Land & Water 
May 9, 191 8 
separate and distinct, e.g.. that of April 4th, that of the 
other day against Villers-Brettoneux and Hangard (6 divi- 
sions, rising to 8, and ending with 10), that against Rcthunc 
the week before (6 divisions). The break-through at Armen- 
tiferes (4 divisions, bc?coming 6 within the first day, and 
rising to 8 by the second, or perhaps 11 by the end of the 
second). Six divi.sions, rising to 7 and reinforced to 10 in 
the operations against Arras on March 2iSth and 29th, etc. 
Although the break-through at Armentieres gave an 
opportunity for rapidly developed action, and although in 
the course of three weeks following nearly 40 divisions 
appeared in that region, yet even here we have to deal svith 
successive and distinct actions, with longer and longer pauses 
for re-arrangement in between and with stricth' local 
objectives. 
It is the same thing if we contrast the length of front in 
the first and in the second phase. The first phase involved 
a shock on a front of about 50 miles, rapidly extended to 
over 70. None of the local efforts of the second phase have 
at any one action covered a front of more than 15 miles, and 
the greater part have been confined to lengths of from 6 to 
10 miles at the most. 
Again, the first phase was one continuous blow, rupture, 
and pursuit, pressed to its extreme limits, and evidently 
expecting, up to the last moment, a decision. The second 
phase has admitted distinct and lengthening intervals between 
each loc&l and partial effort. 
The battle, then, has, during the whole of a period roughlv 
corresponding to the month of April, had the new mark of 
what I have called the second phase, and it is as part of this 
perhaps as the termination, or nearly the termination of this, 
that we must regard the great action of April 29th, which 
may be called the Battle of Locre. It was a complete local 
defeat for the enemy, and an exceedingly severe one. 
We have been told more about it than we have about 
most of these affairs, and at this distance of time we can 
judge it in some detail. I will proceed to analyse it. 
Firet, as to its object : The enemy, in a strength of about 
9 divisions against about 4, had seized Mt. Kemmel some four 
days before, and had extended his line at the base of this 
height ; so that it stood, at the eqd of his success, in a nearly 
straight line north-eastwards, from Meteren along the base 
of the hills through the saddle west of Kemmel, in front of 
the village of Locre, right up north (further across the saddle) 
to the fields in front of La Clytte, and thence north of the 
cross roads of Vierttraat. 
It passed through the hamlet of Voormezeele. The line 
then swept on eastward round Ypres in a flat salient to which 
it had been retired, and then up through Bixschoote, in which 
region the Belgians took it oh to the marshes of the Lower Yser. 
Two things will be clearly apparent from the trace thus 
established, especially if we put the matter (as upon Sketch I.) 
in the form of a diagram. First, that if the enemy could 
make another rapid advance in his centre north-westwards 
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from Dranoutre along the arrow, forcing Locre and the 
saddle between Mt. Kemmel and the Mont Noir, turning, 
and then occupying the next lump of hills (Mont Noir and 
.Mont Rouge) he niight create such a salient round about 
the ruins of Ypres as would be untenable. But it might 
have to be a rapid movement to succeed. It would then 
compel a rapid evacuation of that deep salient, and it would 
throw the Allies back in the north. ' 
Next, a blow of this sort outflanking the Mont Noir and the 
Mont Rouge would put nes-riy the whole of the range of hills 
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into German hands, completely dominating the plain to the 
north. Nothing would be left to take but the Mont des Cats, 
and by the time that had gone it would be certain that the 
whole of the northern plain \^ould have to be evacuated, and 
Dunkirk uncovered in any case. 
Such was the obvious strategic advantage aimed at when 
the blow was planned and prepared during the three days' 
lull after the occupation of Mount Kemmel, and such were the 
results envisaged when the enemy's bombardment began at 
3 o'clock in the morning of Monday, the 29th. 
The order of battle at this moment would seem to have 
been as follows, reading from west to east — that is, from 
right to left of the Allied line : — 
On the extreme right at .Meteren, and from Meteren up to 
the base of the Mont Noir, were the Australians. From 
there to a point somewhere near the front of La Clytte, and 
between it and Locre, ran the French, holding the base of 
the hills and the saddle between Kemmel and the Mont Noir. 
On the left, continuing eastward up to the Ypres Canal, 
were 3 English divisions— the 25th, the 49th, and the 21st. 
The whole of the front thus engaged extended for a 
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