May 1 6, 191 8 
Land & Water 
construction was shown by curves made out in quarterly 
stages which ended on December 31st, showing the destruc- 
tion line descending somewhat sharply and the construction 
line ascending still more sharply to meet it. Had these two 
slopes continued we should have had them crossing before 
the middle of February last. If we continue those curves 
now in the light of the latest returns, we shall find that, 
while the destruction curve still slopes downwards, the 
angle of the slope is more gradual. This is accounted for 
by the fact that, while the fourth quarter of 1917 showed a 
loss of 170,000 tons less than the third quarter for British 
shipping and of 221,630 tons less for the world's shipping, 
the improvement for the last quarter is only 50 per cent, of 
this in the case of our own shipping and only 66 per cent, 
for the world's shipping. The building curve, of course, 
instead of continuing to rise, does not even remain parallel. 
But as there is a net gain of 81,000 tons, while both curves 
now slope downwards, the destruction curve is steeper than 
that which represents replacement. The situation on 
January ist and April ist may then be compared in this 
way. On the first date the world was losing tonnage at the 
ra^e of 340,820 tons a quarter, whereas on the second the 
rate had fallen to 258,903 a quarter. 
Of tlie present state of affairs we have, as indicated above, 
only the figure for British construction for the month of 
April, during which we produced 111,533 tons only. But it 
■is officially pointed out that during this month repairs to 
damaged ships increased by no less than 40 per cent. This 
represents a call on material, plant, and labour in the ship- 
yards, which may very easily be the equivalent of a very 
considerable tonnage of new shipping. But, apart from this, 
it would be a mistake to estimate the increase or otherwise 
of the effort in shipbuilding simply by monthly returns. 
We have not -yet reached the stage of all ships under con- 
struction being uniform in tonnage and design. The com- 
pletion of each individual ship must depend partly on its 
character, partly on the date of its inception, partly on 
local conditions — of which the demand for repairs to injured 
vessels is, after all, only one. It therefore would not be 
surprising if th" monthly returns varied within very wide 
limits. The official estimate for the production of British 
yards during the current year stipulated a monthly rate of 
165,000 tons from the date of the Admiralty statement in 
March. The natural thing to expect is a gradual approxima- 
tion to this output, and then a steady increase upon it, so 
that the average for the next seven months should come 
out approximately at this figure. It is, however, an obvious 
possibility of the situation that the reorganisation of the 
industry secured by Lord Pirrie's appointment m«y give us, 
before eight months are out, results which are substantially 
better. 
Losses by Submarines 
We shall not get the returns of British and world's losses 
, by submarine for April for another fortnight, but there are 
significant indications that an improvement will be shown. 
First, I find a general impression prevails that submarines 
are being sunk at a far higher rate than ever before — the 
most satisfactory way, when all is said, of securing the pro- 
tection of our trade. Next, Admiral Sims, speaking at a 
complimentary dinner to American officers in London a 
week ago, is reported to have said that, in his opinion, 
there was no danger that the Allies were going to be defeated. 
Germany had never had any hope of victory, save in the 
, submarine campaign, and the progress of this from its highest 
point in April last had shown a steady decline, whereas 
building had steadily progressed. He then added that these 
two curves would cross at the present rate inside of two 
weeks. From that time on building would increase our 
shipping instead of submarines decreasing it. Germany 
knew this just as well as the Allies, and it was this knowledge 
that explained why'she was making such a desperate effort 
on the Western front. It was her only and laist chance. 
The Admiral's reference to the two curves crossing 
in a week's time not only confirms our supposition that 
the anti-U-boat offensive has gained in effect, but gives 
ground for hope that there has been a further decline in 
submarine losses, and that a notable advance in the world's 
rate of shipbuilding may shortly be revealed. That the 
American rate should have been comparatively low for the 
first months of the year was fully to be expected, for the 
mere scale of the original plan, apart from every other con- 
sideration, militated against the early output being, month 
by month, proportionate to the desired total. A year ago 
the Emergency Shipping Corporation's programme was 
framed on an expectation of half a million tons a month. 
The practical difficulties in realising so vast a project at so 
early a date were insuperable. It is probable that more 
would have been achieved in the first twelve months if a 
programme considerably less ambitious had been attempted. 
With Mr. Schwab's appointment,' at the end of the winter, 
to the general supervision of the whole undertaking, however, 
a new direction was given to the scheme, and it is not un- 
reasonable to interpret Admiral Sims's prophecy to mean 
that the American reorganisation effort is now about to 
bear fruit. If 4,000,000 tons are to be produced in the 
current year, as seems not improbable, production at the 
rate of the original plan — namely, half a million a month — 
will have to be attained, and that very shortly. Now, if 
all the Allies and the neutral world have together only pro- 
duced 544,000 tons in the first three months of the year, it 
is easy to see what a vast difference a comparatively small 
acceleration of the American rate will make to the general 
position. And, as the quarterly gap is now only just over 
a quarter of a million tons, a continuation of the downward 
slope of the destruction line ought soon to put us in the 
position which the Admiral forecasts. 
If this point can be reached in a week, it means something 
much more significant than that the power of the submarine 
to reduce the world's shipping by attrition will have come 
to an end. It means that shipbuilding will be contributing 
more to the result than the naval defensive. Now, there is 
no reason to suppose that the destruction curve will not 
continue downward. THere is, indeed, every expectation 
that it must do so. And if America alone can get to half a 
million tons a month and the rest of us to 200,000, then it 
would not be so very long before the handicap of shipping 
shortage must definitely be removed. It is not necessary 
to dwell upon the severity of the handicap as it stands to-day. 
By making it a vital necessity to substitute home-grown or 
home-made products for those that we used to import, the 
submarine has in the first place put such a strain upon our 
man-power that we have not been able to measure and 
provide provisions of men at the front by military require- 
ments only. We have had to balance this necessity against 
others not less imperative. That it has reduced our food 
supply is a disagreeable, but not a vital matter. What is 
entirely vital is that limited transportation is at once the 
bottle-neck which prevents the vast resources of America 
being reflected in her strength in the field of battle, and 
imposes, not in one, but in all fields of war, ruthless limits 
to our employing the forces already at our disposal. 
When the Admiralty return was published in March of 
the tonnage lost, by enemy action, built and acquired as 
prize, it appeared that the shipping of the world available 
to the Allies showed a net reduction of two and a half million 
tons from the figure it stood at before the war. The losses 
for the month of March make the total now t^o and three- 
quarter millions. If the rate of loss remained only constant 
and the shipbuilding went up to the anticipated figure, the 
whole of this deficit would be wiped out in, at most, six 
months' time. It is surely impossible to over-estimate the 
effect this will have upon the campaign. It will be a fin^l 
assurance of victory, so long as the enemy does not find some 
new naval means of breaking in to our sea communications. 
And it is surely not ra«h to prophecy that no such means do 
exist or can conceivably be brought into existence. 
.It will be observed that herein I take it for granted that 
the normal means of sea war — that is, battleships, cruisers, 
destroyers, and submarines employed for their legitimate 
purposes against our armed sea forces — available to the 
enemy since the beginning, will not probably be used with 
effect against us now. If the enemy has made no effort to 
employ them up to now, is it likely that this failure of the 
submarine will compel him to a final struggle ? Certainly 
if it does, the effort will be made in conditions far les; pro- 
mising than they have ever been. For it is now abundantly 
apparent that the conversion of our system of naval adminis- 
tration and command from the old quarter-de6k or auto- 
cratic principle to the present staff principle has resulted in 
exactly that gain in energy, enterprise, and efficiency, that 
the advocates of the conversion so confidently foretold. It 
must, in other words, be as abundantly clear to the enemy, 
as it is to us, that Allied sea-power in the month of May, 
1918, has reached a point in efficiency never previously 
touched during the war and t hat its mark is not that individual 
ships or squadrons are better trained, nor that individual 
commanders are bolder or more skilful, though, no doubt, 
the crucible of war has run much dross away and left the 
true metal clear. The change lies in this : that the Navy 
as a whole — and this includes the Allied forces no less than 
the British — is being handled with initiative. It can be 
so handled to-day because at last the varied and widely 
diffused brain work necessary to it is executed and co- 
o.dinated to the right purpose. 
