Land & Water 
April 4, 19 iB 
The junction between the Allied armies remains at the 
moment of writing intact : the chain though still in some 
movement holds in every link ; the losses inflicted upon 
the enemy continue to be those inflicted by an inferior 
defensive against a superior offensive ; the bringing up of 
the enemy's heavy artillery to his more forward positions 
is not yet accomplished. 
Before attempting to grasp' the situation as it stands at 
the moment, let us recapitulate the various phases of the 
battle and its development during these ten days. 
It will be remembered that the enemy opened his bombard- 
ment upon a front of 50 miles from the River Scarpe to the 
River Oise an hour before dawn upon the morning of Thurs- 
day, March 21st, when he launched his infantry from three 
to foiir and a half hours afterwards (according to the sector 
of 'the line upon which he attacked). His principal effort 
was directed to the cutting off of the Cambrai salient and 
presumably to the creation of a rupture in the British line at 
that point. 
This salient lay at about or rather more than one-third of 
the distance from the southern to the northern river, and 
had he succeeded in breaking the British defensive organisa- 
tion there, he would at once have effected his purpose, for 
though a considerable portion — some 30 miles — of the British 
line would still have lain to his left (that is, below or to the 
"south of the point of rupture), he would have turned the 
great bulk of the British army by its right, could easily 
have thrown back the remnant upon the marshy obstacle 
of the Oise Valley, and, long before aid could have appeared, 
would have begun to roll up the main line from the south 
northwards. 
We know, from captured documents, that his plan was 
based upon a very rapid advance upon this first day, and 
that he expected by its close, having broken the main British 
position, generally called the third line or principal line of 
defence, to reach the neighbourhood of Bapaume, and to 
have advanced over a distance of about 12 miles. 
His failure to do this upon the Thursday had, as we shall 
see, a very considerable effect upon the later development 
6f the battle. Though more than one-third of his total 
assaulting force was concentrated upon this effort against 
the Cambrai salient, he did not succeed in creating a rupture, 
and the third line everywhere stood intact ; his deepest 
penetration being in the neighbourhood of Croisilles and the 
subsequent retirement of the British through the night 
being effected in order to the main defensive positions behind. 
In mere ground, the deepest part of the belt thus occupied 
was less than two miles, and on the morning of the second 
day he still had in front of him the-unbroken defensive front 
which it was his business to pierce. He had had extremely 
heavy losses, and could count as \'et only 10,000 prisoners 
— most of them wounded — and the numerous field pieces 
abandoned in the front lines to which they had been pushed 
up to take their toll of the assault. Meanwhile, he had 
been acting with considerable force upon his extreme left 
towards the Oise, south of St. Quentin. There also he had 
compelled a retirement, but it was an orderly retirement, 
to the neighbourhood of the Crozat Canal, undertaken during 
the night, and here also on the morning of the second day 
he was everywhere in front of a main British defensive 
position ; that is, positions fully wired and long-entrenched. 
On Friday, March 22nd, things changed. 
Upon that day, though still attacking with great energy 
along the whole 50 miles of front from the Scarpe to the 
Oise, his principal efforts were made upon the left in front of 
St. Quentin, and at some time between half-past 3 and 5 in 
the afternoon he pierced the main British defensive positions 
west of St. Quentin in the neighbourhood of the ruins and 
great Wood of Holnon. His forces poured through the 
breach thus created rapidly down in an opening fan upon 
the Valley of the Omignon Stream, the neighbourhood of 
Vermand, and the open country to the south of it. This 
misfortune compelled a readjustment of the whole British 
line which had to retire by its right, pivoting upon the north, 
which still stood unbroken. The retirement was over an 
angle of about twenty degrees, the hinge of which was the 
Vimy Ridge and the country to the south of it, just in front 
of Arras. By the Friday night, though the British right 
still stood just behind the Crozat Canal and upon the high 
ground dominating that depression from the west, the centre 
was bent backward to the neighbourhood of Monchy La 
Gache, and thence ran due north to the neighbourhood of 
Fins, after which point it veered north-eastward to the hinge 
above mentioned in the neighbourhood of Arras. The 
heights of Henin and St. Leger were there still held, pro- 
tecting the hinge, and the Vimy Ridge, of course, in the 
extreme north beyond the Scarpe, was intact. 
But tliis retirement of the second day could not be made 
upon a fully prepared defensive pOsitioH, for such no longer 
existed. It was but the beginning of a general retirement, 
which continued in good order, but without interruption or 
serious check to the enemv, throughout the next three days. 
The first natural obstacle behind the British as they yielded 
to the pressure was the middle course of the Upper Somme 
between Ham and Peronne, and it was already clear that 
the first phase of the battle would end upon a line just 
covering the main road, Arras-Bapaume-Peronne-Ham. With 
such a trace, the positions along the Crozat Canal upon the 
right were far forward of the centre, and a retirement in this 
neighbourhood also was necessary in order to conform to 
the general movement. 
During the Sunday, March 24th, the battle was fought 
for this line of the main road and of the Upper Somme and 
necessarily terminated in favour of the very great masses 
the enemy had brought to bear, in which had already been 
identified over sixty divisions. By the Monday evening, 
the 25th, the enemy was in Bapaume and in NesJe and had 
crossed the defensive middle line of the Upper Somme. He 
probably counted at that moment some 50,000 prisoners 
and 600 guns, the former category including, of course, 
wounded men who made up by far the greater part, or nearly 
the wliole, of the list, for there had been no surrounding 
of units — as is proved by the fact that no Staff captures 
were reported. The French were already in action upon 
the extreme right of the British, but as yet in comparatively 
small numbers. They were only beginning to take o\'er 
the right of the British line. 
Character of the Defensive 
We must pause at this moment in the action to emphasise 
two essential facts : First, that so far the whole weight of 
the enemy had been thrown against the British alone ; 
secondly, that the defensive had been undertaken, as classical 
rule directs, by the smallest number of men necessary to 
maintain the line intact and to inflict the maximum number 
of losses upon the defensive. Meanwhile that defensive was 
now being rapidly fed with newly arriving units, and though 
the retirement could not fail to continue with the necessary 
losses in prisoners and in guns the chances of preserving 
the line increased. 
On the Tuesday evening the Germans stood before Albert ; 
the French, who were rapidly taking over the southern part 
of the line, had abandoned Roye and Noyon, so that the 
battle was to rage the next day along a line nearly due south 
and north from the neighbourhood of Arras, the hinge in 
the north, which still stood intact. By this time 70 
German divisions at least had been identified as having been 
thrown into the battle area. Albert was occupied by the 
enem}' upon the evening of the Tuesday. Upon Wednesday 
the somewhat increasing strength of the British line began 
to tell, and this, coupled with the difficulty the enemy had 
in following up his rapid advance with supplies, munitions 
and heavy guns, caused but a slight fluctuation upon the. 
map north of the Somme, where the line lay from just before 
■ Chipilly along the heights to the west of Albert, across the 
old starting-point of the battle of the Somme near Beaumont- 
Hamel, and so through Bucquoy to the unchanging positions 
which defended Arras. 
But on the same day — Wednesday— two events modified 
the battlefield ; the first was the crossing of the Somme 
near Chipilly by the Germans, compelling a considerable 
retirement upon its left bank to the neighbourhood of Le 
Hamel, while much farther to the south against the French, 
the Gentians reached a point immediately in front of 
Pierrepont ; and the French, evacuating Montdidier and 
the hollow of the river Avre stream called "Des Doms" 
(of the ponds) which passes by that town, took up positions 
on the heights immediately to the west of it. These positions 
therefore form, as will be seen upon the map, the point of 
an angle too sharp to be long maintained either by the enemy 
or by the Allies. 
The enemy now held — that is, by the morning of last 
Thursday — two quite distinct faces of the angle. The one 
face ran for 55 miles to 60 looking a little north of west from 
Montdidier to east of Arras ; the other ran at right angles 
, to it, facing a little west of south, and passing from these 
heights near Montdidier through Lassigny to the Oise below 
Pont-L'Ev6que, With this sharp right-angular form of the 
fronts, whicl) was to give the battle all its characteristics 
during the ensuing days, I shall deal at length in a moment ; 
for it is still at the moment of writing the capital point 
in the situation. 
Meanwhile, all during this Wednesday, the 27th, a separate 
attack in very great strength was made upon a narrow front 
with the object of breaking the standing hinge at Arras. 
