January 17, 1918 
LAND & WATER 
for the most obvious and elementary points : area, distribu- 
tion of population, and relation of the whole to the German 
position in the west. 
Our second step must be to explain how this distribution of 
population arose ; that is, the economic exploitation so fully 
developed within Gqrmany and Boliemia and the potential 
economic exploitation which awaits German capital and 
enterprise in the nesv lands to the east. 
We must next consider how the complex of religions 
in these regions afiects the problem. Next, we must turn 
to the historical causes which have produced this state of 
affairs before the war and tempted the Pnissian reigning house 
to the adventure in which it has, for the moment, succeeded. 
Each aspect of the enquiry will show us, 1 think, more and 
more clearly, that either that adventure is to be destroyed by 
the force of the older civilisation in arms, or that it will, if it 
be established, permanently be the master of that old civilisa- 
tion. 
This war has frequently been called a war of life and death 
for natiofts. The term has seemed exaggerated to those who 
naturally (and all cultivated men must have great sympathy 
with them) re-act against the vulgarity of certain sections 
of the Press and politicians. None the less the phrase 
though violent is ultimately true. Tlie struggle is indeed a 
struggle of life and death, in the sense that the vigorous im- 
l)ression of deser\<xi superiority which the older Western 
civilisation ga\'e to all Europe, the culture which it suj)portetl , 
the diversity which it nourished, will never stand against a 
great and upon the whole homogeneous power erected upon 
such a scale in the midst of Europe. Though les^ than us it 
would master us and put ;us into a position of inferiority. 
Though incapable of building as we have built, or thinking as 
we have thought, it would be capable of reducing us to a 
permanent jealous and insecure defensive wherein all that wc 
care for and that makes us ourselves would gradually dis- 
appear. No instrument theoretically forbidding so great a 
political organisation to exercise armed power is of the least 
value. If that organism already exists, is allowed to continue 
in existence, to confirm itself, and to define itself further, to 
take root, and to acquire a sohd historical substance, it would 
give the tone to all Europe, and what that tone is we know. 
The intense local patriotisms which were the life of all Europe 
will have no place in such a scheme : the tradition of the past 
\\'ill be cut and the greater will be governed by the less. 
Which last is in morals almost the definition of decay. 
[To be conlinitcd). 
Captbre of Mount Tomba 
OF military movement during the week there has been 
none sa\e a step upon the part of the Austrians north of 
Mount Tomba, wliich has a certain local importance, 
though it is of no great moment in the war as a whole. 
It will be remembered that the French a few weeks ago 
M ized the trenches on the crest of the Mount Tomba from the 
Austrians by one of those rapid co-ordinated pieces of work of 
which the model was ranged in the October of igiO in front 
of Verdun, \\'hen Douaumout and its strip of territory were 
t'-taken. 
In this comparatively small action on Moimt Tomba, 
iiers fell into French hands at a trifling cost, and 
ii.d object (which was reached) was the Austrian 
trencli system overlooking the crest of the hill. We have 
just liiid the sequel U> that which was proved to be an 
Austrian retirement of about a mile down the northern slopes 
and their consequent abandonment of observation over the 
plain. It is possible, or probable, that this move indicates an 
abandonment for the moment, and perhaps throughout the 
winter season-pof any attempt to force the Itahanline at this 
|X)int. For many weeks past — indeed, for nearly two months 
— the crest of Mount Tomba in the hands of the enemy has 
been their principal mark of success. The snow was very late 
in falling. A great concentration of guns and mimitions was 
therefore rendered possible in the.se hills, and a successful 
advance towards the plain. The only part of the last rampart 
which the enemy reached, however, the only point from which 
he could overlook the cities and plain of Venetia, was the crest 
of Mount Tomba. The Allies had been thrown back on to the 
soutliem slopes and the enemy's observation posts on a clear 
day commanded everything below them up to the Adriatic 
itself. 
'This advantage they would appear to have relinquished in 
the course of the last few days imder the pressure of the 
Irench occupation of the summit. 
A Correction 
T note from several letters that have reached me, uh tm i»iiy 
for correcting a false impression given about a month ago by a 
misprint in these colunms. This misprint consisted in the 
word " upon " appearing in place of the word " over," which 
last, as the context should have shown, was the right word. I 
said theft (as I rejnat now) that the enemy had through the 
events in Russia a superiority in men and material for tin- 
moment (JVC)' the West. That is, the number of pieces at his 
disjiosal probably, and the nimiber of men at his disposal 
certainly — the orgunised forces and the recruiting field behind 
them — IS larger than the corresjxmding strength of the Western 
European Powers. To these will ultimately be added the 
effort of America. But for the moment the difference exists 
and, that is why, in a word, we are on the defensive. To say 
that the enemy had a present superiority in numbers, upon 
what is famiharly called " chc Western Front," that is, the 
line from Alsace to Nieuport, would be nonsense. The West 
in one sense means the Western Powers as a whole ; the West 
in the other sense means the Anglo-French hne between the 
Adriatic and the North Sea. And so far. as that line is con- 
cerned, the enemy has not a superiority in men or in guns for 
the moment. He has probably no more than 157 divisions 
in France and Belgium, and whatever he has altogether 
between the Stelvio Pass and the mouth of the Piave dons not 
make up fm flw l>iij margin betw, .n i.i^ nrn=p,it strength in 
France and Belgium, and that of his opponents. But what 
he has got is. short of novel events in Russia, on which one 
cannot prophesy, biit which do not seem likely, a great 
reservoir of men to draw upon for use ultimately against the 
three Western AlUcs. 
In this connection there is a point which ought to have been 
fauly clear, and which it is remarkable to find as confused as 
it is in much contemporary writing : The advantage to the 
enemy of this Eastern man-power being released need not antl 
probably will not take the form of many divisions being 
transfencd bodily from East to. West. The lonn it will 
probably take is the very great extension of what has already 
begun, to wit, the use of the Eastern front as a rest camp and 
the pei-petual filling of gaps on the West with that proportion 
of the Eastern forces which are of young and good material. 
The ultimate effect in mere numbers is exactly the saaic whether 
you replace losses by such recruitment (which could not have 
taken place had Russia still been fighting) or whether you 
move units as a whole. The choice between one and the other 
system is entirely a matter of system, not of ultimate numerical 
strength ; it is a choice between keeping your cistern full from 
a tap and keeping it full from a bucket. The result in mere 
man-power is the same in either case. 
So much for the numerical position. The situation of 
Northern Russia, which you may call at will a collapse or a 
treason or an anarchy or a defeat (in mihtary terminology 
the last tenn is certainly the accurate one) the elimination of 
South Russia — whether you call it g, betrayal or a secession 
or what you will — has provided the enemy with anything from 
three-quarters of a million to a million men for ultimate use 
upon the West, which he would not have had if the Russian 
State were still standing and were still fighting. Meanwhile, 
of course, the enemy's annual recruitment of about 500,000 
men yearly in the German Empire and more than 300,000 
in the Austro-Hungarian continues — Class 1920 has been 
called up in both those coimtries. ; And, the annual 
recruitment of Bulgaria certainly, less certainly of the Turkish 
Empire, is more than equivalent to the recniiting power we 
possess for replacement against it in the Eastern fields of the 
war. 
But the numerical calculation thus established (and it 
is exceedingly simple and should be obvious to everyone) is 
only one factor in a very complex problem. There are four 
others which posterity will be able to analyse at leisure and 
which we either cannot or must not analyse at all sufficiently 
for any practical judgment. 
Those four remaining factors are : (i) The rate at which 
America can supply men and material, including the power 
to maintain tonnage for the same; (2) The progress pf the 
submarine campaign against our communications andciviUan 
supply, coupled with the rate of building against it ; (3) The 
technical advantages of the Western Allies compared with 
those of the Central Empires during the next few months — 
that is, the rate at which they may devise and train upon either 
side; and (4) most important of all : The internal conditions of 
the enemy's tciTitory as connected not only with the material 
efficiency of his armies, but tivilian moral and all the rest of it. 
The first three cannot be discussed. Upon the 4th, which 
may be discussed, we have data quite insuflicient for a con- 
clusive judgment. Of its nature this judgment would depend 
upon something imponderable. Even if wc knew every- 
thing about the enemy's material condition and its pro- 
bable exasperation in the next few months, we should still 
