8 
Land & Water 
February 28, 191 8 
have been nam«l Hindenherg. with Setdhtz and MoUke. Both 
oMhe la to- carry only ii-fnch guns, though with a(po..ibe 
broads de of Ten at a^ small arc. The addition of the four 
S^/s. then, would add an -tijl-y strength much greater 
nJativelv than the Gangoots would add in the case ot me 
baUlSs The only disadvantage of the Russian battle 
c^ Srs ifthat their s^ed, namely 2^ knots is infer^r to ha 
of the ships which von Hipper commanded at Jutland. It is 
Quite uinecessarv to dweTf at length on the value of light 
cmi^rs Tnd modern destroyers. The importance of addihonal 
St forces is immense in the phase of war now going forward 
in the North and Narrow Seas, and were there to be a fleet 
action it would be greater still. . Tribune 
\Vlien Rissi fell I wrote an article m the ^eu' York ^riourie 
noin ing out that, if there were the faintest chance of the 
Russian sS>s being surrendered to Gennany an entirely new 
value would be given to the help that the American Battle 
F^eet <^uld afford in Northern yv-aters. It has been aX:onstant 
mattcrof comment that the public has heard of no such 
amcentration of Allied naval battle strength in the Nor h Sea 
as has taken place on land, in the case of the military forces. 
There were two obvious reasons against such a concentration 
being made. First, it was unnecessaiy so long as the British 
Fleet possessed the immense preponderance that has existed 
since the beginning of the war. Secondly, while the co-opera- 
tion of an English and a non-English speakmg naval force was 
feasible in such operations as took place off Gallipoh in the 
serine of iqi'5. there would be enormous difficulties in secunng 
a similar cooperation in the case df fleets manoeuvring at sea. 
Especially would this be the case when ships are for more than 
half their time at sea working in close order and in the dark- 
ness. The secret of successful naval tactics is to be found 
in bringing the means of communication to perfection, llie 
difficulties that have stood in the way of an Admiral making 
himself promptly understood— and obeyed— by all the vessels 
under his command is the explanation of so many naval 
actions having proved inconclusive in the past. It was perhaps 
the greatest of all Nelson's triumphs that he surmounted this 
difficulty as it never had been surmounted before. And 
he did it less by the invention of the more intelligible 
signals than by making signals so largely unnecessaiy. 
With every captain knowing precisely what was in the 
Admiral's mind, the most effective co-operation of every 
unit was generally secured vVithout further ado. And as we 
know from the Jutland dispatch, the co-operation of the light 
cruiser squadrons with the battle cruisers on that eventful 
day was practically perfect, just because it was instinctive. 
Again and again the Commander-in-chief's wishes were antici- 
papted by his rear-admirals and commodores, because long 
and intimate intercourse had made his wishes in any set of 
circumstances easily divined. Now mutual understanding of 
this kind might, indeed, ultimately be reached between a 
British Admiral and a division of French or Italian warships, 
but it could only be obtained after long and difficult training. 
If then it has not been attempted to incorporate considerable 
French or Italian units in the British battle and cruiser fleets, 
it may be chiefly because the situation did not make it neces- 
sary, and there seemed no likelihood of it becoming necessary 
—so that the difficulties of securing homogeneity of signals, 
arid so forth, did not in fact even have to be faced. 
But should the Germans gain the immediate reinforcement 
of the Russian battleships, with the prospect at a later date 
of being able to add four battle cruisers as well, a position 
that a year ago was entirely unexpected will have arisen, and 
new naval dispositions will become imperative. There can 
be little doubt that this will take the form of American 
co-operation on the greatest scale. Fortunately in this case 
the difficulties presented by French or Italian co-operation 
would be absent. The differences in tactical methods and 
in the formula of signals and of their significance are real — 
but unity of language would soon bring about unity of method. 
The United States Navy, as has often been pointed out in 
these columns, could reinforce us immediately with three 
divisions of four ships, with a reserve of two, if not three, 
to replace any unit temporarily under repair. They are 
magnificent ships, so exceptionally armed, manned and 
officered, as to promise a high standard of war efficiency 
after the briefest possible period of special training in war 
conditions. And, let it be added that, were Admiral Mayo 
ordered to join Sir David Bcatty with the whole of his fleet, 
it would be a decision that would give infinite satisfaction 
to the whole of the American Navy. Against a possible 
addition^ to the Gennan Fleet of eight ships, there would 
thereforfe be a corresponding increase of the Allied main 
fleet by no fewer than 14. And, once more, we must 
make the point that the American ships are more powerfully 
gunned than the Russians, so that while restoring the old 
relative strength in numbers, the relative gun superiority 
would also be maintained. 
It must not be assumed that we have to look upon the 
incorporation of the Russian ships with the Gennan Navy as 
a certainty. Some patriotic officers, if any survive may 
succeed in destroying them first, and if they are not destroyed, 
they rnay be in such ill repair that it would take a long time 
to make the four battleships seaworthy and fit for action 
In the case of the batUe cruisers, the delay in their bemg fit 
for lise might be greater stUl. On all these points the Govern- 
ment has no doubt the latest and best information There 
may be no danger at all ; it may be a danger which cannot 
materialise for many months. The only satisfactory feature 
of the situation is that, if it does materialise, the American 
Fleet alone can restore the balance. 
Lord Jellicoe's Speeches 
It is in some ways a great pity that Lord Jellicoe's series 
of speeches has not been more fully reported 1 is true 
that in the first of them he told the schoolboys at Ea mg that 
sailors were trained to act and not to speak, and that they 
should not be too impressed by the talkers. But ever since 
he has been engaged in convincing a great number of the 
public that, despite the eariy education of which he complams 
a saUor can talk to the high satisfaction of his hearers and do 
a good deal towards making people appreciate the vast scale 
of the Navy's achievement and the splendid spirit which 
Great Britain at Sea— whether in naval ships or merchantmen 
or in fishing craft— has exhibited during the last three and 
a half years. That appreciation of these great things should 
grow and intensify is a very vital matter mdeed so that it 
seems aU to the good that Lord Jellicoe should contmue 
addressing his feUow-countrymen on a subject no one can 
discuss with more intimate affection than he, and of which 
no British audience is ever likely to tire, when it is presented 
to them by one whose long and devoted service must, in vest 
his words with quite exceptional significance. ^ . ^ j 
- The most important and the most closely argued of Lord 
JeUicoe's addresses was that delivered on Wednesday last 
at the Aldwych Club. It was a delivery of quite exceptional 
interest for many reasons— not the least of which is the 
speaker's impersonal detachment while criticising Admiralty 
Boards, of which he himself was so influential a member. 
In the first place we learned, what I confess was new to me, 
that in August 1914 the German light cruiser programme was 
overhauling ours, and that the enemy's ocean gomg submarines 
and destroyers were equal if not Superior to our own in numbers. 
Inexplicable as our neglect of light craft had been, few of us 
could have realised that the situation was indeed as the ex- 
First Sea Lord has now revealed. And his explanation of 
how this dismal state of things came about is not less inter- 
esting than the revelation itself. It is that .the public thought 
only in terms of Dreadnoughts and that money could not be 
obtained for anything else ! It seems then that the sea 
lords, responsible for preparing the Fleet for war must 
repeatedly have urged the necessity of more cruisers and more 
destroyers, but without succeeding in persuading the Cabinet 
to ask the House of Commons for the means of supplying them 
We must therefore, one would suppose, regard it as a quite, 
extraordinary piece of good luck that an exception had been 
made in favour of the 16 Arethusas and Calliopes. It makes 
one tremble to think where we should have been had 
these cruisers not been approaching completion ]ust as the 
war broke out. , , ^1. ^ • 
In a previous speech Lord Jellicoe told us that m 1913 
Lord Fisher had awakened him and his colleagues to the 
reality of the submarine menace to commerce, a thing that 
he might very well have done, for it is to be presumed that 
he knew then, what we know now, that Germany s larger, 
wide radius submarines were actually more numerous than 
our own. One wonders if it was at the same time that 
representations were put before the Board for protecting our 
Fleet bases in the north from the attentions of this redoubtable 
fleet of submerged cniiscrs— for to them the few hundred miles 
tliat divided these bases from the German ports were, of 
course, a quite negligible interval. Of the long-distance 
possibilities of our own submarines we were fully mlormed, 
for we had sent many to Australia. The danger therefore was 
patent. One is tempted to ask whether the individuals who 
lacked courage to ask Pariiament for cruisers and destroyers 
were the same that declined to protect the main bases ot our 
fighting squadrons ? For that matter it would be interesting 
to know precisely who were the individuals so impervious to 
the seamen's arguments in favour of such obvious necessities 
of war. It is a germane inquiry, for Pariiament, I believe, 
has never been known to refuse provision the sea lords have 
demanded on the ground that the safety of the country niade 
it necessary. Perhaps we are to understand that the civilian 
chief of the Admiralty realised that there was a general limit 
