Land & Water 
May 1 6, 1918 
French and German Theories: By H. Belloc 
THERE has been a lull of now just over a fortnight 
between the last German offensive in Flanders, 
which, as will be remembered, was broken by the 
verj' considerable victory of April 29th, and the 
present date ; this article being written after the 
receipt of dispatches sent upon the night of Sunday, May 12th. 
That lull has only been broken by one abortive effort upon 
a small scale, in its final development, at least, and quickly 
checked, which was attempted by the enemy last Wednesday. 
As a whole, the period has been one of marking time upon 
the side of the oltensive, while the defensive has watched it 
in the same mood and with part of the same prolonged policy 
as will characterise its whole attitude, so long as tlie enemy 
submits himself to this strain. 
It is clear, from the tone of the Press, that opinion has 
been puzzled by so long a halt ; and the question has even 
been asked whether the great offensive will continue. 
We have every reason to believe that the great German 
offensive will continue. The political motives which prompted 
it are as acute as ever; the concentration "is undiminished. 
There is a permanent and fundamental contrast between 
the German and the French conduct of military operations, 
which contrast may be traced, upon the German side at least 
as far back as Frederick the Great ; on the French as far 
back as Camot — the creator of the modern school. 
Briefly, the opposing doctrines are, on the one hand, the 
theory that success is most probably attained by a single 
plan thoroughly thought out and imposed upon the enemy ; 
on the other, that success is most probablv attained by the 
prevision of every possible chance, and "all depends upon 
great rapidity of judgment in changing plan from one line 
to another as necessity arises. 
It is of a dramatic interest, rare in the annals of war, to 
note that the two latest exponents of these two contrasting 
theories are both in the field. Bernhardi, who wrote, with 
as much lucidity as his language would allow before the 
present war in defence of the first thesis, is reported, I know 
not on what authority, to have commanded and been de- 
feated the other day at Bethune. Foch, whose great essay 
on The Conduct of War has been the text-book of the French 
schools, is in command of the Allied armies. 
The Bernhardi Theory 
Bernhardi has said, in effect, this: "Be resoh'ed to act 
in a predetermined fashion which shall give the form to all 
you do. Thus disembarrassed of every temptation to 
vacillate and of every opportimity for intellectual vagary, 
you \yill deliver your blow whole-heartedly, and if your 
material and 3'our will be sufficiently strong, your enemy 
will be condemned to vour own plan, no matter what the 
ingenuity or multiplicity of his alternative plans." 
It is the doctrine of those who mystically, as one may say, 
confuse with, or conceive in, the mere prophecy of victory 
the fact of victory itself. The French temperament, which 
is, if anything, too much enamoured of reahty and has, if 
anything, too great a contempt for vision, prefers to cal- 
culate and, at the same time, to trust to rapichty of judgment. 
The power of calculation is seen not in the slow preparation 
of a mass of detail co-ordinated to one plan, but in the simul- 
taneous grasp of several ; just as the power of a mathema- 
tician is not shown in his accuracy or patience when making 
a simple addition of many thousand figures, but in his power 
to co-ordinate the interdependence of many variants. 
Of the first theory it may be said that when it succeeds it 
succeeds entirely ; and not only is the result complete, but 
also it leaves, for what it is worth, a sense of destiny or 
creation. You intended to do one thing, and that thing you 
did. It confirms you in the sense of victory, and it impresses 
neutral and foe alike. It is 1866 and 1870. But, on the 
other hand, if you fail, you fail altogether. It is a theorv 
useless for the defensive, and one such that men practising 
it can hardly understand the great Napoleonic doctrine that 
one must always expect one's enemy to be about to do what- 
ever would be the worst for oneself. 
About the second theory it may be said that it is a product 
of the defensive type, and therefore of a conscious weakness. 
That is for philosophers to discuss. At any rate, it has these 
three advantages : That if it wins it wins quite as completely 
as the first ; that it can rally against local or immediate 
failure ; and that in the case of general failure, it is at least an 
instrument for prolonging to the utmost the chances of reco\'erv. 
Now, quite apart from the theoretical interest of these 
contrasting ideas — enormous as |t is to the future of the 
war — there is the practical interest of observing that our 
knowledge of the German theory confirms our conviction 
that the great offensive will be continued, and confintis our 
opinion (for it is not a conviction, but only a judgment of 
probability) that it will be continued intensively and in the 
same spirit of gambling to win or lose as inspired its first 
inception upon March 21st. 
Everything tKe enemy has done in the past was of this 
prolonged sort following a predetermined plan. He pushed 
the first Western invasion beyond the point- of defeat and 
nearly to the point of disaster. He pushed the plan of the 
first Flanders. offensive, which we call the Battles of Ypres, 
right up to the point of exhaustion without result. He did* 
exactly the same in front of Verdun. He did the same again 
against the (J!hemin des Dames. On the Allied side, with 
the exception of the advance last year east of Ypres, an 
offensive ceased upon the failure to achieve a final object or 
upon success in achieving a limited one. We have a right, 
in view of the enemy's general theory of war, coupled with 
our experience of his action in the past, quite apart from 
the common sense of the position, his political necessities 
and his actual concentration, to behave that he will continue. 
What sector he will choose for the next action, and upon 
what scale he will nialce it, we cannot tell, but upon the 
balance of probability it is the front of Albert that should 
most tempt him. It has only one disadvantage, to wit, 
that he has not there any opportunity for surprise. But 
that he can hardly now expect upon any sector. 
While it is ridiculous to pretend a knowledge of the enemy's 
• plans (and that is what prophecy comes to when your enemy 
has the initiative), it is not ridiculous at all, butthe best of 
sense, to estimate the elements which he has before him 
and his reasons for doing this or that. And it is therefore of 
value at this moment to consider what advantages the enemy 
has in attacking between the Somme and the Scarpe, 
and particularly between Albert and Arras as distinguished 
from the advantages he has in attacking south of that 
sector. 
In the first place, upon a great part of this front (which is 
one of rather less than 30 miles) the enemy is not upon a 
disadvantage of ground, and that is particularly the case in 
the north of it. In the sovWli, the Allies hold the high ridge 
which runs parallel to and west of the course of the Ancre. 
But the northern, 12 or 15 miles above the upper courses of 
that river, and in the watershed between the basins of the 
Somme and the Scheldt, are not marked by any line of terri- 
tory where we staad overlooking him. It is true that ground 
has not the importance it had ; but, still, other things being 
equal, ground makes a sufficient difference to determine all 
calculation. Where there is a marked ridge it has profoundly 
affected the defensive throughout this war. 
The second obvious advantage of an attack in this sector 
is that it takes advantage of the salient of Arras. The 
enemy had 'already created a bulge of which Arras was the 
marking point when he made his great advance up to and 
past Albert after his victory in front of St. Ouentin in March. 
He accentuated the value of that bulge to himself and its 
disadvantage to us when he got his new success upon the Lys 
and pushed west of Merville, creating a new front in the rear 
of Arras all the way from Robecq to Givenchy, near La 
Bass^e. It is true that such a bulge is not verv pronounced. 
The extreme depth given it by this northern advance of his 
•on the Lys is only 12 miles, and that advance is 20 miles and 
more north of Arras (hi^ advance begins at Givenchv, which 
IS about 16 miles north of Arras, and extends to Robecq, 
which is some 23 miles north-west of Arras). Still, there is a 
salient of just the sort which he has loved to create before in 
his Eastern strategy, and the reduction of which would give 
him a further great advantage of territory and the infliction 
of losses upon his opponent. 
Thirdly, a real and rapid success upon this sector comparable 
to his break through by St. Quentin or upon the Lys, the 
other day, would give him .very much more than the mere 
reduction of the Arras salient. It would give him an advance 
towards the nodal point of all communications in this district, 
the town of Doullens, .which stands some 15 miles behind 
the nearest of his present positions. 
Lastly, it is a sector upon which the Alhes have less lateral 
communication of the old-established kind (main roads and 
railways) than e'sewhere. 
