March 28, 19 18 
Land & Water 
with the British field-guns was point blank, and the assault 
was made with that complete disregard of immediate cost 
which is the logical consequence of the Prussian tactical 
theory. The whole system of the Prussian service, I repeat, 
and its whole tradition, at once the cause and the effect of 
its type of discipline, involves extremely heavy initial expendi- 
ture upon the conception that it is ultimately the cheapest 
price to pay for success. Although the day was misty — at 
any rate, during all its earher hours — the target afforded by 
these successive waves was excellent and the execution done 
against them was correspondingly great. It is very difficult 
to discover from the as yet imperfect descriptions received 
whether the retirement here was contemporary with that to 
the south or came afterwards as a consequence of that to 
the south ; but, at any rate, upon the southern half of this 
same .sector, between the Cambrai front and the Sensee, the 
remainder of this specially massed concentration got through 
to near the third line in front of Morchies. But just as the 
northern horn of the advancing crescent was held at Fontaine, 
so was the southern horn held from the British positions iri 
the wood of Louveral Chateau, and apparently the line 
suffered little indentation between that point upon the 
Bapaume high road and the village of Havrincourt. The 
German attack on this southern half of the crescent, number- 
ing about four tg one against the British defensive, was 
conducted by the remaining eight divisions of the 17. When 
the fighting died down at the end of the day the situation' 
in this capital sector of the whole line was, so far as the 
evidence afforded can guide us, what is seen upon the accom- 
panying sketch-map i, with an enemy gain at the deepest 
point, south-east of Bullecourt and at Croisilles, of about a 
mile and a half. 5 
It is clear that this falling back upon the third line in the 
■orth would have left the Cambrai salient untenable, and it 
IS equally clear that the line from in front of Havrincourt 
village to the falling ground in front of Epehy liad to be 
withdrawn to conform with the northern situation. But 
the first accounts dealing with the Thursday's fighting tell 
us very little about this portion ; a sector, if we count no 
further south than the fields in front of Ep^hy, of about 
12,000 yards, or rather more than 7 miles. Between this 
pomt— the fields in front of Epehy— and the last of the line 
•n the right towards the Oise (the fighting on the banks of 
which river was about 20 miles south of Epehy) we were 
only told, with regard to the first day, Thursday's, fighting, 
that on the extreme right, just north of the Oise itself, a 
heavy concentration of the enemy, 6 divisions strong, was 
held by one British division during the whole day. There 
was here, therefore, as I have said above, another special 
concentration; but it failed of its effect, and the British 
force here was only withdrawn at night after the fighting 
■ad ceased to conform with the hue further north. 
We may sum up the accounts received of the first day's 
fighting, Thursday the 21st, briefly, then, as follows: 
After an intensive bombardment, beginning a little before 
iawn, continued in most parts of the line for four hours 
(though in some for not more than three), the German 
infantry was launched to the number of 40 divisions against 
the whole British front between the Sensee Brook, just 
south of the Scarpe. and the Oise, a distance, allowing for 
the folds in the Une of over 50 miles. The chief weight of 
the attack was upon the northern quarter of the Une a 
sector of 12 miles, between the Sensee Brook and the Cambrai 
front. Here the enemy penetrated to the third or main 
British defensive line, occupying a crescent of land the two 
horns of which stood at Fontaine and Louverval respectively, 
and the maximum depth of which was not quite a mile and 
a half. In conformity with this indentation, the Une further 
to the south between Havrincourt and Epehy was retired, 
both places being still covered by it, while Le Verguier 
t\ miles south of Epehy, was also held. The last section 
between the Somme and the Oise witnessed on its southern- 
most extremity the very heavy pressure of six German 
divisions, which were successfully held, but by nightfaU the 
defensive was called back up to or behind the Crozat Canal. 
On the Thursday night a dense mist again arose and 
forbade effective operations. Aircraft could not leave the 
ground in the southern area, where the mist was especially 
dense ; the air was clearer in the north, and dispatches tell 
us of heavy bombardment from the air against points in 
Belgium, which have, of course, nothing to do with the main 
action. The mist upon the southern sector, where the 
enemy was to attempt a decisive effort upon this Friday, 
the 22nd, rose late in the forenoon. As it cleared, perhaps 
between 10 and 11 o'clock, it was apparent that the main 
enemy effort was developing upon the south, and that 
the decisive stroke for the turning of the British Une by its 
right was being delivered. 
The accounts so far received of what foUowed are meagre ; 
but, piecing them together, and including the enemy's dis- 
patches and claims, we' can airrive at a general outline. For 
this purpose, we must take our view from the town of St. 
Quentm and consider the ground extending over 150 degrees 
from Ep^hy, 12 miles N.N.W. of St. Quentin to the neighbour- 
hood of Tergnier, an equal distance due south of it, where 
the marshy Oise Valley begins. 
The whole of this district is that which was devastated 
by the enemy during his retreat a year ago. It consists, for 
the most part, of the upper basin of the Somme River, which 
flows through St. Quentin and, after running south-west 
towards Ham, bends round sharply north to Peronne. The 
ground falls away westward by a gradual decline of about 300 
feet from heights just west of St. Quentin, and is drained by the 
three parallel streams of the Upper Somme with its canal, the 
Omignon, and the Cologne. South of the Somme a water- 
shed, from 150 to 180 feet above the water levels, separates 
the Upper Somme from the Valley of the Oise. It is known 
as the Ridge of Essigny. There is a depression at the south- 
western end of this ridge which runs from the Somme itself 
to the Oise Valley, and is used by the canal known as the 
Crozat Canal. 
We have seen that on the previous day, the Thursday, no 
less than six German divisions had exercised their pressure 
upon the small British force defending the upland between 
the Upper Somme and the Oise Rivers, and that in the night 
the British force, which had thus checked tlie enemy all 
day, was retired to the neighbourhood of the Crozat Canal. 
The fighting of Friday morning developed, therefore, upon a 
line without any marked salient, running in front of Epehy, 
Le Verguier, and so down to the Crozat Canal, and along it 
to the marshy Oise Valley. The main weight of the attack 
appears to have fallen to the north of St. Quentin, and 
a protracted defence of Epehy and of Le Verguier, each of 
them standing upon heights commancUng the fields in front of 
them, was made. The holding of the latter point by the 
24th Division being specially singled eut by the British 
Commander-in-Chief for distinction. 
In the course of the day the enemy's progress to the north 
and to the south of Epehy, which had begun to form a pro- 
nounced salient round that height, compelled its evacuation. 
Heudicourt was reached upon the north and Villers Faucon 
upon the south, and the point of Roisel to the south again. 
Under these conditions, the whole line here had to fall back 
to positions in front of Bertincourt, behind Roisel, and even 
beyond Hancourt. Thence the battle fluctuated upon a line 
running nearly southward, but a little eastward until it 
covered Ham, and so on west of the Crozat Canal, across 
which the British had retired, to the Oise VaUey. 
We have not yet heard in what force the enemy came upon 
thi^ front of 10 miles south of Heudicourt, but' it was here 
in the Vermand district, that he forced his way through the 
third or main defensive Une, and compelled a considerable 
retirement, involving a modification of the whole line. It 
wiU be of interest to study in detail the point where this 
local success of his was accomplished. 
Immediately in front of and to the north of St. Quentin 
town the front British trenches ran, 1 believe, as follows : 
They covered the chateau and park of Fayet, lunning 
about 500 yards from the great high road which leads (rom 
St. Quentin to Cambrai. About half-way between Fayet 
and Gricourt they bent back somewhat westward, covered 
the ruins of Gricourt village, and to the north-west of these 
the marshy village of Pontni, but left Pontniet in German 
