8 
Land & Water 
May 
dy 
1918 
Never to sufler EurojJe to 
intermeddle in Cis- Atlantic 
affairs. America. North 
and South, has a set ol 
interests different from 
;hose of Kurope, and pecu- 
liarly her own ; she should, 
therefore, liave a system 
of her owr. . separate and 
apart from that of Eurojie. 
While tlie last is labouring 
to become the domicile of 
despotism, our endeas^jur 
should : urely be to make 
our hemisphere that of 
freedom. One nation, 
most of all, could disturb 
us in this pursuit : she 
now offers to lead, aid, and 
accompany us in it. liy 
acceding to her proposi- 
tion, we detach her from 
the band of despots, bring 
her mighty weight into 
the scale of free govern- 
ment, and emancipate at 
one stroke a whole conti- 
nent, which might other- 
wise linger long in doubt 
and difficulty. 
Great Britain is the na- 
tion which can do us the 
most harm of any one of 
all on earth ; and with 
her on our side we need 
not fear the whole world. 
With her, then, we should 
the most sedulously nour- 
ish a cordial Iriendship 
and nothing would tend 
more to knit our affections 
than to be fighting once 
more side by side in the 
same cause, not that I 
would purchase even her 
amity at the price of 
taking part in her wars, 
but the war in which the 
present proposition might 
engage us, should that be 
its consequence, is not 
her war, but ours. Its object 
establish the American system 
The King and Queen and Major-General 
John Biddle 
Major-General Biddle commanded the American troops who 
paraded before His Majcst} on Saturday, May 
is to introduce and to 
of ousting from our land 
all foreign nations, of never permitting the i'owers of Europe 
to intermeddle with the affairs of our nat ons ; it is to 
maintain our own principle, not to depart from it, and if, 
to facilitate this, we can effect a decision in the body of 
the European Powers, and draw over to our side its most 
powerful member, surely we should do it ; but I am clearly 
of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent war, instead 
of provoking it. . . . 
The President accepted Jefferson's advice, and the Monroe 
Doctrine was promulgated, which preserved half the world 
for the growth of democracy without bloodshed. 
In the ninety-odd years since this happened the two 
countries have achieved the important success of adjusting 
all difficulties between each other without entering into 
hostilities which would enable their enemies to catch these 
two most consistent and powerful exponents* of political 
liberty divided, and thus destroy them. From time to time, 
also, the two nations have given each other a helping hand. 
But the long immunity from attack threatening the exist- 
ence of our common principles somewhat dulled the foresight 
which on some of the earlier occasions enabled us to triumpli 
by preparedness without bloodshed. When the iiand of the 
Hun struck it was not recognised in either country with 
absolute clearness . that the same old crisis faced us again 
and that our free existence again depended on co-operation. 
Moreover, neither country realised in full measure that 
the same obligation lay on us in regard to the other nations 
that had joined the ranks of freedom. It was not so much 
a clear foresighted realisation of the true meaning of the 
struggle as it was the direct menace of the German advance 
through Belgium that precipitated- Great Britain's rush to 
arms. It was not a far-sighted conception of the meaning 
of the struggle that convinced America. It was the Lusitania 
and the decree of ruthless submarine warfare. There were 
many in both countries who knew what was the real signi- 
ficance of the crisis the day the Kaiser ordered his mobilisa- 
tion, but the majority were too befuddled by the complexities 
of the situation to lay a firm grasp on the one essential and 
all-important truth tliat again we were laced with the old 
choice : "Give me liberty or give me death." 
We are all in it now, fighting with our lives for our liberties. 
By foresight perhaps we 
could have saved both. By 
fighting we can at least save 
the more precious. 
This is the history of our 
co-operation in the defence 
of liberty. Twice we have 
joined together early and 
avoided war. And once we 
were foolish enough to aid 
the enemy by fighting each 
other while he endeavoured 
to destroy the principle by 
which both nations live. 
This time, not seeing the 
peril early enough to prevent 
it, we have got to fight our 
way out togetlier. 
And then what ? What 
about the future ? If we 
go forward together in the 
unending task of trying to 
improve democracy and safe- 
guarding it all over the world, 
we shall see problems and 
dangers eye to eye so that 
we may, even if ^e do not 
achieve foresight, achieve 
promptness and i^nity of 
action against the dangers to 
our common ideal. 
There is an earnest hope 
ver\- prevalent in America, 
and I believe also in Great 
Britain, that after the war 
there will be a League of 
Nations to enforce justice. 
If this can be achieved, the 
two countries can maintain 
an active and harmonious 
understanding as members 
of this league. If there 
are not enough nations in 
the world whose ideas of 
what constitutes justice agree 
to allow the formation of such 
a league or its effective operation, the United States and 
Great Britain must, nevertheless, maintain together tlie 
eternal watchfulness which is the price of liberty. 
Even the autocratic attacks of history did not show us the 
full measure of danger to pur institutions which the German 
onslaught on civilisation has revealed. The German plan 
for autocratic world dominion was to be gained through' 
commerce as well as by war. The Germans saw that by the 
economic conquest of a country they could deprive it of its 
political liberty as well as by military conquest. Their 
economic and military plans for world dominion went hand 
in hand. 
We are fairly familiar now with the German reason for 
attacking Belgium and France first rather than Russia. The 
Western advance gave the German armies control of great 
deposits of iron and coal in Belgium, Northern France, and 
in the Briey basin opposite Verdun. It turned out that 
they were indispensable for the German? in this war, but 
their object in taking them was primarily for future wars, 
both military and commercial. The conquest of these 
regions would give Germany a practical monopoly of con- 
tinental coal and iron. 
The control of the dye business of the world and its relation 
to explosives is well known-. There were similar plans for 
gaining a stranglc-hold upon the world by a monopolv of 
potash. 
During the war, both the United States and Great Britain 
have demonstrated that a Government controlhng a large 
percentage of any of the world's necessary products can hold 
other nations in economic peril, just as Germany tried to use 
her projected coal and iron monopoly on the Continent. 
The United States, for instance, has most of the world's 
cotton. Great Britain has nearly a monopolv of rubber 
production. The two nations together control most of the 
coaling stations necessary to world commerce. It is plain 
that other nations besides Germany have the commercial 
weapons to waylay the world, but they have not used them 
after the German method. American cotton has gone to 
Liverpool and Hamburg on the same terms that it has gone 
to Providence and Fall River. German, Japanese, and 
Scandinavian ships have coaled at Hong Kong, Port Said, 
and Gibraltar on the same terms as British ships. But the 
tth. 
