how that lamentable cam- 
paign goes on, although this week we have, perhaps by chance, 
been informed that a 13,000-ton Cunard finer has been tor- 
pedoed, but not sunk, off the Irish coast. The returns of last 
Thursday and of the Thursday before, were certainly of a 
nature to make us hope, at last, that the menace had been 
considerably diminished. But the American Secretary' for 
War somewliat startled the world on Monday morning by 
warning us not to be deceived by any so fond illusions. He 
will have it the enemy has called in his submarines and is 
refitting them for a great and, perhaps, final offensive. In 
May there was a weekly average of 66 ships that either fell 
to submarines and mines or were attacked unsuccessfully by 
submarines. The average for the last two weeks is less than 
a seventh of this. There was recently a report from Berne 
that 23 submarines due home in German ports in the month 
of December, failed to give any account of themselves But 
from official sources we have heard nothing which justifies 
our accepting such pleasant news as reliable. It has not yet 
been claimed by us that we are sinking submarines faster than 
the enemy can build them. If so wide and determined an 
offensive is in preparation, are we equipped to meet it ? The 
.\dmiralt\- one presumes has at least as much information as 
Mr. Baker, and possibly more. The question is, whether even 
in the past 12 months adequate preparations have been made. 
The event will show. 
Arthur Pollen 
