March 14, igi8 
Land & Water 
13 
■which may now be usefully produced. I omit certain 
important passages of a confidential charactm-. This state- 
ment, dated December 27, 1917, deals with the very essence 
of the problem that concerns us at present. 
The Russian Markets 
■ The chief asset in Germany's future is the Russian market. 
To assure her economic control over Russia, Germany began 
the "preventive" war of 1914. She decided upon that 
course as soon as Russia, by concluding an agreement with 
<jreat Britain in 1907 and preparing a series of mihtary 
programmes, had signified her intention to become free froin 
German domination. The grand programme of Russian 
armaments was begun in 1912, and was to have been com- 
pleted in 1918. Therein lies the main reason for Gennany's 
precipitating the struggle in 1914. Without the Russian 
market, Germany'canhot hope to carry on her industrial develop- 
ment, and must' suffer the consequences of her past groivth 
— a tremendous economic crisis and a wholesale exodus of her 
population. From Russia, Germany derived cheap food- 
stuffs and raw material ; to Russia, Germany supplied the 
products of her industries. The Russian export market was 
largely monopolised by German firms. German exports 
similarly monopolised many branches of Russia's foreign 
trade. During the year preceding the -war tliey increased by 
a figure equal to the total of British exports to Russia. Gennany 
was fast becoming predominant in imports of agricultural 
implements and machinery, in motor cars, and all kinds of 
machinery ajid mechauiical appliances. Moreover, German- 
owned chemical and electrical works in Russia^monopohsed 
the home production. The possibilities of the Russian market 
are so enormous that Germany can afford to lose her other 
mercantile connections if she secures control of it. The 
economic trend of the "peace" negotiations at Brest- 
Litovsk shows clearly enough what are Germany's aims. 
"Germany's domination in the Russian market affords 
not only an invaluable asset in itself ; it enables hfir to reach 
the markets of Asia across the borders of Persia. Afghanistan, 
and '^Mongolia. She xvill thus be able to discount British 
occupation of the Bagdad route, and compete with' the United 
States and Japan in Siberia and the Far East: American 
interests in Siberia are very considerable. Siberian imports 
of .\merican agricultural machinery increased enormously 
with the development of colonisation, which had only begun 
to assume notable proportions just before the war — Siberian 
gold-mining', lumber industries, and fisheries are still in their 
infancy. They offer huge fields for American, Japanese, and 
AustraUan enterprise. 
"Siberia and Manchuria are the greatest untapped- wheat 
producing countries in the world, with natural outlets to the 
Black Sea and the Pacific. Germany aims at controlling the 
first, if not the second, of these food markets. Thousands 
of (lerman prisoners of war and interned subjects of the 
Fatherland have been studying the language and the customs 
of Siberia with a view to future business there. 
' ' // the Bolshevik intrigue engineered by her does not enable 
Germany to capture Russia by 'peaceful ' means, she will 
do so by forfe. She is already concentrating her armies on 
the south-western front in readiness for an advance on 
■ Odessa and Kieff next March or April, when cUmatic condi- 
tions are favourable. By this course she will come into 
possession of the rich wheat and best sugar regions of Little 
Russia, gain a permanent foothold on the Black Sea coast, 
and be in a position to strike at the Donetz steel and iron 
region. As soon as Germany takes the Don region she loill 
control tlie fuel and the food supply of European Russia, and 
have the country at Iter mercy. 
'The Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the Cossacks 
a^jpreciate this danger, and have revolted against the pro- 
(ierman Bolsheviks in Petrograd. They are natural, aJhes 
of tlie Siberians, who also realise the consequences of the 
Bolshevist 'negotiations' with Germany. All these kindred 
•elements are going to 'fight to tlie last gasp against German 
absorption. But without aid from the Allies they tnay fail. 
They have to combat the ignorant Russian peasants in their 
own midst, for millions of landless parasites have swarmed 
to the land-grabbing appeal of the Bolshevism (Social 
Democracy) and of Maximalism (Socialist Revolution). 
"It would be the greatest and most fatal mistake to consider 
Rusiia as having ceased to he a factor in the war. She was 
the main factor in the German plan of a 'preventive' war 
at the very outset of hostilities, and she has not ceased to 
be a factor because of her military collapse." If anything, 
site is more important to us now that there 'is real danger of her 
falling into German Imnds. for it is obvious that once in 
possession of the South of Russia — tlie granary as well as 
the mineral storehouse of the country — the Germans would 
be able to prolong their struggle with the Allies almost 
indefinitely." 
Further, I pointed out the necessity of organising propa- 
ganda : "The people of Russia must know our motives fully 
and exactly. The truth abput the Bolshevist intrigiie with 
Germany must be set forth. We should offer to help the 
Russians preserve their freedom and independence." 
III. 
But no el^'ectual action was taken. Our diplomatic 
front was still in abeyance, each Ally continuing to deal 
with this \dtal matter not on its intrinsic merits or on avail- 
able information from reliable sources, but according to 
prejudices or tendencies dominating their own domestic polity. 
It is to the credit of Japan that she has shown us a way out 
of the impasse. \Mien the Government at Tokio proceeded 
to sound the other Allied governments as to their respective 
views on the Russian situation, the first serious step was 
taken towards saving Russia and towards the establishment 
of a real unity of the Allied diplomatic front. 
It is fairly obvious, in the light of undisputable facts 
adduced in the statement cited above, that German pre- 
dominance in Russia is tantamount to a German victory. 
That Germany will exert every effort to secure her grasp t)n 
Russia is also beyond question. Her largest pre-wax cus- 
tomers — the British Empire, the United States, and France — 
will certainly consider their own interests in trade and in 
the supply of raw material. Germany knows that she has 
little to expect from them. Germany must have Russia, 
otherwise she cannot afford to continue the war. 
During a conference held early in January, General Foch, 
turning to the Japanese representative, asked, d br&le pour- 
point, what was to prevent them from immediately landing 
a substantial force (I withhold figures) at ? Two 
months earlier, Generjil Alexeiev had warned his countr^'meIl 
that Japan would take this step if revolutionary anarfchy 
continued to prevail in Russia. These military geniuses 
were more clear-sighted and outspoken than the majority 
of diplomatists, and politicians. The question put by the 
French Generalissimo did not for this .reason obtain a full 
and immediate answer. 
There were, it is true, certain obvious difficulties. The 
people of Siberia, like most of the Europeans settled in the 
East, were suspicious of Japan. Before he became Hadji 
Wilhelm, "Protector of Islam," the chameleon Kaiser of 
Potsdam had magnified the bogey known as the Yellow 
Peril. He had incited Russia against Japan. To his crafty 
counsels the hapless Tsar fell a ready victim, the rotten 
government then prevailing in Russia, bereft of organic 
connection with the people, drifted into the senseless war 
with Japan. Since then the spectre of Japanese " aggression " 
had obsessed the minds of Siberians, particularly those 
living east of Baikal. 
A glance at a map will emphasise the dominant fact in the 
Trans-Baikal situation : that this region is dependent 
for its trade outlet upon the Pacific littoral. I have also 
made allusion to the economic interests of Japan, the United 
States, Australia — an(i I may add to this list also Canada — 
ip the East Siberian market. Japan's interests tax exceed 
those of any other country. The fishery rights secured to 
her by the Treaty of Portsmouth on the East Siberian coast, 
coupled with the reversion of Russia's treaty rights in 
Manchuria, place her indisputabl}' in the front rank. This 
position carried with it bounden duties as well as undoubted 
privileges. She could not stand by indefinitely while 
Bolshevism proceeded with its work of disruption and 
anarchy. Her first duty was, of comrse, to protect her own 
interests ; but in doing so she was bound to save the 
Siberians from their internal or external foes— from the 
inroads of Bolshevism and the invasion of Germany. 
According to accounts received from Washington, some 
hesitancy has been displayed there in agreeing to single- 
handed action by Japan. We must assume that there is a 
certain measure of truth in these assertions. They tally 
with other facts, notably the persistent tendency displayed 
by American representatives in Russia to deal gently with 
the Bolsheviks. This tendency may be ascribed to domestic 
causes. Tlie American mentality has become accustomed 
to machine politics and rough political methods. They have 
done no very great harm amidst a well-educated, patriotic, 
and energetic and individualistic nation— at least, not in 
times of peace. The methods of the Bolsheviks, resembling 
in many respects the methods of Tammany Hall, were treated 
with habitual American tolerance as "part of the political 
game." Lenin, like "Boss" Croker, had simply "got there" 
— so much the worse for the "other fellow," who was "no 
account," could not "deliver the goods." Trotsky had lived 
in New York, and showed his appreciation of the lessons he 
