12 
Land & Water 
May 2 , 1 9 I 8 
the •xtraordinary circuiiistanceti in which it vva» undertaken, 
were of quite subsidiary importance. The primary object, 
it must be borne in mind, was not the destruction of the 
mole forts, or of the aeroplane shed, or of whatever military- 
equipment was there, or even of killing or capturing its 
garrison. These were only important in so far as their 
partial realisation was necessary to relieving the block-ships 
from the danger of premature sinking. 
This is a matter of real capital importance and of very 
great interest, for it is, I think, not diificult to realise that, 
had similar circumstances existed at Ostend — had it been 
possible, that is to say, to occupy the defenders and distract 
their attention on some perfectly irrelevant engagement^ 
the requisite time would have been given to those in command 
of the block-ships to make sure of getting them into the 
right position. As things were, they were threatened b}' 
the fate which made Hobson's attempt at Santiago a failure. 
With the whole gun-power of Ostend concentrated upon the 
blocking-ships, there was not a minute to be wasted. But- 
with the enemy's fire drawn there would have been the 
leisure which alone could make precision possible. 
Moral Effect 
This enterprise, carefully planned and boldly and resolutely 
carried out, seems to have achieved a very high measure of 
success. It is natural enough, on the first receipt of the 
news, that we should all have been carried away by our 
wonder and admiration at the astonishing heroism that made 
it possible to carry through so intricate a series of operations, 
when every soul engaged was seemingly aware of the desperate 
character of the enterprise, when no one could have expected 
to return alive, when the enemy's means seemed ample, not 
only for the killing of every one engaged, but for the imme- 
diate frustration of every object that they had in view. For 
nearly four years now we have had a constant recurrence of 
such feats of courage, and repetition does not lessen their 
power to intoxicate us with an overwhelming admiration of 
those who are the heroes of these great adventures. But we 
should be misconceiving the significance of this event if we 
were to measure its importance either by the ordered daring 
of those engaged in it, or by its successful execution, or by 
its immediate military results, great and far-reaching as these 
seem certain to be. 
The tiling is more important as affording conclusive 
evidence that the British Navy, as inspired and directed 
from headquarters, has now abandoned the purely defensive 
role assigned to it by ten years of pre-war, and three and a 
half years of war administration. It means that the Fleet 
has escaped from those counsels of timorous — because un- 
imaginative and ignorant — caution, which have checked its 
ardour and limited its activities since August, 1914. The 
effect may be incalculable. The doctrine that every opera- 
tion which involved the risk of losing men or ships must 
necessarily be too hazardous to undertake, is no longer the 
loadstone of Whitehall's policy. The Navy is at last set 
free to act on an older and a better tradition. 
It is indeed on this tradition that on almost every occasion 
the Navy has, in fact, acted when it got a chance. When 
Swift and Broke tackled three times their number of enemy 
last year, and Botha and Morris six times their number a 
month ago, the gallant captains of these gallant vessels did 
not wait to ask if the position of their ships was "critical" 
or otherwise ; but, with an insight into the true defensive 
value of attack — which, seemingly, it is the privilege only of 
the most valorous to possess — went straight for their enemies, 
fought overwhelming odds at close quarters, and came out 
as victorious as a rightly reasoned calculation would have 
shown to be probable. 
Similarly, on May 31st, igi6, Sir David Beatty, when 
his force of battle-cruisers, by the loss of Indefatigable 
and Queen Mary, had been reduced below that of the enemy, 
persisted in his attack upon von Hipper and, by demoralising 
the enemy's fire, provided most effectively for the safety of 
his own ships. Losses did not make him retreat then, nor, 
when Scheer came upon the scene with the whole High Seas 
Fleet, did he withdraw from the action — his speed would 
have made this easy — 'though the odds were heavy against 
him. He. kept, on the contrary, the whole German Fleet in 
play, drawing them dexterously to the north, where contact 
with the Grand Fleet would be inevitable. And, when the 
contact was made, his last effort to break up the German 
line was to close from the 14,000 yards, a range he had 
prudently maintained during the previous two hours, to' 
8,000, where his guns would be more certainly effective, 
realising perfectly_ that no loss of ships in his own squadron 
would signify, if only the entire destruction of the German 
Fleet were made possible by such a sacrifice. It would not be 
difficult to give score* of incidents in which individual admirals 
and captains have shown the old spirit under new conditions. 
But, save only for the crazy attack on the Dardanelles 
forts — and this was hardly a precedent we should rejoice to 
see followed — we have looked in vain for any sign of naval 
initiative from Wliitehall. The explanation lies in the fact 
that we had no staff for planning operations, nor the right 
men in power for judging whether any proposed undertaking 
was based on a right calculation of the value of the available 
means of offence and defence. The events, therefore, of the 
night of the 22nd and the early hours of the 23rd are of 
quite extraordinar\- importance, for they mark an under- 
taking needing long and elaborate preparation, and one 
which could not have been brought to a successful issue, 
had it not enjoyed from its first inception the entlmsiastic 
support of the Admiralty. But this is not all. Not only 
was this an Admiralty supported undertaking, it was one 
that, unlike the Gallipoli adventure, was carried through on 
right staff principles. There was a definite, well-thought-out 
plan — careful preparation for every step in the right selection 
of men and means for its execution. 
I think it is right to put this forward as the most important 
aspect of a significant, stirring, and successful enterprise. It 
is the most important because the news of Wednesday last 
means much more than that Zeebriigge is blocked, that 
Ostend is crippled, and that an expedition — at first sight 
perilous beyond conception — has been carried through with 
losses altogether disproportionate, either to its dangers or to 
the results achieved. The news means that a new direction 
either has been, or certainly can, and therefore must, now be 
given to our naval policy. A year ago sceptics were asking 
if the Army would win the war before the Navy lost it. 
Why, they said, if our land forces can force a way through 
what we were told were impregnable fortifications, should 
the greatest sea force in the world be impotent against an 
enemy who sUnks behind his forts with his surface craft, 
while devastating our sea communications with his sub- 
marines ? Is naval ingenuity, they asked, so crippled that 
we can neither protect our trade against the submarine at 
sea, nor block the enemy's ports so that the submarine can 
never get to sea ? The critics repUed that all was well with 
the Navy, but that all was sadly wrong with its official chiefs. 
The reorganisation of the Admiralty a year ago was imme- 
diately followed by the adoption of the convoy principle — 
and submarine losses were reduced to half. This long- 
advocated measure, the recently inaugurated barrage at 
Dover, and now the events of the morning of April 23rd, 
have justified the critics and the changes in method and men 
which they urged. Zeebriigge has been in the enemy's 
hands since September, 1914, and it has taken us three and 
a half years, not to discover a man capable of attacking it, 
but in developing an Admiralty capable of picking the man 
and giving him the right support before the attack could be 
made. If a similar spirit had actuated a properly constituted 
Admiralty all these years, what might not the Navy have 
accomplished ? 
In the last eleven months the emancipation of the Navy 
has gone forward apace. And not the least significant of 
the stages in the process were first the appointment of 
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes to be head of the Planning Division 
at the Admiralty, next his removal from the Admiralty to 
Dover, next the inauguration of the Channel barrage, and 
now his surprising and masteriy stroke at the Flemish ports. 
The enumeration of these stages is worth making, for they 
mark the genesis of the plan we have seen achieved. It was. 
if I am correctly informed, quite understood when .Admiral 
Keyes went to Dover that his mission was temporary. If he 
was sent to do the things which he has done, and now that 
he has done them is taken back to Whitehall, then it might 
seem as if we might look forward to an aggressive policy at 
sea more worthy of the superb force which we posses?, "and 
more consonant with its glorious heritage than anything 
which we have witnessed in the past. And, if Sir Roger 
cannot be spared from his new command, so auspiciously in- 
augurated, then we must trust that some other of equal brains 
and spirit has already taken or will take his place. Zeebrugge 
and Ostend, then, will figure in naval history, not only as 
the names of achievements unique and splendid in them- 
selves, but more famous as the harbingers of still greater 
things to come. Arthur Pollen. 
The History of the British Army, by the Hon. John Fortescue, 
is a classic. The author has now taken from it extracts which 
deal with British operations in the Low Countries from 1690 — 
1794, and publishes them separately under the title British Cam- 
paigns in Flanders (Macmillan. 8s. 6d.). It is a most interest- 
ing volume, and not only for the soldier, but for all who take an 
historical interest in the great battlefields of this era, and in the 
settling of the present war. 
