March 21, ig i 8 
J^and <x w ater 
Raiding the Rhine Cities: By H. Belloc 
THE new factor in the fighting season that is 
opening is the use of the air against civilians. 
The enemy some time ago deliberately created 
a change for the worse in warfare between 
European nations. That change consists , in a 
repeated attack upon points far behind the siege lines of the 
West and including the bombardment of the civilian popu- 
lation in what are called (though the definition hardly 
applies to-day) by the old-fashioned term of " open towns." 
We shall do well at the opening of this season to consider 
the respective advantages and disadvantages in this respect 
of the two parties which are, in the West of Europe, deciding 
the fate of the world : for there — not in Russia — lies the 
issue between our victory or the enemy's successful resistance 
and his imposition on us of his peace. 
First, let us grasp the history of the thing. 
Prussia inaugurated in 1870 a new principle in European 
warfare. It was a principle in line with others which she 
had created or expanded in previous wars. It was one which 
her rivals fiercely denounced, hoped to be ephemeral, and did 
not themselves copy. This principle was the principle that 
civilians — all that part of the nation, including the women 
and children, who are not within its military organisation — 
should be subjected to the pressure of war without privilege 
or special distinction of any kind. We must distinguish here 
between the hurt done in hot blood or from lack of discipline, 
or through the exceptional cnielty of a commander to civilians, 
and the new Prussian doctrine. What made that doctrine 
new — the essence of it^was universality and calculation. It 
was, as I have said, a new principle, the like of which no 
nation in Christendom had accepted before. 
This new step was but the realisation in part of a general 
thesis which lies at the very core of all the Prussian system : 
that anything is permitted to PrussiaVi policy so long as it 
tends to the aggrandisement of the Prussian State. In other 
words, that the moral duty of increasing the power of the 
Prussian State overrides for the directors of that State all 
other moral duties. 
Since the idea was profoundly immoral and inhuman, it 
was not, as a fact, fully appHed. It grew slowly, because a 
criminal always feels subconsciously, however perfect his 
immediate immunity, that it may not be eternal and that 
mankind is a permanent judge. All moraJ degradation, 
however rapid, is (Successive, and nearly always goes by 
distinct steps downwards. It is hardly ever a mere plunge. 
We have had very striking examples in the present war of 
this last truth. The enemy did not at once proceed to all 
the logical consequences of his creed. The very last steps in 
it have not even yet been taken. 
For instance, when he retired from the Noyon salient he 
propounded a theory tha* a belligerent might legitimately 
devastate a whole countryside, carry off its inhabitants into 
slavery, destroy every house, every fruit tree, and every well, 
because such action was of military advantage to himself. 
Yet he did not destroy Noyon itself, the most valuable asset 
to his enemy in the whole district. In the same way, he has 
laid down that the suspicion of even a slight advantage 
given to his enemy by even the most important or sacred 
monument of the past, justifies the destruction of such a 
monument. That was his plea for beginning the destruction 
of Rheims Cathedral on a doubtful suspicion that the towers 
might be used as observation posts, infinitesimal as that 
hypothetical advantage would have been. Yet, after 
beginning this destruction, he did not complete it. 
In the same way each successive Prussian novelty in 
international crime has come after a considerable interval, 
and the deliberate terrorising of the civilian population by 
bombardment from the air has been of comparatively recent 
development. Even now he continually drags in the word 
"reprisals." 
The enemy has, however, now definitely adopted this 
method, and has continued it so long that the Allies have 
been compelled to follow suit. Had they not done so they 
would have left in the hands of Prussia an instrument of 
victory of which they would themselves have been deprived 
and its cumulative effect might have been overwhelming. 
It is with the greatest difficulty that you can persuade men 
to break with some long-established standard of honour even 
under the most grievous necessity ; and the highest respect 
is due to those who for long urged that retaliation should be 
postponed. But it is now clear that retaliation is a necessity, 
and what we have to consider — most unfortunately — are the 
practical conditions under which this new method, can be 
exercised by either side. 
Much the greater part of these practical conditions are 
forbidden to public discussion. The publicist knows little 
of them, and the more he knows the more it is liis duty to 
be silent. The military and constructional authorities, who 
know most, have, beyond all other men, the duty of con- 
cealing their knowledge. The number, the carrying power, 
etc., of the machines used — which are the very first 
practical factors — are things that must not be touched, and 
many other similar points wUl occur to the reader as barred 
from all publicity. But there are a certain number of topo- 
graphical and political points which are open to analysis and 
which it is important to grasp, both in order that the public 
may understand the problem set and also that it may under- 
stand what advantages the Allies enjoy in this unhappy 
extremity to which Prussia has driven them ; for, with the 
exception of one great province, unalterable until we break 
the Prussian siege line in the West — I mean the province of 
communications— ours maritime and therefore vulnerable 
and slow, his continental and therefore rapid and invulner- 
able — advantages can "be counted upon our side as well as 
on his. 
The Enemy's Advantage 
Let us first of all appreciate what are his advantages — 
advantages which led him to adopt this new policy. 
The first and most conspicuous advantage he has is the 
fact that the two principal capitals, not only of the Allies, 
but of the world, Paris and London, are highly accessible to 
his machines. The. distance from his starting points in 
Belgium to the London area is, upon the average, less than 
150 miles. The distance from his starting points to the 
area of Paris is, upon the average, between 80 and 90 miles. 
Secondly, the way to both capitals is indicated in clear 
weather bj' water. The valleys of the Oise, the Marne, and, 
in an approach from the south, of the Seine, can be followed 
to Paris upon any clear night, however dark ; while London 
lies at the apex of an estuary terminating in a broad and 
unmistakable river. . 
Thirdly, the great areas concerned, especially that of 
London, make his task of recognition easier. The defenders 
cannot hide a patch of this size upon the landscape of a clear 
night, and the attackers cannot miss it. London is especially 
vulnerable from the fact that the greater part of the trajec- 
tory to it lies over the undefended area of the sea-, and because 
of its very great size. Parjs is especially vulnerable because, 
although the approaches to it are over land and the area is 
smaller, the length of the trajectory is much less. 
The two capitals are not only exceedingly vulnerable, but 
are also, when attacked, places the raiding of which the enemy 
can calculate to yield great fruit of the sort which he seeks. 
For, in the first place, the closer and denser a population 
the greater the moral effect of a raid. In the second place, 
the mere numerical proportion of the whole nation which is 
situated in each of the two areas is very large. In the 
third place — much the most important factors-each Cjen- 
tralises, in a degree unknown to other countries, the national 
life. Each is the brain of the national organism. 
Every one recognises this in the case of Paris ; a tradition 
no longer corresponding with modern realities masks it in the 
case of London. But if we honestly consider those realities 
we shall perceive that London is even more of a national 
centre than Paris. The Press, for instance, has far more 
power in Britain than in France, and the London Press 
largely moulds the opinion of the whole country. Every 
direction of this war has for Britain its chief centre in London. 
What is more, the principal offices are there gathered closer 
together even than they are in Paris. One may put the 
matter most clearly by an extreme case, which happily has 
not yet been realised, and ask oneself what the effect would 
be upon the strength of either nation if a really serious 
destruction of records and disorganisation of personnel could 
be effected in either capital by a raid on a much larger scale 
than any that has yet taken place — always supposing the 
present centralisation to be maintained. 
The first great asset, then, of the enemy is the vulnerability 
and essential importance of the two great modern capitals 
which his aircraft can so easily reach. 
His second asset is connected with this first, and consists • 
in tho fact that his siege line happens to have fallen so far 
