April 
1 1 
191 8 
Land & Water 
The 13 divisions of the first category (that which deals 
with divisions as a whole) are as follows : 
(The 1 2th Division 
I The Guards Erzatz Division 
rThe 119th Division 
1 The ist Division 
The 13th Division 
The 45th Division 
The 5th Division 
The 8Sth Division 
The 20th Division 
(The 208th Division 
The 6th Division 
The 125th Division 
The ist Bavarian Division 
These 13 divisions on which we have general iijformation 
pro\'ide that information in three separate groups — the first 
two showing the lightest losses, the next three heavier losses, 
the last eight very heavy losses indeed. 
We have first the two standing at the head— ;-the 12th 
Division and the Guards Erzatz. 
These two betray a loss of 25 per cent, in the first week's 
fighting. Considering the nature of the fighting, its pro- 
longation and the fact that these units were at work all 
through, that figure is low. Moreover, in the case of the 
I2th Division, it is accounted for largely, such as it is, by the 
very heavy losses of the 62nd Regiment, which was caught 
in its advance along the Arras-Cambrai road, early in the 
battle, and lost 800 men apparently at one blow. 
The three next divisions — the 119th, the ist, and the 
13th — form the next group, which is that upon which we have 
•btained — not true di\-isional figures — but the average remain- 
ing strength of many individual companies after a week's 
fighting. We apparently have no divisional documents or 
information from prisoners upon these divisions from staff 
reports, but have found a fairly uniform return for company 
strength by examination of prisoners ; and in these divisions 
the companies examined fell to numbers varying from far 
below to just over one-half their original strength during the 
irst week's fighting. 
Heaviest Losses 
The lemaining 8 divisions — much the largest group in the 
whole category of 13 — not only furnish information upon 
divisional losses as a whole, but show an extraordinarily 
high proportion of such losses. 
The 45th Division lost 50 per cent, in the first day's fight- 
ing ; at what point in the line we are not told, but presumably 
upon the north. 
The 5th Division is that same Brandenburg Division which 
has been re-formed over and over again since it was so cruelly 
butchered in front of Verdun two years ago. Its tradition 
remains, and it is one of the best divisions in the 
German Army. It was thrown in to try to stop that 
"shepherding movement" of which I spoke when the 
German flood was deflected westward from Noyon. It was 
therefore specially heavily tried. It lost 50 per cent, at 
Ham and more at the crossing of the Somme River 
immediately after. 
The 88th Division lost 30 per cent, on the first day's fighting 
against the English and 40 per cent, of the remainder in the 
fighting against the French on the 29th at Meziferes. The 
total losses, therefore, in nine days reduced it by nearly 
60 per cent. It would seem that this division was one of 
those withdrawn after the first day's ordeal and put in again 
later, after a short rest. It may have been exceptionally 
unlucky. • 
The 20th Division lost in the week half its strength, and 
suffered especially heavily in officers. The 208th lost more 
than two-thirds of its strength. 
The 6th (another Brandenburg Division, memorable in the 
attacks at Vaux in 1916) and the 125th suffered a total loss 
of Ihree-quarlers. 
Sucli an enormous proportion of loss for such large units 
will be questioned by many. It is difficult to see how any 
organisation could remain after punishment of this sort, 
though, of course, smaller units do not come under the same 
criticism. But we must accept the evidence given us ; and 
we may be certain that it has been carefully controlled, 
co-ordinated, and checked. 
The 1st Bavarian seems to have suffered in much the same 
proportion, though the figures are less precise. 
Of these tremendously heavy losses in the worst tried of 
the enemy's divisions during the week, we have corrobora- 
tion in a special instance taken from the second category of 
evidence, that of small units, to which I now turn. 
The eight divisions which provide details of this sort 
— that is, details about special units only — are : 
The 4th Division (also an elite which did very hca\^' 
' work at Verdun two years ago) 
The 50th Reserve Division , 
The 239th Division 
The 26th Division 
The 41st Division 
The 3rd Division of the Guards 
The i6th Bavarian Division 
The 1st Guards Reserve Division. 
These eight divisions provide very different types ot 
information, but the first mentioned of them, the 4th Division, 
helps us, as I have said, to understand how some divisions 
have actually lost three-quarters of their total numbers. 
For we have in the case of this unit very precise details 
upon the fate of the ist Battalion of the 140th Regiment. 
The four companies of this battalion would, at their 
full establishment count 250 men each. Even if we allow 
only 250 men to have been actually present in the battle 
in each company, the losses (which have been ©btained 
with absolute precision from a captured document) are amazing 
and they all took place in the first day's fighting. At the end 
of that day the ist company had 35 men left ; the second 
company 16 ; the third 26; and the 4th 17 — with an even 
heavier corresponding loss in officers and n^n-commissioned 
officers. In other words, at the end wf the first day, se far 
as this battalion was concerned, less than •ne-tenth of its 
full establishment remained unwounded, and even if that 
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establislmient was reduced, as most of the German establish- 
ments now are, the killed and wounded were still seven-eighths 
of the whole ! 
In the 50th Reserve Division we get something of the same 
sort, though the details are less precise. It would seem that 
the remnants of whole regiments had to be reorganised 
together, and we have evidence of one company completely 
annihilated. 
In the 239th Division two regiments lost 30 per cent 
to 50 per cent. 
Of the 26th Reserve Division and the 41st Division we 
have such fragmentary evidence as that in tlie first case 
a whole company were annihilated ; in the second that one 
battalion lost just under half its officers apparently, in a 
single day. 
The i6th Bavarian gives, in certain unnamed regiments, 
a loss of 25 per cent. only. Of the 3rd Division of the Guards 
we have company details only showing losses of 40 per cent. 
Lastly, we have the curiously minute evidence from a 
fraction of the ist Guards Reserve Division. It concerns 
only a single battalion of the 64th Reserve Regiment, but 
it is absolutely complete. This battalion was engaged in 
the fighting for Bapaume, astraddle of the great high road 
from 13apaume to Cambrai, and was reduced in the tremendous 
struggle for Bapaume from a full nominal establishment 
of a thousand) which can hardly liave been much less than 
an actual 800 men) to only 80 unwounded at the end of the 
day ! It called for a draft, and could only receive 150 men, 
bringing it up again to 230, at which strength it stood in 
