14 
Land & Water 
March 14, 191 8 
had learned in the Western Metropolis by remitting sub- 
stantial sums to pav off numerous debts as soon as he had 
obtained a share of the Tammany-Bolshevik spoils. But 
American tolerance does not imply approval. In pre-war 
days, home politics in the United States were marked by 
jieriotlical overthrows of the "machine, " whenever citizens 
found "Boss" rule too onerous. The natural remedy for 
Bolshevism, according to the American idea, lay with the 
Russians themselves. Perhaps I have stated the position 
crudely, but, I believe, not unfairly. The separate peace 
now signed bv Lenin, coupled with the German invasion, 
disi)els all these fanciful presentments of Bolshevism. There 
cannot be the slightest doubt that American opinion will 
in the end whole-heartedly support Japan. 
IV. 
In paying a fine tribute some time ago to the essential 
character of British rule. General Snouts drew attention to 
a fact that escapes the understanding of visionaries and 
demagogues — the British Empire has laid the foundations 
of a new world-edifice, the Brotherhood of Nations. It has 
given substance and reality to the noblest ideal of humanity. 
Our alliance with Japan was a natural and consistent 
expression of British tendencies. We were the first White 
Great Power to conclude a living national union with a 
\'ellow Power. We did so for what may be regarded 
by superficial critics as selfish motives, to safeguard our 
interests in Asia ; in reality, because we instinctively felt 
that Japan was animated by a spirit of progress and enlighten- 
ment that made her our natural ally in the East. 
Have our hopes been disappointed ? I do not think that 
the rashest and most inveterate opponent of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance can aspire to produce the slightest tittle 
of evidence in support of a negative answer. In her rela- 
tions with Russia, leading up to an agreement, concluded 
by \'iscount Motono while he was Ambassador in Petrograd, 
Japan pursued a wise policy, strictly in accordance with her 
obligations towards us. We have not a single reproach to 
bring against Japan in connection with her policy in Asia or 
elsewhere. Yet the internal situation in* China has fre- 
quently given her much provocation. Germany's "peaceful 
penetration " of the Celestial Empire in pre-war days threat- 
ened to bring about a state of affairs resembling Turkey. 
Japan was affected to a much greater degree than were 
other Powers ; but, in loyalty to us, she steadfastly refrained 
from precipitating a conflict. 
Since the outbreak of the war, Japan has loyally fulfilled 
her obligations to us. Viscount Motono took the initiative 
in prompting Russia to avail herself of Japan's aid in the 
supply of munitions. Japan's military activity was re- 
stricted to the Far East, and although this restriction was 
galling to the national amour propre whicli interpreted it as 
an evidence of mistrust, the Japanese bore the slight 
without r(?i>ining, and when later they were invited to extend 
the ^^phere of their naval activities, they cheerfully complied, 
("oming to more recent times, when the Bolsheviks assumed 
ciintrol in Harbin and the Russian General Khorvat invited 
Chinese aid to quell the revolutionaries, Japan refrained 
from taking action, being desirous only of considering the 
wishes of her Allies, although her interests at Harbin far 
exceeded those of any other Allied Power. 
Still later, after it had become apparent that enormous 
quantities of munitions and suppUes collected at Vladivostok 
—largely from Japan— were at the mercy of Bolshevik- 
German agents, she still withheld her hand, in spite of the 
fact that other interested Powers showed a disinclination to 
take action. And only when public opinion at home began 
to be disturbed by this loyal quiescence the Japanese Govern- 
ment took the initiative. But before doing so the .\llies 
were approached and their views consulted. I think Japan 
has displayed remarkable reticence in the face of the strongest 
provocation, and has shown cause for every confidence on 
the part of the Allied governments and peoples. 
V. 
It would be premature and quite outside the scope of 
Al led journalism at the present moment to discuss^ the 
details of the measures that Japan may be called upon to 
take Certain things are, however, self-evident, and do not 
constitute a secret. In the first place. Allied munitions and 
stores at Vladivostok must be saved ; in the second place 
Siberia must be cleared of enemv subjects, and within this 
dehmtion we must include the Bolslieviks, since they have 
signed a traitorous peace with Germany 
The miUtary aspects of the task that now confronts Japan 
are obvious. The Siberian railway and the Amur waterway 
have been captured by the Bolsheviks with the aid of 
liberated convicts and enemy prisoners of war. The line of 
advance is thus indicated by the nature of things. The 
Amur will be cleared either by flotillas ascending that mighty 
river as soon as navigation opens or by a flanking movement 
of troops. The main objectives are Irkutsk — to cut off the 
Amur basin, and Omsk — to secure a base for advancing on 
Tinmen and Clieliabinsk, which respectively command the 
railways to Moscow and Petrograd. From a strictly military 
point of view, the clearing up of Siberia from the Pacific to 
the Urals is almost entirely a matter of railway transport. 
Sufficiency of rolling stock, repairs of bridges that may be 
destroyed — these will be factors upon which the progress of 
the Japanese must depend. There can be no question of 
armed resistance on the part of the Bolsheviks. 
Nor is it likely that the Cossack armies distributed' 
throughout Siberia wiU combine with the followers of Lenin. 
If such a contingency should arise, it will be due entirely tO' 
their ignorance of Allied aims ; in other words, to the defici- 
encies of our propaganda. The interests of the Cossacks are 
even more conservative than those of the Siberian settlers, 
to whom they bear in point of numbers a relation approxi- 
matelj' of one to ten. The total population of Siberia is 
under 7,000,000, that of the Cossacks over half a million. 
That Bolshevism is utterly alien to the spirit of the 
Siberians will be seen from the following facts. Reserve 
troops brought hither from Russia during the war and 
garrisoned in the large cities have enabled alien agitators 
—many of whom had been expelled from the United States 
for revolutionary propaganda— to dispose of armed brute 
force to back up their nefarious designs. In this foul work 
they have been helped by large numbers of convicts and 
Germans — all liberated during the Revolution. The 
Siberians were not only opposed to Bolshevism : they formed 
volunteer battalions and went to fight the Germans during 
the offensive of July, 1917. 
And now let me explain why Bolshevism is a vain Word to 
the Siberians. Lenin and his crew have been able to 
demoralise the Russian reserve troops and the landless 
peasants by promises of peace and land. In European 
Russia this meant depriving landowners of their property. 
In Siberia there are no landowners, strictly speaking, except 
the Cossacks. All settlers have received allotments on 
tenure from the State. The State owns practically all the 
land in Siberia. Every man who is willing to work can 
become a prosperous farmer. There is room for a hundred 
million and to spare. 
The Siberians themselves are a more developed and go-a- 
head people than their Russian kinsmen. They are the 
product of a long" continued process of national selection. 
Only the hardiest and most enterprising Russians emigrated. 
Moreover, the political exiles to Siberia were also the most 
independent and resolute men in Russia. The Siberian 
farmers have formed dairy and other co-operatives. They 
were no fit subjects for Bolshevik propaganda or experiments. 
It should not be difficult to make them understand why 
Japan has been compelled to come to their aid. They 
know that Japan is our ally, and' that the British market 
has been and must, after the war, remain their best customer. 
It is equally essential that they should know of American 
sympathy with Japan's movements. They . use la vast 
quantity of American — and Canadian — agricultural machin- 
ery, without which they cannot develop their farms. 
Wliat will be the ultimate consequences of Japan's inter- 
vention ? The answer to this question involves a large field 
of study, that can be briefly touched upon here. The whole 
future of Asiatic politics has been affected by this 
war. Germany's plans of instigating an Islamic movement 
against us in the Caucasus, Turkestan, Persia, Afghanistan, 
and India are too well known. Japan's influence among 
the Asiatic nations had been growing steadily, and is likely 
to be enhanced by impending events. It is well for us that 
it shpuld be so. No better answer could be found to the 
Protean aspects of Potsdam intrigue among Moslem races 
than the presence among us of an Asiatic Great Power with 
aims and interests in direct conflict with those of Germany. 
And perhaps it may be permissible to venture the prediction 
that Japan's intervention in Siberia may ultimately bring 
the Mikado's legions face to face with those of the Kaiser. 
I think the Japanese will be glad to meet their foe face to 
face, and there can be no doubt that they will give an excellent 
account of themselves. But in the maturing of these future 
events Japan will help us to bring Russia back to her normal 
self — to the comity of nations. 
As for Japan's reward, is it necessary or seemly to discuss 
the question ? Do we ask ourselves what we are going to 
make out of the war ? The future Peace Conference will 
decide. Meanwhile, let us trust Japan as we trust ourselves 
—as a full-fledged member of the community of nations 
now fighting for freedom, justice, and humanity." 
