April 4, 19 1 8 
Land & Water 
The Great Battle : By Hilaire Belloc 
WHAT is the Great Battle of Picardj-, the 
second Battle of the Somme ? What is its 
main outHne as it has developed in its first ten 
days up to the end of March ? Let us grasp 
this a4 a preface to any comprehension of it. 
There was a great line from the North Sea to the Aljjs 
held under siege conditions, that is, under those of a war 
of positions. The enemy had been forced back to tlus while 
he was still fighting upon two fronts, the Eastern and the 
Western. He held it in the West with difficulty against 
a superior force because his vast resources had to be divided 
for an Eastern War. Opposed to him were two armies 
proceeding from two ver\' different civilisations, the French 
and the English, acting in alliance to defend Europe. These 
two armies held the one, the southern half of the Western 
line frd^m the Alps to the neighbourhood of the River Oise, 
the other the Northern half from the neighbourhood of 
the River Oise to the North Sea. That is very roughly and 
truly the first condition. 
Upon the diagram appended the scheme is suggested by 
the sides of an obtuse angle, A — B, which is the British line, 
and B — C, which is the French. 
The enemy's continued inferiority was turned into a certain 
superiority by the betrayal of the Allied cause in Russia. 
He no longer had an Eastern front to 'consider. He could 
mass his enormous forces against the West. What should 
he do ? It would take him some little time to concentrate 
upon the West, and further he must await the season. But 
with the advent of the season and with that time elapsed 
he could strike with superiority upon the West whenever 
he chose. Would it be to his advantage to strike thus upon 
the West at all ? His submarine campaign was progressively 
diminishing the strength of his great western opponents. 
It was hampering the civUian life of one island half — Britain 
— the supplies of munitions from that half to the Continent 
(especially to distant areas of warfare based on the Medi 
terranean), and its continuance appeared assured. His losses 
had been, in proportion, somewhat more severe than those 
of the French ; more than those of the Italians, and far 
more than those of the British ; he therefore had but his 
last resources to use if he would risk them. The new 
American pressure could not be felt seriously for many months 
to come. Upon such a purely miHtary calculation it was 
his to stand still upon the defensive in the West in spite 
of his slight present superiority and to take advantage of 
the increasing domestic strain among those opposed to him : 
Not to strike at least till that strain was at its maximum. 
Civilian conditions within his own countr}', however, were 
far more serious than those among his opponents. Under 
the pressure of these conditions he determined to stake 
everything, and to win or to lose in a brief and intense 
adventure. 
This conclusion reached, what should be his scheme ? 
Clearly, to strike upon the right of the British front, that 
is, nearer B than A and as near B as possible. 
Such a blow would have the advantage of coming at the 
point where British supply had the furthest to travel from 
the Channel. It would menace the main Allied railway 
communication ; it would have the incidental minor 
advantage of choosing the driest ground — particularly dry 
after a long spell of exceptional weather and therefore 
permitting rapid movement. It would have the capital 
advantage^the whole object of, the move — of separating the 
French from the British forces, and, if the rupture were 
immediately effected, of putting him upon the flank of the 
British line, A — B, and rolling it up. He would destroy 
the British Army as a fighting force before the reserves 
of the Allies, particularly of the French, could come into 
play. The Valley of the Oise, marshy and difficult, would 
protect him from danger upon his own flank during this 
sharp and very expensive, but decisive manoeuvre. He would 
strike with an overwhelming mass — and consequently with 
extraordinary losses ; but he would risk the expense because 
that expense, if he were immediately successful, would 
be worth while. How could he be immediately successful ? 
How could he obtain a decision within a space of time short ■ 
enough to ensure that his very heavy losses in such a gamble 
would not have to be continued to the point where h§ should 
be again in a position of inferiority, and that inferiority 
final and irretrievable ? 
He could do this by making the breach while his left flank 
was still well covered by the Valley of the Oise — a mile 
of marshes and backwaters with few crossings. This 
invaluable obstacle would serve him down to about the point 
of Noyon, which I mark N upon the accompanying dia- 
gram I. 
If the British Hne yielded and he could get round it before 
a retirement beyond the point N had been made, he had 
separated the two armies : He had separated them so rapid- 
ly that the Allied reinforcements would not come up in time 
to be of service. He had separated them with a good 
obstacle between him and any danger of immediate attack 
upon his own flank. 
But things did not so develop. The British line, losing 
terribly and continuing to retire, still remained intact, 
pivoting upon its hinge at H, which is the neighbourhood 
of Arras. It went right back, the French extending and 
keeping in contact with it as it receded. Montdidier at 
M was lost by the French : the angle became sharper and 
sharper ; and there had appeared more than 20 miles of 
open country between M and N : open country not protected 
by the marshy mile width of the Oise valley, open therefore 
to a flank attack by the French reserves. 
On the tenth day of the battle that is how the position 
stands. This open southern flank is his concern. The enemy 
must at all costs prevent increasing pressure upon this 
imperilled open flank between M and N, that is, between 
Montdidier and Noyon. If, indeed, he can still break the 
Allied, which is principally the British, front between M 
and H he has succeeded, although that dangerous southern 
face between M and N is still insecure — for he could therv 
attend to it at his leisure later. If he retains sufficient 
strength to enlarge himself further upon that southern face 
between M and N and to reverse the French pressure there, 
he has also succeeded. But his immediate concern at the 
end of last week was to save that open, endangered site 
which has come into being through the retardation of his 
original programme and through the steadiness of the British 
retreat. 
That is the scheme of the Second Battle of the Somme 
as it stands upon its loth and nth days, Saturday and 
Sunday the 30th and 31st of March, 1918 : A battle that 
will probably decide the fate of Europe. 
From this, the roughest outline, let us turn to follow 
it in more detail. 
The great battle in Picardy is at the moment of writing 
(the evening of Sunday, March 31st, based upon dispatches 
sent upon the evening of Saturday, March 30th), entering its 
nth day. 
Considerable as that period is for an action in which more 
than half the German forces in the West and nearly half 
tlie German army as a whole is engaged, not only has no 
decision yet appeared but there lias not yet appeared either 
any one of those final elements which point to a decision. 
