March 14, 19 18 
Land & Water 
LAND & WATER 
5 CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, W.C.2 
Telephone : HOLBORN .2818. 
THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 1918. 
Contents 
8 
PAGE 
The Town Hall of Rheims. (Photograph) i 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem. (Illustration) 2 
The Outlook ' 3 
East and West. By Hilaire Belloc .5 
The Naval Estimates. By Arthur Pollen 
Judas. (Cartoon). By Raemaekers 10 and 11 
Russia and Japan. By Robert Wilton 12 
Jerusalem and Damascus. By Myra K. Hughes, A.R.E. 15 
The Stage Irishman. By J. C. Squire 16 
The Return. (Part II). By Stacy Aumonier I7 
Village Memorials. (Review) 18 
House and Home. By Charles Marriott 20 
The Agricultural Labourer. By Sir Herljert Matthews 22 
Domestic Economy- 26 
Notes on Kit xi* 
The Outlook 
IN introducing the Naval Estimates last week to the 
House of Commons, Sir Eric Geddes reviewed at some 
length our shipbuilding prospects and requirements. 
He confirmed the disquieting fact that our average 
monthly output of merchant shipbuilding had declined 
from 140,000 tons in the last quarter of 1917 to 58,ooo\tons 
in January. 
For this a variety of explanations were offered: "The 
weather was exceptionally bad, and delays were caused 
thereby." "Januar\-, because of the holidays, was always 
a bad month for the output of ships"; "Februarj' was 
going to be better" (though in this Sir Eric Geddes appears 
to differ from Mr. Barnes, who should have access to all the 
information before the War Cabinet). "The main fact, 
however, is that whether due to labour unrest, to strikes, to 
difficulties of whatever kind, the men in the yards are not 
working as if the life of the country depended on their 
exertions. Employers also are not perhaps, in all cases, 
doing all that can be done to increase output." "The 
serious unrest which existed in January will have its effect 
on completions in later months." The First Lord added 
that he was driven to the conclusion that even at this late 
date the situation is not fully realised. 
With this statement we entirely agree, but the responsi- 
bility for dealing with Labour troubles must rest with the 
Government. It should be obvious at this critical stage of 
the war that the slackening of effort in the shipbuilding 
\ ards will lead straight to disaster. Labour unrest will not 
he dispelled by speeches in the House of Commons ; there is 
need for drastic action. It is not enough to plead that 'the 
piece-worker is inclined to take more holidays. Labour 
lias legitimate grievances, but their deman<fe must not 
always be met by concession and compromise. There can 
he no compromise where the safety of the State is concerned. 
But it should be the first duty of the Government to put 
Labour in command of facts and figiu^es which truthfully 
represent the actual state of afiairs. It is the Government's 
apparent distrust of labour, by the concealment of the truth 
which fosters and foments agitations that, when they 
come to a head, it has shown itself too timorous to handle 
boldly. 
« • 
In looking-for the causes of^this deplorable declinejin 
output which has made January and February two of the 
blackest months in the history of the war, we may be per- 
mitted to refer to the resolution of the District Committee 
of the Federation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Trades 
which was passed on January 31st. It was to the following 
effect : "We are strongly of opinion that the Government 
should immediately open up negotiations with all the enemy 
countries, and that facilities should be afforded to Labour 
and Socialistic bodies in this country to meet with the Labour 
and Socialistic bodies of the Allies and Central Powers, that 
their vif.ws may be obtained ; and we warn the Government 
that unless they do afford such an opportunity to Labour in 
Great Britain, or if they fail to give satisfactory' guar- 
antees that they will open up negotiations, we will down 
tools." ■^ ^ 
The meeting further decided to insist upon a reply bv 
February 8th. What else is this but treason ? The resolu- 
tion was promptly disowned by other large bodies of Labour, 
yet the fact remains that the output of tonnage declined 
by two-thirds in the month of January, and that at the 
best in the month of February we can only expect about 
two-thirds of what the same yards, with fewer men, have 
done in previous months. 
We do not say that this is an instance of cause and effect, 
but we should like to know whether this threat has been 
carried into effect. 
Perusal of the military communiques from day to day is 
apt to leave on the public mind the impression that the 
raiding and counter-raiding activities on the Western front 
are minor affairs without immediate meaning. When, how- 
ever, these operations are reviewed over a longer period they 
are seen to have a certain indicative significance. 
To take the past week only, there was the enemy's attempt 
against the Belgian posts round Merkem, accompanied by 
an effort to bridge the Yser south of the flooded area. The 
attempt failed. There was the attack on the British posts 
south of Houthulst Forest ; another failure. The assault 
on the British line from Polderhoek chateau across the 
Ypres-Menin road was more ambitious and determined, but 
once more in its results negative. South of the Lys, on the 
sector between Armentifires and La Bass^e, several tactical 
"feelers," none Very encouraging. At Lens and on the 
Scarpe, more especially round Monchy-Ie-Preux, the same. 
The same again on the front between Havrincourt and 
St. Quentin. 
Then we come to an attempt, sharply checked, at Chavignon 
at the western end of the Aisne ridge ; and another at Corbeny 
at the eastern end. There was the assault at La Neuville, 
the bridge-head estabUshed by the French on the eastern 
bank of the Aisne and Marne canal north of Rheims. There 
was the attack by two battalions on the old fort of La 
Pompelle, where the French line has been pushed across the 
Vesle. Both these enterprises drew a blank. Some further 
fighting occurred on the col between the Butte de Mesnil 
and the Butte de Tahure ; and an outbreak of activity at 
Vauquois in the Argonne. The front north of Verdun, of 
course, is a disturbed area, where the artillery duel is per- 
sistent ; but for a long time past the enemy had south-east 
of Verdun been quiescent. The effort to penetrate the 
French line near Les Eparges was probably therefore intended 
as a surprise. If so, it was not fortunate. 
* * * 
Tactically the enemy has been striving to improve his 
methods. Experience has shown that so far they have been 
too costly. He is anxious to reduce his losses, partly because, 
having regard to his present resources in man-power, that is 
imperative ; partly because it is doubtful if his troops will 
stand the old methods of mass slaughter. Though it would 
be going far— too far, perhaps — to say that the temper of 
the German Army is depressed, there can be no question 
that it is sullen. 
Tlie Germans entered upon the war confident, above 
everything, in the superiority of their tactics. It was a 
confidence shared as much by the rank and file as by the 
General Staff. And at first it appeared justified. Then it 
was rudely dispelled. To the astonishment of the enemy 
— and we may depend upon it also to his dismay — the Frencli 
proved to be tactically his masters. And the disillusion was 
terribly expensive. In the face of modern weapons, mass 
attacks have ceased in the strict sense of the word to be 
war at all ; they are sheer imbecility. So tas from war 
to-day having been, as some imagine, reduced to a brainless 
struggle of horde against horde, modern equipment has made 
it more than ever necessary to rely upon brains. 
The man at the head of the French Army knew this from 
the start, and acted upon it. In order to compensate and 
offset the effects of disillusionment regarding the French, 
the legend was started that the British Army, at any rate, 
would be tactically indifferent — unable, in a word, to fight 
efficiently. British tactics turned out to b^ as resourceful 
as the French. What has been the result ? Having burned 
his fingers over the tradition of Teutonic steadfastness, 
physical bravery, and the rest of it — the enemy set himself 
sedulously to copy Allied methods He is still doing it, 
and in his own way trying to improve vipon them. 
Somehow he must tactically get level with these Western 
opponents, for if not he will be thrashed to a pulp. He is 
well aware of it. Despite the poses of politicians, and the 
pretensions of Press, magnates ; notwithstanding the visions 
