January 105 1 918 
LAND & WATER 
protagonists in defence of Europe, did not go to \var for some 
international theory dear to internationaf anarchists, fThey. 
did not go to war for Karl Marx's bo6k Das Kapital, strll less 
for the private interests of a batch of adventurers cjrajvn 
from all corners of the earth.. They did not go to \\ar to 
help a clique of men with no country in their attack on the 
religion of their hosts, nor did they go to war to support 
such men against the peasantry whom they detest and 
whose influence in the future government of the place thev 
seek to eliminate. They went tu war to defend the public 
law of Europe, whicli had been broken, and to save the national 
traditions of Europe from a threat morally intolerable but im- 
fortunatelv physically strong. They went to war to preserve 
the future" existence "and power of their own states. If the 
townsfolk in one part of what was once the Russian Empire 
choose to accept such masters, that is no concern of ours. 
An Independent Poland 
Ihe third point iu tlie si)eech wliich is specially noticeable 
is the declaration that Poland must be independent. Here 
again the thing said implies more than the actual words used. 
An independent Poland " comprising all genuiriel'y Polish 
•lemcnts " would, were it brought into being, Ix; the death 
i)iow of Prussian ambition and of the wholf Prussian theor\- of 
aggression. Prussia reposes historically upon the attempted 
murder of Poland, and Poland .-remember, readies the sea to 
the North at Dantzig, and comes within a startlingly' short 
distance of Berlin towards the West. Hut -the restoration of 
Poland though a moral necessity to the cause of the .\llies 
and to the restoration of a decent Europe, that is, to the defeat 
of Prussia, is, as has been pointed out in these columns more 
than once, rather a te,st than an aim. If we win, of course 
SVC shall restore Polan<l. Not to do so would Ix; an ele- 
mentary folly. But ithd/ur u-c c.\x do so or not, is the real 
point :' it is the unfaihng mark of victory or defeat. In 
other words, we cannot pretend to ha\-e achie\«l our ends in 
this war, to ha\-e o,rTi\'ed at a stable victorv, or indeed at any 
victory at all, if we pmve ourselves unable at its conclusion 
to re-erect a strong Poland which shall reach to the boundaries 
of the really German States and shall restrict (lerman rule 
within those" boundaries. If we cannot do that we are ile- 
feated and the effects of our defeat will be immediattly 
apparent, no matter behind what fine phrases it may be hidden. 
It was very well pointed out the other day in a series of 
articles simultaneonsly printed I believe both in France 
and in England, that there is attached to this Polish matter 
another crucial one, the position of the Bohemian quadri- 
lateral after the war. Bohemia is practically as well as 
morally the keystone of the arch of free jseoples we propose 
to erect. But the man\' j>roblems involved in this war are too 
inimerous for a detailed analysis here. 
It is satisfactory to tind that these foreign questions which 
could not of their nature mean very much to the bulk of his 
immediate audience, formed sti large a part of the Prime 
.Minister's matte;-, for that matter was delivered, of course, 
not only to his immediate audience, but to all Europe. 
In a point much more familiar to us the speech was equally 
satisfactory, though it was briefly dealt with : The point of 
reparation, especially as regards reparation for the violation 
of common European morals at sea. That is a matter of 
practical and vital importance to this country. If we allow 
indscriminate murder at sea as practised b\' the German 
submarines to establish a precedent, not only the power, but 
the security and one might say the verj' existence as a State 
of Great Britain is at an end. • 
Here we cannot aftord to use general terms. The people 
who ordered this thing and the people who did this thing must 
be punished if we obtain tlie victor^-. It must be made clear 
by example that Europe will not stand a further degradation 
of its standard, and that what may be acceptable to Prussian " 
morals is intolerable to ours. Of course if we fail to obtain 
victory the matter need not be discasscd at all. If we an- 
Ix'atcn the enemy will give some promise or other not to do it 
again — and the security of the sea will have come to an end. 
\Vith that ending the whole of our civilisation will rapidly 
decline. For there will be no power, however insignificant, with 
a real or a fancied grie\ance that will not be able to ha\e 
recourse to such a weapon, just as in private life if you tolerati- 
poison there is no one so feeble but he can terrorise a whole 
community. 
Thcr speech, then, as a whole, has put the main thesis of 
the Alliance justly, and, what is very important, without 
too many particulars. The change of attitude with regard 
to Constantinople was doubtless dictated b\- some international 
agreement. It seems rather, gratuitous," but if victorv hr 
a.ssumed it is not vital. The real point will be who shall be 
the overlord of the Turk if we leave him in Europe, mtirji 
more than whether he is left in Europe or no. If we defeat 
Prussia— if whether bv jwlitical action from \nthiu or by 
niilitjir}- action from without^ — the Prussian military macliine 
is put out of- action, then the old Europe and Western 
civilisation will control the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. 
It peace is made with Prussia still unbeaten, then the Darda- 
nelles and the Bosphorus will be controlled ultimately by 
Prussia. That is a certitude comparable to the certitudes of 
])hvsical law. " i^- 
But one nmst conclude one's survey (at the risk, I am 
afraid, of tedious reiteration) by insisting tliat no declaratior/ 
of the present position of Europe is complete, or even uea'/, 
unless it takes into account the solid fact that Central EurC/ipe 
lias come into existence. That State is no longer a theoi;y. 
It is not an ideal of the future. It is a l)lock of matter wh'/ch 
we ha\-e to deal with and whose continued cohesion or dissolu- 
tion are synonymous with our own defeat or victory, /ft is 
only a matter of weeks before everyone will recognise this, 
and if we insist upon it, as we do in this journal, it is because 
to us facts of this sort seem equally important with opinions. 
It is inexitable that men should still thmk in terms of 1914 
Euroj);- though that Europe has ceased to be, but thfc sooner 
they learn to think in terms of Europe as it now is iny.thjs j'car 
lOi^, the better. . . 
When Napoleon proposed, partly through his aiemories of 
a kepublican youth, partly from personaP. ambition, partly 
(rym mere sequence of fate, to create a united Continent in 
the spirit of the l-'rench .Ke\-olution whi<:;h he incarnated, 
there existed for some years a state of the aort he proposed to 
create. W'e have half forgotten it because it was ephemeral, 
but it was there.; and the real object of the Spanirirds, the 
Portuguese, the P^nglish and the Russians, <lown to the guerilla 
bands in Tyrol who also armed and opposed it, was to destroy 
that State. Its various parts had different names... some 
were put forw-ard as Allied Kingdoms, others were directly 
annexed to the I-'renrh Empire, but fropa the boundaries of 
Poland to somewhat beyond the Pyrenees the thing 
was in being. It covered Italy, and the Germanics were 
a part of it as were the Netherlands. Prussia has not 
created a Statg of the same kind, it is true. Her ideals 
are the exact opposite . of those which inspired the art, 
the songs and the whole civilisation of the French attempt 
under Napoleon. But in the pouit of .success or failure 
the parallel is singularly exact. Pnissia has not.. indeed, 
mastered Europe. Slie is not of a calibre Ijo do that. All 
the old and high civilisation opposed to her stands intact, 
nor has anyone in that civilisation a sympathy w-ith her. such 
as very much of civilised Europe hatl wfth the Frertch 
Revolution and with Napoleon. But she has created such a 
state of her own. There is now properly speaking, not an 
alliance, but an organism of which Berlin is the centre, 
(jf which till' outliers reach already to Mesopotamia and Syria 
and the Marches of Muscovy. Integral and directly adminis- 
tratetl i)arts include Lithuania and all Poland , half Roumania 
and all the Serbian race. Bulgaria is its vassal. If the war 
leaves this State iu being, there will be two peoples of the white 
race, the one in the West, upon the whole, inferior in resources, 
the other in the East, and the latter may prove the master, 
and will certainly be superior. Where iiritain would come 
in such a scheme readers cait determine for themselves. 
That is the real and practical issue of the moment. Not 
that declarations of doctrine have not their value, for mankuid 
is ruled by ideas, but here we have a.rcal and existing thing, 
aiid on its survival or destruction depends the future of the 
world and of ourselves. It was not so even eighteen months 
ago. It is so to-day. H. Belloc. 
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