March 28, 19 18 
Land & Water 
The Great Battle : By Hilaire Belloc 
THE great battle which the Qnemy had announced 
with extraordinary advertisement for many weeks 
began four da}'s before these hncs are written, 
and is still in progress. The present conditions 
of printing make it necessarj- that this article 
should be completed upon Sunday, the 24th of March. All 
phases of the action later than the news reaching London 
at that moment can only be dealt with in our next issue. 
But the results of the first three days — that is, up to the 
evening of Saturday, the 23rd — are sufficiently clear, in spite 
of the inevitable brevity and imperfection of the news 
received, to give us a grasp of its character, of the enemy's 
objects, and of their first results. 
The enemy's strategical object was to tear a great gap in 
the British front as near as possible to its southern extremity, 
or right, upon the River Oise, and thus at once to separate 
the British from the French armies and to permit them, 
when the breach has been fully opened and seized, to roll 
up the British line. 
He depended for the security of his left or southern flank 
immediatel}', after the success of such an operation, upon 
the Oise Valley, which is marshy and difficult at this point, 
and belie\'ed that the obstacle will protect him from successful 
Allied attack here, at any rate, for a space of time long 
enough to permit his complete success towards the north. 
This original plan may be and probably will be modified 
in the course of the action, especially if it does not follow his 
time-table and if, therefore, his losses are, for the results 
achieved in the first few days, beyond his calculation ; but 
that this was the main and simple strategical intention of 
the enemy is obvious from the place and method of attack. 
With these ends in view, he adopted the following 
dispositions : 
(i). He had chosen a very wide front of 76,000 yards, 
or just over 43I miles as the crow flies, from the point where 
the original British front line crossed the canalised River 
Scaipe in the neighbourhood of Roeux to the point where it 
crossed the River Oise in the neighbourhood of Vendeuil. 
(These villages and most of those mentioned in the course of 
the article are to-day, of course, only names for a few ruins 
at the best, and in many cases a little scattering of brick- 
dust upon a mass of shell holes). This front happens to be 
the driest part of all the long Hne held by the British armies 
in France and Belgium, and this feature, a great aid 
to his offensive, has been powerfully accentuated by his 
extraordinary luck in the weather. 
(2). To ensure success, he had concentrated upon this 
front of 43 miles in a direct line (enlarged by sinuosities to 
somewhat over 50 miles, which will be again increased by 
the greater sinuosities developed during the battle) perhaps 
75 divisions out of the 186 which he had in line between 
the Swiss frontier and the North Sea. Of these, he had no 
less than 40 upon his immediate front for the delivery of the 
first shock, and within 48 hours had added another ten to 
replace his losses and to provide fresh material for the 
assault. The numerical value of this force in bayonets can 
only be roughly established. We know that the German 
divisions have been reduced for many months past, and 
for much the most part, perhaps for all, to some 6,500 
bayonets, but it is very possible that additions have been 
made from the younger classes and by the selection of men 
from divisions the main part of which have still been left 
upon the East. Perhaps we may average the divisions in use 
at 7,000 bayonets or somewhat over, and we may, therefore, 
estimate the number of German infantry already engaged 
in these four days at somewhat more than 350,000, with 
at least half as much again immediately behind them for 
reinforcement during the course of the action. Most of these 
units have been specially exercised for three months past in 
view of the present operation ; they have been trained to 
long marches, to sham attacks upon ground in the rear of 
the German lines chosen for its similarity to the points for 
which each unit would be used ; and the so-called " Storming 
Troops," specially picked to act as the spear-hcads of the 
shock, have been kept far back from the fighting zone, fed 
and trained and disciphned in a manner particular to their 
special use. 
(3). An exceedingly large force of artillery, far greater 
than any yet concentrated in proportion to the number of 
bayonets involved, has been massed upon this front. It 
includes not only the German heavy batteries released by 
the betrayal of the Alhed cause in Russia, but also many 
Austrian batteries ; and special attention, has been paid to- 
the mobility of these for the following up of the expected 
rapid advance. 
(4). The clement of surprise was dehberately excluded 
by the enemy, probably upon the ground that it was unattain- 
able and that, upon the balance, it was better worth while 
to hearten public opinion at home (under the very severe 
strain it was suffering) by the announcement of the attack 
and by the promise of. certain and decisive success to be 
followed in a very brief delay by a Anctorious peace. 
(5). The result to be achieved could only be reached 
rapidly and therefore at a great initial expense in men. This 
is the capital point of the whole business. It is that upon 
which we must particularly fix our attention, for it is the 
character which will determine the final result. The Prussian 
tradition in tactics and strategy is rigid and inflexible. It 
has the advantage of all rigid and inflexible things that it 
permits a highly detailed study of its conditions anci a perfec- 
tion therein. It has the disadvantage that if it fails it fails 
altogether, from lack of alternatives. 
This point, the dehberate intention to sacrifice vast masses 
of men early in the action as a price necessary to the result 
and as the cheapest price to pay in the long run, accounts 
both for what has hitherto been effected by the enemy up 
to the moment of writing and also for its failure, hitherto, 
to follow the time-table assigned to it. By which we must 
not be understood to mean any forecast of the ultimate 
result, but merely to establish the character of the first three 
days' engagement. 
Political Necessity 
F It need hardly be pointed out that the undertaking of 
the offensive under such conditions teaches a very valuable 
political lesson. It informs us that the enem}- has been 
compelled to attack from the pohtical conditions existing 
within the German and Austrian Empires. It was the 
opinion of many who judged the situation su'dy upon its 
mihtary side, that this offensive would not be delivered. 
The unprecedented and exceedingly unusual advertisement 
of it ; the relative success of the submarine offensive by 
sea ; the length of time required by the United States 
to put any considerable force into the field ; the very fact 
that so long a period of dry weather made the chances of 
a break in that spell, and more difficult conditions for the 
continuation of the offensive, high ; the considerable activity 
of the enemy in the East ; lastly, the self-evident truth 
that such a gamble deliberately staked everything upon rapid 
success, and that the only alternative to it was an ultimate 
disastrous failure, led many of the best judges in -Europe. 
especiaUy soldiers, to believe that the proposal to attack 
was a deceit designed to compel the Alhes to distribute 
their forces on the defensive and produce a policy of delay 
that would lead to a negotiated. peace. Those who adopted 
the opposite view, and who certainly included much the 
greater part of those observing upon the spot, have proved 
right. The internal conditionsM)f Central Europe are such 
that the enemy could not postpone an attempt to obtaini 
a decision early this year. It is on this account that the 
dice have been thrown, and the issue is now clearly set between 
his rapid ruin or our own. 
Incidentally we may add that such a position puts an end 
once and for all to every discussion of detail in domestic 
or foreign policy. Such a discussion has been dangerously 
indulged in during the long winter period of preparation 
and inaction. It no longer has any meaning, and if any 
of the small minorities that have conducted it with such 
intensitj- in the Allied countries propose to continue it, thej- 
will simply not be listened to. 
« » ■ 
From these preliminary observations we may proceed tO' 
the description of Xhe action so far as the very terse, general 
and impel feet indications afforded permit us to so do. 
It has taken the form of an attack first concentrated upon 
the north of line in front of Arras and Cambrai ; then pressed 
in the second day upon the decisive point to the south in 
front of St. Quentin. It had by Saturday evening compelled 
the retirement of the British line, pivoting upon the north, 
from a direction 30 degrees E. of S. to a direction 20 degrees 
E. of S., the northern point remaining stationary and the 
southern suffering an average withdrawal of from six to 
eight miles, a retirement still in progress. 
