Land & Water 
May 30, 19 1 8 
The Delay and the Attack: By Hilaire Belloc 
AT the moment tlicse lines are written (on the 
afternoon of Monday, May 27th), news reaches 
London that two offensives ha\'e been launclied 
by the enemy early this morning at widely 
distant points : the Flanders front before Mount 
Kemmcl, in the extreme north, and l^he Champagne front 
before Kheims, in the extreme south. 
The delay of the enemy before resuming his offensive 
— the Allied command deliberately left him full choice 
therein — was up to the moment of that attack the chief 
object of military interest. It admits of little analysis and 
less conjecture. 
The enemy's delay was due to one main cause : the neces- 
sity far recruitment. To this must probably be added the 
time necessary for a change of plan — since his first plan 
failed. There may possibly be added doubtful elements 
such as his waiting for new material, fete. We may add, if 
we will, the effect upon him of the present Allied superiority. 
in air work and the perpetual harassing of his concentrations 
in men and material. But it remains true that his chief 
cause for delay was recruitment. 
That he has had to change his plan meant, of course, an 
immense amount of new staff work, a certain amount of 
re-arrangement, and possibly further delay caused through 
the discussion of alternative objects. But his inability to 
strike again until he had in great measure replaced the 
losses of his last immense effort to reach a decision, was the 
governing condition of that halt in operations which had been 
so striking since April 29th, when he suffered a heavy defeat. 
We have here available figures to guide us. The enemy 
lost during that great offensive between March 21st and 
April 29th, one way and another, counting sickness and 
every form of depletion, not less than 500,000 men. He 
may have lost more. He may have lost up to 600,000. But 
500,000. is a safe figure. 
It has been said in this paper, and I think justly, that he 
was then budgeting for losses of some 650,000 at the most. 
To have lost more than that in the first blow before reaching 
a decision .would have crippled him hopelessly. As a fact, 
when he saw that he had failed to reach a decision he checlyed 
his losses before the possible maximum was reached. 
Granted this, what were the forms of recruitment upon 
which he could rely should he determine to break off the 
battle and allow a long pause for the restoration of his estab- 
lishments ? His allies may be ruled out. Austria can afford 
next to nothing, and there are political difficulties as well. 
He can bring little more of use from the East. What else had 
he wherewith to refit ? 
His two sources of recruitment are hospital ' returns and 
his last class called up and in training ; part of which is 
already in depot and ready to be drafted into the fighting units. 
In round numbers, something over 60 per cent, of those 
in hospital at any moment return to the army after an average 
absence of four months. The rest are killed, mutilated, or 
sick beyond hope of immediate further service. 
To have lost 500,000 men, therefore, in the great offensive 
which ended upon April 29th would mean that if the enemy 
delayed to the end of the summer he would get back from 
his hospital returns alone, theoretically, some 300,000 men ; 
in practice, perhaps, a quarter of a million. 
But it was not a question of waiting for the longest possible 
time, but of waiting for j ust so much time as would give him 
the highest effective returns, at the least disadvantage to 
himself through tlie growth of his opponent and of civilian 
strain at home. It is a junction in a double variant. 
Now, the curve of returns after one short intense effort 
fliictuates sharply. There is an early period of rapid returns 
for very slightly wounded or slighty sick. Then comes a 
period varying Jrom six to nine weeks during which what 
may be called the normal lighter cases are beipg cured, and 
during which the curve flattens. At the end of it the curve 
rapidly rises, the rise representing the discharge in great 
numbers of the men who have passed through the simple 
and easier cures and cofne out again. Then comes a long 
period of slow and fairly even rise representing the gradual 
return of the graver cases in their order. 
Other things being equal, the moment when the large 
returns begin to come in. say, after six to eight weeks, is 
likely to be the moment of greatest efficiency. It is the 
moment the enemy has chosen. 
The second factor in recruitment is the new class. 
This new class is in tlio ]>r,-;r.nt '"^e class 1020 -that is, 
the lads who we're born in 1900, and wiio attain their eigh- 
teenth birthday between January ist and December 31st of 
the present year. Rather more than one-half of tliem are 
still under eighteen years of age. It is necessary that the 
oldest should bo used first, and, even so, they have been 
called and trained earlier than any other Germ;m class senior 
to them since the beginning of tlie wan What can 
this class now provide ^ Normally, it would provide quite 
at the end of this summer about 450,000 ; but for the moment 
200,000 is the highest figure we can possibl}' allow, and it is 
certain that those 200,000 will not be put into the fighting 
units right away, but kept for immediate drafts when the 
fighting begins. 
Our conclusion is that the enemy, so far as mere numbers 
are concerned, can already bring up his establishments, if 
he is dealing only with the divisions he has already put in, 
very nearly to the weight in which he was before the great 
attack of March 21st. He has now, so far as mere numbers 
are concerned, so replaced some 70 per cent., or a little more, 
of his losses. If he likes to risk the holding of his line with 
even less men than he held it before, he can milk the divisions 
that have not been in or bring them up bodily to replace 
divisions mauled in the recent fighting, gending the Iktter 
back to the quiet portions of the line. To replace three- 
quarters of your losses when your losses have been from a 
/third to a quarter of- what you put in is very nearly to restore 
your original condition. After a delay thus calculated very 
nearly to fill the gaps created by the great offensive of last 
March and April, and its failure, we have news, as I write 
these lines, of a renewed attack. 
The news is fragmentary so far and quite inconclusive. 
But the prime characteristic of it is that two efforts are being 
made by the enemy upon two sectors as widely separate as 
possible — from 100 to 115 miles apart. The fir.st and appar- 
ently (so far as the news goes) the largest effort, is being 
made in the sector of I^eims. Its exact extent is still 
uncertain. We do not yet know, at the moment of writing, 
whether it includes the strong position of the Chemin des 
Dames or not, but presumably it does. The second effort 
is being made in Flanders upon the familiar ground which 
was that of the last great battle of April 29tft_in front of 
Mount Kemmel, from Locre to Voormezeele. 
No indication of the exercise of pressure elsewhere is yet 
to hand, but it is probable that two such very widely separated 
'Sea 
W^^nnn f . . uf'f ""'"^'■>' *° ^"^her work in the centre.. 
We cannot tell. We know that for the moment the greatest 
weight IS m the south, and we await the event 
Pnin^;,Cf/ r ^°. ^^^P""*;^^ ^ ''"^f dispatch describes''the 
frnn7of .hi ? ^^ ^^ ^^°"^^>' "'^ht. He has attacked on a 
front of about 25 miles, pushed back the Allied right between 
i 
