May 30, 19 1 8 
Land & Water 
parties renounce any claim to charges upon the other for the 
costs of the war. In the second sentence, only twelve words 
long, Rumania is left entirely at the mercy of the conqueror 
for any indemnity he may in future exact. It runs thus, 
translated into English : " Future agreements are reserved 
which shall regulate the indemnities of this war." 
Half the fifth chapter develops that idea upon other lines. 
The army of occupation retains, although peace has been 
signed, the right to requisition any amounts of any material 
it may demand. All the e.xpenses of the army of occupation 
must be paid by Rumania, and all actions are subject +0 
the military tribunals of the conquerors. 
There is no limit to the exportation from Rumania which 
Prussia may not arbitrarily demand ; there is no limit to the 
time over which she may not make those arbitrary demands. 
There is no limitation of payment for what she may seize. 
She may pay nothing or she may pay in her own paper at 
whatever price she chooses. The nominal vendor may not 
open his mouth. Such is the bargain. There is no limit to 
the size of the army of occupation, or to its demands, or to 
the surplus which it may send abroad, or to the power of 
those who loot over those who are looted. 
If any Rumanian peasant protests against the action of 
any agent come to take his stock, the issue will be tried as a 
criminal issue before a court martial composed entirely of 
German or Austrian officers. 
Upon the face of it, such a treaty is not a treaty of peace 
at all : it is a treaty of occupation, and almost of annexa- 
tion. But we must beware against regarding it as a mere 
piece of oppression. There is more policy in it than that. 
The whole thing is based upon the federal idea and upon the 
experience of Prussia in the last half-century. 
That experience leads the rulers of Prussia to believe that 
if you first thoroughly master a district by arms, and then 
release it within a certain degree to enjoy a certain measure 
of local freedom you can later arrange it to suit yourself in 
some scheme of federation the members of which shall exer- 
cise, in all sorts of differing degrees, local customs and tradi- 
tions, and even the simulacrum of independence. It is the 
experienqc of Prussia that this process, first of military 
conquest, then of carefully regulated and very partial release, 
digests the conquered into that expanding body which 
Prussia ultimately rules. 
What remains of the treaty is of secondary importance 
save for one point : the deliberate permission extended to 
Rumania to enter Bessarabia, and< thereby keep up an open 
■ quarrel with the Ukraine. It is a policy which has been 
described often enough in these columns, and the object of 
which is to keep subsidiary States weak by establishing 
points of rivalry between them. We have exactly the same 
thing in the Polish province of Cholm, and tfie artificial 
arrangement of Lithuania and in Courland. 
The conclusion of the Documents adds little to our interest. 
Chapter VI. of the Treaty of Bucharest expands at length 
the new arrangement for the Danube, and fixes Munich as 
the town in which the last details are to be thrashed out. 
Chapter Vll. does not concern us particularly. It deals 
with what it calls "religious" equality, with the special 
object of merging the German-speaking Jews in the mass of 
the Rumanian. 
Chapter ^TII., which contains the last three clauses of the 
treaty (29 to 31), insists that any economic arrangements 
made in the future — though Rumania does not know to what 
extent she , may be bled — shall be deemed to date from the 
signature of this treaty. 
Taken as a whole, the Treaty of Bucharest is the most 
significant of all the purely political events which we have 
seen in Europe since the ultimatum was launched against 
Serbia in July, 1914. If the Treaty of Bucharest stands, 
no matter what the results in the West, Prussia has con- 
quered, she has the East at her disposal, and our civilisation 
is defeated. 
German Order of Battle on March 21st 
LIMITATION'S of time and difficulties connected with 
Whit-week compelled me to postpone to the present 
issue a diagram of the German order of battle as 
that order was described at length in my last article. 
I now reproduce that diagram with certain explana- 
tions. * 
The chief point to note, which was emphasised also in my 
article of last week, is the distinction between the internal 
arrangement of the three German armies involved. The 
Northern Army on the German right, the XVIIth, under 
Below, has only two divisions kept as an army reserve and 
those two divisions in the rear of its left. Its front line is 
It is designed to do it in the neighbourhood of its own centre' 
that is, in the region of St. Ouentin. Its whole mass is 
concentrated upon the two middle groups, Webem's and 
Oetinger's, while there is a division as army reserve behind 
each of the four sections. Seen upon the map, this third 
mass, the XVIIIth army, is not only thus grouped for special 
weight in its centre, but is deeper in formation than the 
other two. Finally, though the six divisions of the Vllth 
army (Schoeler's Corps and Wichura's) were under Boehn's 
command, they are lent to, and tactically seem to form part 
of, Hutier's force. 
The whole sj'Stem may be compared to a great pendulum 
C^vp^s — Orpups ui Luie fhmi "Worth tpSout/i 
•BELOW XV1I*Anny -MA-RWITZ II-^Aimy HUTIER XV'III^Army 
VlP'teserve 
XV/'^Jles€rvv 
XXXIX^Tles^nv 
XXIII"^ -Reserve 
Xll!"' Tieserve 
XI\''^ ■^Oierve 
BOEHN Vfl'^Arnryr 
ncy 
xvw^ 
rV^ "Reserve 
IVH'^Resen'e 
I "T>iViswns ui iute ^^ support' 
H'UA fUlaies ^'Cfu'LT Qroup 
CJnu/u2-ru^crs~ 
I T)ivisu}ns used as army 
reser%>es 
JUTVflLes 
<1 I 
XVII* Amy -BELOW 
w^krxKf -uAUwrrz 
XVIII* Arm/ HUTIER 
'British nir4 Arm>r '^rttisfi V* Kvmf 
•AKRAS 'Vuigram. aF GEHMAN ORDER of "BATTLB ■JWarcA 2J^/9J8 
VIl'*'.Amy "BOElfN 
evenly disposed. None of the five group corps is especially' 
milked to reinfon e any of tfie others. It is a disposition 
designed to strike with most weight well south of Arras, 
and therefore arranged with an eye to something which is 
expected further south still. No group corps contains less 
than three divisions, and of the 23 divisions of which the whole 
was composed, 9 were in support and 12 in line. The Central 
Army under Marwitz is similarly concentrated by the left. 
Its two Northern groups have only two divisions each, with 
nothing in support behind, and the army reserve is five 
divisions strong, the centre of gravity of it lying to the south 
of the centre. But it is the third in the series, Hutier's army, 
the XVIIIth, wliich wc must specially note. It is clearly 
designed to do the main part of the work, as in fact it did. 
of which|the'weight isjin''the south. It is intended to swing 
round a pivot on the north in front of Arras, and to break 
t];e opposing line upon the .south in front of its main weight. 
In other words, the order of battle, the enemy's plan as 
revealed by it, corresponds very precisely to the event. ' 
Where the enemy failed was only in reaping the full results 
of a breach which he had first effected, for it seems certain 
enough that he intended the chief effort to be in the area 
of St. Quentin and the follow-up to be mainly provided by 
the deep formation in that area. What he did not allow for 
was, after a rupture, the rapidity wiih which the Allied force 
would bring up reserves to dam the advancing flood. The 
thing was done in just a week. Ten days and it would 
have been too late. 
