8 
Land & Water 
April II, 1 9 1 8 
Bapaume ruins when these were reached. But a day or 
two later, when next information could be obtained, that 
remnant had again falleii by nearly half : There were 120 
men left. 
Summary of Evidence 
Now if we put all this evidence together what we arrive 
at is this : — 
The best divisions were used early and used hard : Guards, 
Brandenburg, etc. The least tried divisions on which we 
can get information lost only a quarter of their men — but 
these are but a tenth of those examined. A next and larger 
batch lost one-half or something approaching one-half. The 
largest batch of all, the great majority of the divisions analysed, 
had enormous losses passing from one-half to two-thirds, 
and even, in the case of three of them, up to three-quarters. 
While fragmentary but highly detailed and complete evidence 
with regard to units smaller than divisions, from companies 
to battalions, show us that these very high figures are credible 
for the divisions as a whole. 
.\llowing, as we must, that most of the evidence comes 
from the more sorely tried bodies and that the average is 
brought down sharply by the bodies that came in latpr, 
or which were not concerned in the worst parts of the fighting, 
we are certain that in the first nine days or so, a third, at least, 
of the forces thrown in were hit. The evidence would warrant 
lis putting it higher and saying nearly one-half, but one refrains 
from so high a figure because it would surely mean a dis- 
organisation on the enemy's side which his continued offensive 
does not support. If we say of the first nine days somewhat 
over a third for the units thrown in during those first nine 
ciays — if we think in terms of well under 40 per cent., but 
more than 34 per cent. — I think we are on the right lines. 
I see it suggested by the field-correspondents (who write 
with direct and quasi-official information before them) that 
we may reckon «n more than three thousand, but not more 
:han four thousand losses to the division. The latter figure 
would certainly be exceedingly high, yet it may, when we 
aave full evidence, prove true. In any case, we have now 
:onfirmed by ample figures the first rough guess of a toll 
Taken out of the enemy's material for action ; it comes to 
something certainly not far short of 300,000 men, and 
possibly over 350,000, up to a period more than ten days 
before these lines will be in the hands of the public. 
This is a rate of exhaustion the like of which has not 
appeared in any other fighting, even of this war. It helps to 
explain the continued AUied defensive ; it illuminates a 
phrase whic}\ has been used upon the French front, and 
which -I have heard quoted: "Patience: They have still 
many more divisions to pass in front of our machine-guns." 
Numerical Position 
We must recall at this point that foundation of all miUtary 
judgment which has' been somewhat obscure during the 
last few months, the numerical position of the enemy. 
• We have far less data upon which to base it now than we 
aad a year ago. There has been no loss upon the Eastern 
front for very many months. What is worse, there has 
i>een no serious information from the Eastern front. The 
enemy has stopped giving us even those belated and wilfully 
lessened figures of losses which for nearly three years afforded 
in excellent check upon other forms of calculation. 
Nevertheless, our knowledge of the situation as it stood a 
year ago, the known rate of German recruitment, and the 
Known or nearly known position of his present establishment, 
coupled with some guess at his losses during last summer 
ind autumn in Flanders, are sufficient to convince us, even if 
the enemy's movements were not there to prove it, that he 
IS now staking everything. What he may call up from his 
.\Uies, as we shall show in a moment, is hardly significant 
to the struggle. 
The total German losses at the end of 1915— that is, after 
17 months of war, and counting as dead all those who had 
died after ever being upon the ration strength of that service 
m any form since the beginning of the war — was approxi- 
mately one milUon. After the further lapse of an equal 
space of time, after another 17 months — that is, at the end 
of the 34th month of the war, by May, 1917 — in spite of the 
very heavy losses sUffered under the recent English and 
French offensive^ of Arras and Champagne, his losses in 
dead were not 'doubled. In other words, the total late of 
loss had slightly slackened, the reason being that he had had 
prolonged repose upon the Eastern front during the break-up 
of Russia. He had not quite two million dead at this moment. 
He had more than a million and three-quarters.'* He had 
* Sli or seven weeks earlier the au(tioritte9 la Germaay were admituag one and a half 
million dead to the American Ambassador ia Berlia, but still giving under oa« raiUioo 
In their otJQcial lists. 
perhaps more than 1,800,000, but wo may doubt whether he 
had i,goo,ooo. In the lest 12 months the rate again 
slackened. The last Russian effort was short, and broke 
down, and his main losses were due to the heavy fighting in 
Flanders under the pressure of the British and his own 
pressure exercised earlier for many weeks on the Chemin 
des Dames in front of Laon. On the other hand, the effect 
of time and of the blockade was being felt ; losses from 
sickness were going up and old cases were dropping off, 
many of them after discharge to civilian life. Meanwhile, 
he had a regular annual recruitment of just on half a milhon, 
and had called up every available lad, including, at the 
end of last year, class 1920. He stood before the present 
offensive with a ration strength of some five million and a 
strength organised in divisions of some three millions. 
Nearly the whole of what could be used for active effort 
was on the Western front. Of liis total forces available, he 
has already put in, roughly, one-half into the single 
battle area of. the triangle Arras-Montdidier and Noyon. 
Reckoned in fighting value, he has put in far more than 
one-half. 
If he had no more material to put in, if the remaining 
half were pinned down to other sections of the line and 
immovable, his losses would have already been sufficient 
to cripple his effort. But they are not so pinned down. 
He can send back to quiet sectors of the hne divisions hammered 
out of this battle and throw in as fresh material the divisions 
which these replace. Roughly speaking, he can still risk 
material and losses double those already incurred— but 
that will be the end or very near the end of continued 
offensive power so far as the German resources alone are 
concerned-, 
I do not know whether any readers of Land & Water 
want to waste time over the favourite thesis of certain 
writers that the German armies suffer less than the Allies (in 
spite of their tactical formations), or upon the alternative 
thesis (which seems- equally popular) that the German 
General Staff can work a miracle and create men out of 
nothing indefinitely. I hope I may take it that we need not 
waste space here upon the discussion of these alternative 
theses. 
The unknown factor that does apparently remain is the 
factor of enemy supply for the West of men other than German. 
I have read that there are certain Bulgarian units now west 
of the Rhine. No proof is given and the point is not really 
very material for the numbers must be insignificant in any 
case. 
The Austrian situation is worth a more serious consider- 
ation. The highest number given for the existing Austrian 
divisions is 76. The Italians report 60 Austrian divisions 
opposed to their line. If that report is correct it means 
that at least 11 divisions have been brought from the east 
to reinforce the reduced front between the Swiss frontier 
and the mouth of the Piave. That would seem a very high 
nvunber and some doubt has naturally been expressed in 
France and England as to the accuracy of the very high 
figure 60 which the Italians give us. But we must remember 
that we ignore the internal condition of the Austrian army. 
We do not know the present strength of those divisions well. 
There is here a phenomenon something hke that which was 
discovered — in a much higher degree — relative to the Turkish 
forces some months ago. The divisions supposed to exist 
and noted were numerous enough to make us believe that a 
Turkish effort was probable in Mesopotamia. No such effort 
developed. Upon the contrary, the Turkish front weakened 
more and more, and the explanation could only be that the 
nominal strength of the Turks was vastly in excess of their 
real strength, and that disorganisation, as well as other 
forms <jf loss, accounted for the balance. 
At any rate, if we accept the Italian figures, there would 
be a balance of not more than 16 Austrian divisions ; but of 
these, some must be at work in Russia and one or two in the 
Balkans, and the number that could be spared for adding 
to the German forces in France cannot be very large. 
All this is leaving out the natural political argument that 
the Government of Austria-Hungary would be reluctant to 
send more men than it could help to the Western front, and 
the military argument that the obvious way to use the 
remaining strength of Austria would be for action upon the 
Italian front next month or at the latest in June, when the 
weather permits the renewal of an offensive upon that perilous 
mountain flank left open by the decision of the Allies to 
cover Venice, and not to retire upon the natural line of the 
Adige. We know that, as a fact, the Austrians have con- 
centrated heavily in the Tyrol, and it seems to stand to 
reason that the Italian situation will be kept in hand as a 
sort of balance to work with in case the great offensive in 
France should fail. H. Belloc. 
