14 Land & Water May 2, 191 8 
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Villers-Brettoneux and Kemmel : By H. Bclloc 
THE week has been marked by two operations, 
both of great importance : the attack on Kemmel 
and the attack in the region of Villers-Brettoneux 
upon the junction of the French and British 
armies in front of Amiens. The first of tliese 
was a success for the enemy, though a success the expense of 
which we cannot gauge ; the second was certainly a very 
expensive failure. As has been naturally the case in the 
past, through the proximity of the fighting to these shores, 
the acquaintance of many writers with the district since the 
war began, and the apparent threat to tlie Channel ports, 
the former of tiiese operations has been somewhat over- 
estimated (important though it is) and the latter somewhat 
under-estimated. 
Before looking into them in detail, we must appreciate a 
fact about the whole nature of the front to-day which affects 
the enemy's operations from first to last. That fact con- 
sists in two complementary elements : First that he has the 
initiative, and secondly that he has the initiative upon a 
front nearly all of which is now a front of slow and partial 
but continuous movement. 
All belligerents know, from the experience of now many 
years, what a strongly fortified defensive line established 
over a great length of time means in modern war, and what 
the form of an initiative undertaking its rupture may be. 
If your offensive action slowly proceeds to the point of 
exhaustion without doing more than slightly modifying or 
indenting the original line by a few miles, the defensive has 
the advantage. Its losses are normally less than its oppon- 
ents ; the strategic result at the end of the affair is nil. If a 
nipture be effected and a rapid advance takes place through 
the gap, the defensive loses heavily in men and guns before 
the Une is re-established. It should in theory lose much 
more heavily than the attack. That was certainly the case, 
for instance, in Italy last autumn. But if the original effort 
was made with overwhelming forces — spent like water in 
order to obtain an immediate decision — and if the attempt 
to get that decision is carried on long after it has become 
impossible, then the offensive will lose more than the defensive 
by far ; although the fact that the defensive loses so many 
prisoners brings the definitive losses — that is, the losses for 
good 'and ail, the losses in men who never return — nearer 
to an equality. 
A decision having then failed the offensive, but the initia- 
tive still remaining (from superiority of force properly handled) 
with the offensive commanders, a third phase may arise ; 
and it is precisely such a third phase that has arisen between 
Noyon and the sea to-day. This third phase is what I have 
called a war of slow and partial but continuous movement ; 
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in other words, by continuing to attack now here, now there, 
the offensive can prevent a re-crystallisation of the defensive 
line in the intervals of heavier blows designed to try once 
more the chance of breaking it for good and all. When the 
original defensive front has gone, the creation of a new one 
equally solid is a very long business. Ludcndorff spent 
months at it behind his hues during the Battle of the Somme 
in the preparation of the defensive zone generally called 
"the Hindenburg line" from the Vimy Ridge to the Forest 
of St. Gobain. When on the third attempt, while the Allies 
still possessed the initiative, this zone was itself pierced, it 
was only pierced on a comparatively narrow front astraddle 
of the Scarpe River. It was able to re-crystallise again. 
Now, in the present phase the enemy has the advantage 
for his continued effort of an immense line, only a small 
fraction of which is now the original defensive zone and no 
long portion of the rest of which has had even one full month 
in which to strengthen itself permanently. 
If we look at the map and compare the lines drawn across 
it we shall see that the proportion of original British front 
left between the Aisne Ridges and the sea consists of no more 
than the northern part of Vimy Ridge, continued northward 
up to Givenchy, and the stretch north of Ypres, which is 
protected by the continuous and widening marshes of the 
Yser. We shall further see that what may be called the new 
fronts have, as yet, no real stability. There is still fluctua- 
tion in sectors all roimd the great Amiens salient ; and there 
is still fluctuation latterly, as we have seen of a very grave 
kind, on the new Ypres sahent. The proportion even of 
the new line which has been fairly steady for even as little 
as four weeks, is quite insufficient to stabihse the whole. 
Now, in these conditions, quite apart from any chance 
success greater than he has planned, and apart even from a 
third great movement on a wide front, it is obviously the 
enemy's pohcy to keep shaking the defensive. He has taken 
Kemmel. Let us suppose — though it should take him three 
weeks or more — he captures the whole line of heights up to 
Mont des Cats. According to the length of time involved, 
there is less and less menace of disaster to his opponents, in 
spite of his success. The awkward salients formed upon 
the north can be flattened back if time is provided — and. 
after all, he did not get to the top of Kemmel until more 
than a fortnight after his first thrust at Hazebrouck and 
Bethune. But the point is that he keeps the line continually, 
though slowly, moving, thereby certainly prevents its cry- 
staUising, and possibly threatens it with disaster at some 
unexpected point of which he hopes to take immediate 
advantage. It is true the movement has been only slowly 
progressive, but it is obviously intended to bear such fruits. 
Further, with every pronounced advance, even at great 
expense and spread over a long time, some strategic object 
is clearly achieved. For instance, supposing he compels the 
Allies, before he is exhausted, to fall back upon the line of 
the Aa, of which I spoke last week (an excellent natural 
line), he thereby destroys what used to be our nearest lateral 
communication, he uncovers Dunkirk, he is within long 
range of Calais Harbour, and he creates such a salient round 
Arras that he might hope to make that his next prey. This 
latter effect he also produces if, checked in the north, he 
produces a new dent between Arras and Albert. Again, as 
we shall see in a moment, if he seizes the junction land between 
the Avre and the Somme his observation stands upon the 
high plateau of Villers-Brettoneux and gives him great 
advantage. The same thing is tnie of a success upon any 
one of the heights which now look down upon him all along 
the very awkward Hne which chance estabhshed for him after 
his advance in March. For instance, there is great strategic 
advantage in reaching the top of the ridge between the 
Avre and the Noye, or in seizing, as he has failed to seize, 
the extremely marked Lassigny Hills ; or in getting Mount 
Renaud outside Noyon. 
One can never understand even the simplest military 
operation without appreciating its hmitations. The advan- 
tages of the enemy are obvious, and will remain obvious for 
some time to come. He has what are virtually interior 
lines : he has what is still superiority of organised number. 
He has compelled the considerable reduction of a detached 
reserve prepared for a very different purpose and now neces- 
sarily used only defensively as regards at least a portion of 
it. He has, thanks to the Russian treason and his Itahan 
victory, a superiority in pieces if not in munitionment. 
All this he has ; but his limitation on the debit side is his 
