January lo, 191b 
LAND & WATER 
cited wlierc the unlucky peasant w lio fell into the power 
of the hardest of hard taskmasters,^ -.the usurer, .Wjis, 
compcHSjd to return in labour— money he had none, ' 
and the shortness of his crop had caused his trouble 
— a hundred or even two hundred per cent, on the \'alue of 
the money or seed corn ad\-anced by the lender. Frequently 
the Jew is spoken of as the chief agent in these nefarious 
transactions. As Karl Marx said to mc in iSSiwhen talking 
on this very question : " The Jew creeps into the pores of 
an agricultural society." But the Jew is not so bad as the 
native Ku.ssian at this busin(.'ss. The Russian usurer is 
generallv a peasant who, having by some means enriched him- 
self, lends at luige interest to his less fortunate fellows, and, 
by working \\ith them, as he commonly dt)es, screws 
the very last ounce of labour out of his debtors in return 
for his advances. Usury is undoubtedly qne great curse of 
agricultural Russia. It is, as said, mainly' due to the action 
of the Government : and, if the system in vogue prior to tlie 
rexolution continues, not even the creation of good country 
roads would ixrmanently relieve the agriculturists from the 
fe^arful disabilities under which they suffer. The situation 
was getting worse and worse. It can only be relieved by a 
complete change. 
For, not only are the peasants cultivating their land imder 
almost every conceivable economic disadvantage, but there 
is a huge syi>hon at work all the time, which drains away 
such wealth as exists in the country and renders the continuous 
impoverishment of infinitely the greatest national asset, the 
^land, inevitable. 
Russia is terribly indebted for loans and advances to Western 
liurope. She has to pay away interest and profit each year 
upon these loans and investments. Discussing the cpiestion 
before the war with a well-known authority on Russian 
affairs, who is not a Socialist, we agreed the total amount thus 
annually due and payable at /i5,ooo,ooo. F'or this amount 
of wealth so exported from Russia, to meet her c.X'ternal 
liabilities, tli:rc is no commercial rclurn vhatcrcr. And this 
annual charge is almost entirely paid in agricultural produce. 
Thus, putting the total of Russian exports roughly at 
/,'l6o,ooo,ooo, calculated at the Russian ports and the Russian 
frontier, more than one-third of this export, consisting, chieily 
of agricultural produce, is, from the economic standpoint, 
sent out of the country for nothing — this from a country 
that is getting poorer all the time. It is as if the richest top 
layers of the soil were stripped off year by year and transported 
to Western Europe. It is an unendurable tribute which Russia 
can no longer pay. This was in ])rocess of verification before 
the war. The payments of Russia lo her creditors and in- 
^•estors necessarily appear in the comparison between exports 
iUid imports. They can be arrived at, as a whole, in no other 
way. Well, these figures show that, in the four years prior 
to 191.;, Russia had fallen behind in her payments to Western 
Europe to the extent of tens of millions sterling.which had been 
met by financial legerdemain. 
Such a .state of things cannot possibly go on. Russia's 
indebtedness to the West has been greatly increased by the war. 
]>ut if she could not j)ay interest on the amounts previously 
due without utter and hopeless ruin, clearh'. anv addition 'to 
her burden cannot ])ossibly btt borne. It is of the \-crv great- 
est importance that we should look all these facts in-tlie-rfacc. 
The small farmer and ])etty bourgeoisie of France pspeeially: 
should at once taki' account of the unsatisfactory iiature of 
•he Russian securities, with which they have been encumbered 
by the financiers, greatly to the profit of these latter. Xo 
doubt, according to the ordinary money cant of the day, it 
would be monstrous that Russia should not pav her foreign 
creditors interest on moneys honestly lent at moderate in- 
terest to construct her railways and otherwise to " develop " 
her \ast territory. But when it is clearh" shown that such a 
drain of her Wealth to the West, not only spells ruin to her 
agriculture but cannot be allowed to continue bv any patriotic' 
Russian — how then ? 
We arc in the habit of speaking of the enormous resources 
of Russia, of the vast mineral and forest wealth of Russia, of 
Russia as the granary of Europe and so on. It is high time 
that we should clear our minds of illusions. Russia is a 
country of immense possibilities. Sibe>ria has actually in- 
creased in population far more rapid!}- than Canada. But 
Russia requires that her latent wealth should be sj'stematic- 
all\- developed by national industry. 
This will take time and effort. At present she is economically 
and financially in desperate case. Her peasantry refuse to 
l>art with their grain becaiise they are unable to obtain in 
exchange for it. with the greatly depreciated rouble, the 
goods tliey require for tlieir day to day life, which were 
formerly hawked around by German pedlars. Her town popu- 
lations arc at their wits' end because many of them arc un- 
able to get sufticient food and fuel, owing to the disorganisa- 
tion of the railways. The return of the soldiers from-the 
front threatens little .short of destruction. I'nless the Constit- 
uent Assembly, when it meets, at once takes the land question 
in hand, the peasants will settle itin their own way. Under 
such circumstances it behoves the statesmen, financiers and 
merchants of France and England to meet for serious and 
unprejudiced conference, in order that they mav be able to 
co-operate with their respective Governments in a sound 
economic policy. But it is the duty of the French and 
English peoples, likewise, to take care that the real interests of 
the Russian peasants and townsfolk shall not be imperilled by 
capitalist exactions or Bolshevik anarch}-. 
A Franco-British Economic Alliance 
By J. Coudurier de Chassaigne 
WH.\T could be of greater interest at flu- moment 
than to study, if only superficially, the mechanism 
which has preserved the French and British 
j)eopIes from hunger, and from the miser\- 
which wouUl have been inevitable without the ceaseless 
energx' of the Ministers of the two countries ? It is to 
this policy of brotherly union between France and Britain 
tor . collecting- all o\er the world, and distributing 
l)etween ourselves and our friends the things which 
are essential to our very life, that we owe the certitude 
of being able to tight till victory is ours. To this work, 
achieved in the sole interest of the community, we are, each 
and all, in duty bound to <ollaborate, by submitting loyally 
to the regulations and restrictions which the various con- 
trollers ,of foodstuffs and law materials decree for our own 
good. And I am convinced that I am not unduly optimistic 
in stating that the results of the economic policy of the 
.\llies constitute a victory which compensates for inevitable 
weakness in other domains, for the simple, reason that free 
nations, un]irepared fijr war, cannot realise in such a siiort 
space of time that military unity which has proved the 
best asset of the Central Empires. 
. . M. Clementel. the l-'rench Minister of Commerce, more than 
any, is responsible for this fortunate state of things. His 
success proves first the importance of a political axiom 
too long ignored by France. It is that continuity in office is 
I'.ssential if practical and lasting benefits are to be obtained 
therefrom. 
In F'fance the Third Re)niblic inauguiated a system of 
ti-niporary Ministries which is the condenmation of the French 
))olitical system. Happily for us, however, we rc;ilised that 
we could not i;o nn ejianginc,' our Mini^trr for I'oreiKii Affair- 
everv six months, as we did our Prime Minisft'r. Tluis, 
when M. Delcasse came to the Ouai d'Orsay on June iSth, 
i.S().S, he remained at the head of our diplomacy till German 
intrigues drove him from oflice on June dth, 1905. , 
This question of continuity is especially important when 
one has to deal with the- Anglo-Saxon races. They like or 
('.islike a man personally ; they trust or distrust him quite 
apart from his intelligence or from his political views, J- or- 
tunately for I'rance, for England and, for Immanity, two 
French Ministers of Foreign .\ffairs, M. Delcasse and M. 
Piclion, each a convinced partisan of the Entente Cordiale, 
remained in office for a long period of years. The same 
jHinciple of continuity whe.;i applied to diplomatic, agents 
abroad has done marvels. M. Paul Camb'bn, who for 
nearly twcnt\- years has enjoyed the full confidence of two 
Kings of Englaj,id and of successive ,Britis-h Go\-ernments, 
is a living proof of what the personal touch can do in bringing 
about and maintaining good relations between two free nations. 
The same might be said of tlu' Frencli Ambassador in Washing- 
ton, M. Jusserand, who for, so many years has been tlie link 
l)ct\vcen the two great Republics. 
To-day M. Clementel jprovides another confirmation of 
the vital importance of this principle of continuity. He knows 
personally all his British colleagues. Liberals as well as Con- 
servatives. They know him too ; .they appreciate his per- 
sonal gifts, his charming manners, his common sense,, his 
tenacity and his absolute loyalty. I'hey consider him a good 
fellow, a real friend, in fact one of themselves. It matters 
little to them what ^I. Clemeiitel's views may be on the home 
])olitics of his own c<jinitry. It is the man himself they have 
learnt to admire. In one word, English statesmen of all 
unitir^ who have lieen m contact with M. Clementel -tru&t 
