February 14, 191 8 
Land & Water 
be afloat— even if we suppose that the Allies will be so weak 
as not to insist upon the replacement of the ships illegitimately 
sunk by submarine. The question is, what can three million 
tons do for Germany in helping her through the immediate 
problems that face her after peace is established ? The 
problem of employing them will no doubt be simplified if all 
Allied sources of supply are for a certain period closed to 
Germany altogether, the German shipowners may indeed 
find that the only market for a great part of their tonnage is 
to charter them to foreigners. But if we suppose some of the 
South American trade and the whole of the Dutch East 
Indian trade still to be open, there remain such matters as 
the supply of bunker coal and the use of the Suez Canal, 
both of which are almost entirely under British control and 
can therefore be exercised in accordance with any common 
policy the Allies adopt. 
If we put these factors together, it is difficult to see that 
the bare justice of the situation — and by this I mean the 
natural and inevitable preference given to Allied needs before 
the question of German supply can be considered at all — 
must create a position that will to a great extent leave Germany 
in a state of economic isolation for a considerable period. 
This isolation, I repeat, will in no way whatever be the result 
of any deliberate desire to injure or punish the enemy. It 
follows, of course, from the facts of the situation. 
We surely are quite safe in taking it for granted that an 
understanding along the lines set out above has already been 
come to bv the Allies, or will be agreed in the near future. 
The special powers already conferred on the President of the 
United States of America, the similar powers which the Defence 
of the Realm Act gives to the British Government, and with 
which simil.-:>.r laws have invested the governments of the 
constituent dominions of the Empire, and of France and Italy, 
make the carrying out of such a programme a matter of 
comparative simplicity. When its coming into effect is 
certain, it is unlikely that the countries not yet fighting, who 
have severed relations with Germany, such as Brazil and 
China, would stand apart from this machinery. It would be 
manifestly to their interest to make common cause with 
countries that represent so great a preponderance of their 
normal customers. 
The question really is : Should this programme be drawn 
up in detail and publicly announced ? It could not be done, 
of course, as an alternative policy to seeking victory in the 
field. But it would have another, and quite different, justi- 
fication. It is impossible to read the public statements of 
Hertling, von Tirpitz and the rest without being continually 
struck by the fact that they all take it for granted, not only 
tha Germany's diplomatic relations will be normal with all the 
belligerents after the war is over, but that Germany's trading 
facilities in the belligerent countries will be exactly as they 
were. No doubt enhanced prices and a straitened supply of 
everything is anticipated, from which Germany, like the rest, 
must suffer. But it does not seem to have dawned upon the 
minds of any that — apart altogether from peace terms — 
there must be a period, possibly as short as thre: years, 
possibly as long as ten, during which all questions to do with 
food, raw material and shipping must largely be controlled by 
the common interests of the Allies, and that the first of these 
common interests will be to undo the ravages of war. For 
this the resources of the Allies must be monopolised for the 
benefit of the Allies and, until Allied needs are satisfied, there 
can be no margin, not only for Germany, but even for the 
neutrals that have not made common cause with us. 
Perhaps a calm and dispassionate statement of Allied 
intentions in this elementary matter may — -and for the first 
time — bring back to the business heads of Germany a much 
needed sobriety of cogitation. 
Finally, there is a new fact in the situation which states- 
men in this country would do well to take into account. When 
I arrived in New York last June, while the war enthusiasm 
of the people was very evident, one could not fail to notice 
that, so far as enthusiasm was bred of indignation, it was 
anger against the German Government, and not against the 
German people, that provoked it. The bulk of opinion in 
the United States was still under the influence of the Presi- 
dent's discrimination between the military chiefs and the 
duped subjects in the enemy countries. Erzberger's agita- 
tion, for more democratic forms and peace without annexa- 
tions, was taken to prove that the President's distinction 
was an operative stroke of policy. His reply to the Pope 
looked like a continuation of that policy. There was a 
general hope that the German nation would, without too long 
a delay, perceive the only path along which salvation could 
be found, and compel a renunciation of outrage and conquest 
and a settlement of real reconciliation — without rancour on 
one side, or a sense of unslaked revenge on the other. Thefn 
came the story of the Kiel mutiny, and many held it as proq 
of the working of the new leaven. But the seizure of the 
Gulf of Riga, the push into Italy, and now' the shameless 
proceedings at Brest have seemingly brought American opinion 
to a totally different view of the situation. 
The last recorded speech of the President, following as it 
does on the Congressional inquiries, the Senate demand for 
a non-party Cabinet, and so forth, are conclusive proofs of 
this contention. It is realised, in short, that it is not practical 
politics to build on the differences of aim which the German 
Government and the German people profess. A proposal 
for a joint Allied statement of an intention to exclude 
German competition as an obstacle to Allied reconstruction 
after the war, would certainly have a very different reception 
to-day than it would have had six or nine months ago. 
Arthur Pollen. 
\Oficial i>ioto. 
American Railway Engines in France. 
