i6 
Land & Water 
May 2, 19 1 8 
Brettoneux, the essential point, he had gained, but lost 
again. 
Once again we have to ask the question, impossible to 
answer with exactitude, what the cost to the enemy may 
have been ? The nature of the attack proves it to have 
been considerable. For it was one in which more and more 
men had to be fed in, and yet in which the object was not 
accomplished. Also some of the best divisions available 
were used. There came in the first attack the 4th Division 
of the Prussian Guards which had already been used twice 
since March 21st, and which had been given a fortnight's 
rest, and its ranks fully replenished from its Berlin recruit- 
ment. A fresh division back from the Eastern front, the 
77th Reserve — Westphalian in composition — was also used. 
Two more divisions came in during the day ; and prisoners 
were taken before the end of the thirty-six hours from yet 
two more, the 228th and the 243rd. It is not certain that 
the whole of these last units were engaged. 
As the British re-advanced over ground previously lost 
it was possible to make some estimate of the proportion of 
German dead, and the official dispatch from headquarters 
says that the numbers of these were exceptionally high. In 
other words, the German effort at Villers-Brettoneux was 
not only a failure, but an exceptionally expensive one. 
^ As is usually the case when the enemy's plans go wrong, 
his dispatch upon this occasion is misleading. He may 
very well be exact in claiming some 2,000 prisoners and 
4 guns, for he made a rapid advance on the evening of the 
Wednesday. But to say that our counter-attacks "broke 
down with sanguinary losses" is obvious nonsense, while to 
leave out all mention of the capture and recapture of Villers- 
Brettoneux is equally ridiculous. The counter-attack was 
completely successful. That, indeed, is the whole point of 
the action. 
Nearly coincident with this principal piece of work, which 
may be called the action of Villers-Brettoneux, was a second 
piece of work in the north which may be called the action of 
Mount Kemmel. It opened upon the morning of Thursday, 
April 25th, and continued throughout two days and part of 
the third, reaching its maximum, which was also the moment 
in which the hill was seized, during the first twenty-four hours. 
The tactical details of this action have been clearly given 
in the daily Press and have been followed closely by opinion 
at home. What has been perhaps less thoroughly dealt with 
has been its strategic aspect. 
The tactical details were that a very large force drawn 
apparently entirely from the 4th Germany Army, that of 
von Amim, fought to surround the hill of Kemmel by the 
north and by the south. Among those who attacked were 
identified the Alpine Corps, the 117th Division, the nth 
Bavarian Division, and the 56th Division. The enemy 
carried Dranoutre and pushed up the valley to the west of 
Mount Kemmel. He carried Kemmel Village itself to the 
east of the height (and by that time the summit was clearly 
turned on both sides) ; he reached, but did not pass, the 
"Cross Roads" (for which the Flemish is Vierstraat), and he 
got into the mass of craters at St. Eloi. As the enemy had 
outflanked the summit of Mount Kemmel, both from the 
east and from the west, the summit was doomed. But for 
local reasons, probably connected with the necessity of 
holding the enemy during the formation of new dispositions 
behind, it was determined to hold the summit as long as was 
possible. This sacrifice was allotted to a French division, 
which maintained the defence until the hill was completely 
surrounded and its defenders lost with it. 
By the morning of the next day — Friday — the enemy 
claimed 6,000 prisoners, most of them French, and his line 
la}' from in front of Locre right up the depression between 
Mount Kemmel and the Scherpenberg to the neighbourhood 
of La Clytte ; thence along the northern base of Mount Kemmel 
to Vierstraat and so to St. Eloi. His capture of Kemmel 
had already given him the whole of its district at a blow. 
The familiarity of the public with this part and these 
names, their proximity to the British seas, and the fame of 
Ypres and of its salient during the last three years, between 
them somewhat obscured and exaggerated the strategical 
meaning of the German success. 
That success is important, but it does not in itself connote 
any great strategical change. Had a similar effort been 
made, for instance, against Hazebrouck, it would have been 
worth while meeting and containing it, and it would have 
been met and contained. What the capture of Mount 
Kemmel does is to give complete observation towards the 
north, and to begin a gradual advance westward along the 
chain of hills of which Kemmel is the eastern bastion, and 
render the Ypres salient more and more difficult to hold. 
But supposing that salient evacuated completely and the 
line redrawn from the marshes of the Yser south-westward, 
no considerable strategic result immediately follows. As 
part of the general German plan to shake the Allied front 
and to keep it continuously in movement, all this has its 
place. But there is nothing decisive about it. There is no 
great strategic move taken, until, for instance, Dunkirk be 
uncovered : a contingency already mentioned as possible in' 
the future if the enemy should compel a retirement to the 
fine of the Aa. And we must clearly keep in mind during 
all these actions that pace is everything, for pace is measured 
in expense. So long as (i) the yielding is gradual ; (2) the 
cost imposed upon the advance is far superior to that imposed 
upon the defence ; (3) the yielding takes place where there 
is room to manoeuvre and where nO strategic consequences 
follow ; (4) the yielding does not lead to any disintegration 
or confusion— so long advance here or there is not to the 
enemy's advantage. He continues to make it and will con- 
tinue to make it because he hopes that on every one of these 
four points he will some day score and so achieve his result. 
But until he does so he is still hazarding expense of men 
against a possible but not attained result. H. Belloc. 
