April 25, 1918 
Land & Water 
13 
thoroughly trained troops, have been confined mainly to a 
defensive strategy. The Germans, also, like Napoleon, having 
the advantage of inner hnes of operation, could adopt his 
methods which so often won a decisive triumph in a single 
campaign. Considering their superiority in numbers, equip- 
ment, and position in 1914, they cannot be pronounced 
brilliant pupils of the great commander. 
It is well to reahse how slowly and awkwardly the 
British military machine worked in WelHngton's day. 
Nor must the fault be ascribed solely to the Govern- 
ment ; it must accrue to the nation as a whole. Take 
the following jottings of Lord Uxbridge's agent at Plas- 
newydd in August, 1807, when England stood entirely albne : 
"Our regular army is now to be increased by enlistments 
from the militia, but there is great unwillingness to save the 
country unless in a constitutional way. . . . Our country 
gentlemen make no distinction in the means of defence they 
would adopt between an insignificant rebellion in Scotland 
and the mighty invasion with which we are now threatened. 
. . . We have nothing very great to expect till the enemy 
is actually amongst us. He will then give us a practical 
lesson."* 
Politicians Aforetimcs 
Nothing awakened John Bull. He jogged along in the 
old ruts. Successive Cabinets sought to co-ordinate the 
regular army, militia, and volunteers. Pitt, Dundas, and 
Windham ; Addington and Hobart ; Pitt, Camden, and 
Castlereagh ; Grenville and Windham, successively produced 
their reforms until chaos reigned supreme. The Perceval 
Ministry (1809-12) totally failed to solve these difficulties, 
which, of course, could be overcome only by the adoption of 
conscription ; but that nervous Cabinet feared to take so 
drastic a step. After the disastrous failure at Walcheren it 
hesitated to send Wellington tlie needful supplies either in 
men or money ; and (as will appear later) so unpopular was 
the Peninsular War that the Whigs, who opposed it outright, 
might well have ejected Perceval if he had greatly increased 
the taxes. Home poUtics, therefore, prevented a vigorous 
prosecution of the war, until, in the summer of 1812, the 
action of Russia breathed new energy into the calculating 
trimmers of Westminster. Harsh things have been said 
by soldiers of politicians during this war, but nothing com- 
parable to the insults hurled by Napier at the memory of 
Perceval : " The politician, believing in no difficulties because 
he feels none, neglects the supplies, charges disaster on the 
general, and covers his misdeeds with words."f 
But the damning charge against the Portland and Perceval 
Cabinets is their ineffective use of the existing forces. In 
1808-9 the effectives were 26,500 cavalry, 178,000 infantry, 
artillery and engineers, 24,000 ; and the embodied militia, 
77,000, Pasley in 181 1 reckoned that, by calling up the 
reserve militia and training the volunteers, 120,000 men 
might be spared for active service. He arraigned British 
statesmen of timidity and blindness in keeping so many 
regulars at home, and in frittering others away in spasmodic 
and generally belated efforts. Our troops (he wrote) cost half as 
much again as those of any other nation ; our politicians rarely 
looked ahead, never framed a consistent military policy, or 
provided adequate equipment. If they continued to act 
thus we should "have nothing before us but the gloomy 
prospect of eternal war." We must act on land as vigor- 
ously as by sea, or else we might be conquered on both 
elements. Trust in Coalitions was futile ; indeed, in course 
of time— " Germany might become so power/id as to act the 
part which France now does." Let us vigorouslj' support 
Wellington and the Spaniards, for there only could we hope 
to overthrow Napoleon's power. 
Such is the gist of Pasley's essay, which I recommend as 
a tonic to the croakers of to-day.{ 
Wellington also, in the spring of 1812, asserted tliat 
Napoleon's ascendancy was rotten at the base, being "sus- 
tained by fraud, bad faith, and immeasurable extortion"; 
and that an honest understanding among the European 
Powers would end it. 5 If in those dark times our military 
thinkers foresaw the issue of 1814-15, have we any cause for 
pessimism now, when all the Powers of the world are united 
for the overthrow of a supremacy which is less intelligent 
and inspiring, far more odious- and extortionate ? May we 
not also derive conlidence from a survey of our recent military 
* Th$ Paget Papers, II., p. 316. 
t Professor Oman {Peninsular War, IV., p. 67) rebuts the diatribes 
of Napier against Perceval (Napier, bk. xi., ch. 10, xiv, ch. 2) ; but, 
surely, after Torres Vedras, Perceval should have properly supported 
WelUngton or resigned if Parliaraeut refused. 
I Pasley, op. cit., pp. 19, 40, 98, 105, 119, 146, 498-501. 
§ Life of Sir IV. Gomm, p. 240. 
efforts which dwarf e\ery thing that Pasley deemed possible ? 
In efficiency the British Army probably excels our Peninsular 
Army which in December, 1812, Wellington pronounced 
inferior to a French armj' presumably of equal size.* The levies 
of 1914-16 are certainly equal to the highly trained German 
Army — a feat of organisation which dwarfs every other 
effort in our annals. 
Relatively to Germany, it seems probable tliat we occupy 
a position more favourable in naval affairs than our fore- 
fathers did to Napoleon in 1810-12. At that time and down 
to the spring of 1812 he excluded us from intercourse with 
the Continent, except Turkey and parts of the Spanish 
Peninsula. His empire comprised nearly all the coastUne 
from Hamburg to Venice and Ragusa ; he had the active 
support of the Danes, and in June, 1812, when Russia failed 
him, the United States declared war against Great Britain. 
Potentially, therefore, his resources in shipbuilding were far 
greater than ours, and he hoped to overwhelm us at sea. 
Thus, on March 8th and August. 9th, 1811, he bade Decrfes, 
Minister of Marine, prepare for great naval enterprises in 
1812 ; eight sail of the line must be ready at the Texel, 
twenty at Antwerp or Flushing, and large squadrons in 
French and Italian ports, for expeditions to Ireland, Sicily, 
Egypt, Martinique, Surinam, " et tout le Continent hollandais " 
(Australia). Pinnaces were to be built suited to the naviga- 
tion of the Nile and the Surinam. The Boulogne flotilla 
must be prepared to carry 30,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 
and 2,000 artillerymen. In the spring of 1812 fears of 
invasion revived in England. On January 23rd, 1813, 
(that is, even after his disaster in Russia), he ordered naval 
construction which would raise the numbers of his battle- 
ships to 104. At that time we had only 102 in commission, 
with 22 in reserve ; and in view of the hostilities with the United 
States, the horizon was not reassuring. True, we had reduced 
the last of the enemy colonies, Java, and we controlled the 
tropics ; but the immense extent of the Napoleonic coast- 
line required that at least five British squadrons should 
blockade or observe his chief ports, and he hoped thus to 
wear us out until his new fleets could challenge us to decisive 
combat. 
In guerilla tactics at sea he had many advantages. It was 
impossible to prevent hostile cruisers from slipping out and 
doing mischief. In 181 1 the French and their naval Allies 
captured seven, and in 1812 eight, British cruisers, while we 
took or destroyed seven and four respectively. Our losses 
by wreckage were always far heavier (e.g., three sail of the 
line and 15 cruisers, as against one French cruiser in 181 1). 
In that year not one hostile squadron evaded our blockading 
forces, though the Toulon fleet attempted a futile sortie. 
But Napoleon continued to press on liaval construction, and 
Pasley deemed the scattered British possessions so vulnerable 
as to make the issue doubtful against the dominating mass 
of the Napoleonic System. Strategically, it possessed enormous 
advantages over the present German Empire, which in open 
waters can act only from "the wet triangle" (the Ems, 
Heligoland, the Elbe) and from the Flemish coast. The 
further Jiis System extended, the heavier were the losses to 
our merchant shipping, viz., 387 in 1804 to 619 in 1810. 
Thus, Trafalgar procured no immunity for our mercantile 
marine, which in 1810-12 was at the mercy of cruisers and 
privateers from nearly all the ports between Copenhagen 
and Venice. 
On one topic the Napoleonic and the German strategy lays 
equally insistent stress, viz., the supreme importance of 
possessing the Flemish coast. "He who holds Antwerp," 
said Napoleon, " holds a loaded pistol at the head of England." 
During the futile negotiations at Chatillon in March, 1814 
(i.e., when he had virtually lost Holland), he said: "I am 
ready to renounce all the French colonies if I can thereby 
keep the mouth of the Scheldt for France." That dominating 
point, then, was worth the former colonial Empire of France, 
obviously because from Antwerp to Ostend he could coerce 
England at his will. Such, too, is the creed of Berlin ; and 
by their submarine and aerial warfare, waged largely from 
Belgian bases, the Germans have, with their usual fatuity, 
supphed novel and irresistibly cogent arguments for ejecting 
them thence. j. 
The crowning contrast between 1811-12 and 1917-8 has 
already been hinted at. Perceval's unwise maritime pro- 
cedure led to the American declaration of war in June, 1812, 
and to a serious diversion of British naval and military 
strength. The signal tact and moderation of the -British 
Foreign Office and Admiralty in 1914-7 paved the way for 
friencUy relations with our kinsmen ; and under the pressure 
of German frightfulness these developed into an alliance 
which may prove to be one of the decisive issues of the war. 
" Crokcr's Diaries, I., p. 41. 
