8 
Land & Water 
May 30, 19 1 8 
The Turkish Conspiracy— III 
The Narrative of Mr. Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador in Turkey, 
1913-1916 
Mr. Morgenthau adds 
to-day fo his porlr.nt 
gallery of the leading 
personalHies in Con- 
stantinople at the begin- 
ing of the war a life 
sketch of Ev.ver Pash.i. 
He also continues his 
narrative of persistent 
German intrigue in the 
Turkish capital. 
CERTAINLY 
Enver had 
one trait 
that made 
for success 
in such a distracted 
country as Turkey — 
audacity. His other 
dominating motive was 
an unUmited ambition. 
I remember sitting 
one night with Enver, 
in his private apartment. On one side hung a picture of 
Napoleon, on the other one of Frederick the Great. Between 
them sat Enver himself ! This fact gives some notion of the 
man's colossal vanity ; these two warriors and statesmen were 
his great heroes and I believe that Enver actually thought 
fate had a career in store for him not unlike theirs. 
That, at 26, he had taken a leading part in the revolution 
Mohammed V., Sultan of Turkey 
His Majesty is a kind-hearted old gentleman, who is entirely ignorant of the world, and lacking in 
personal force and initiative. 
in the Balkan war. 
Enver issued a circu- 
lar to the Turkish 
commanders practical- 
ly telling them that 
they must look to him 
for preferment alone 
— that they could 
make no headway by 
playing politics with 
any group except that 
dominated by the 
Young Turks. 
Talaat was not an 
enthusiastic Prussian 
like Enver. He had 
no intention of playing 
Germany's game ; he 
was working chiefly for 
the Committee and 
for himself. He could 
not succeed unless he 
had control of the 
army ; therefore, he 
had made Enver, for years his closest associate in " U and P" 
politics, Minister of War. But he needed a strong army 
if he was to have any at all ; therefore he had turned to 
Germany. Wangenheim and Talaat, in the latter part of 
1913, had arranged that the Kaiser should send a military 
mission to reorganise the Turkish army. Talaat told me 
that on calling in this mission he was using Germany, though 
which had deposed Abdul Hamid caused him to compare Germany thought that it was using him. That there were 
T^ x_ . J.: t,__ i-_ X-1J „- xi__x definite dangers in the move he well understood. A deputy 
who discussed this situation with Talaat in January, 1914, 
has given me a memorandum of a conversation which shows 
well what was going on 4n Talaat's mind. 
"Why do you hand the management of the country over 
to the Germans ? " asked this deputy, referring to the German 
niihtary mission. "Don't you see that this is part of 
himself with Bonaparte ; many times has he told me that 
he believed himself "a man of destiny." Enver even 
affected to believe that he had been divinely set apart to 
re-establish the glory of Turkey and make himself the Great 
Dictator. Like Napoleon, Enver was short in stature, but 
his diminutive size did not prevent him from being a hand- 
some, even an impressive, figure. He was the type that in 
America we sometimes call a matinee idol ; the word women Germany's plan to make Turkey a German colony that 
frequently used to describe him was "dashing." His face we shall become merely another Egypt." 
lr»Qprl Hid '*Wfn iinrlnr-^^o «^ «^..f.^^4.1...»» i;„j t-^i. 
contained not a single line or furrow ; it never disclosed his 
emotions or his thoughts ; he was always calm, steely, im- 
perturbable. That Enver certainly lacked Napoleon's pene- 
tration is evident from the way which he had planned to 
obtain the supreme power ; for he early allied his personal 
fortunes with Germany. For years his sympathies had been 
wjth the Kaiser. At the fall of Abdul Hamid he had gone 
on a military mission to Berlin ; and here the Kaiser immedi- 
ately detected in him a possible instrument for working out 
his plans in the Orient, and cultivated him in numerous ways. 
Afterwards Enver spent a considerable time in Berlin as 
military attach^ ; when he returned, he was wearing a mous- 
tache shghtly curled up at the ends. He could speak German. 
Indeed he had been completely captivated by Prussianism. 
As soon as Enver became Minister of War, Wangenheim 
■flattered and cajoled the young man, played upon his am- 
bitions and doubtless promised him Germany's complete 
support in achieving them. In his private conversation Enver 
made no secret of his admiration for Germany. 
Thus Enver's elevation to the Ministry of War was vir- 
tually a German victory. He immediately instituted a dras- 
tic reorganisation. Enver told me himself that he had 
accepted the post only on condition that he should have a 
free hand ; and this free hand he now proceeded to exercise. 
The army still contained a large number of officers who in- 
jChned to the old regime rather than to the Young Turks — 
many of them partisans of the murdered Nazim. Enver 
promptly cashiered 26S of these, and put in their places men 
who were known as "U and P" men and Germans. The 
Enver-Talaat group always feared a revolution that would 
depose them as they had thrown out their predecessors. 
Many times did they tell me that their own success as revolu- 
tionists had taught them how easily a few determined men 
could seize control of the country ; they did not propose to 
have a little group in their army organi.se such a. coup d'etat 
against them. The boldness of Enver's move alarmed even 
Talaat, but Enver showed the determination of his character 
and refused to reconsider his action. One of the officers 
We understand perfectly;" replied Talaat, "that that is 
Germany's programme. We also know that we cannot put 
this country on its feet with our own resources. We shall, 
therefore, take advantage of such technical and material 
assistance as the Germans can place at our disposal. We 
shall use Germany, to -help us reconstruct and defend the 
country until we are able to govern ourselves with our own 
strength. When that day comes, we can say good-bye to 
the Germans within twenty-four hours." 
Xertainly the physical condition of the Turkish army 
bcHrayed the need of assistance from some source. The 
picture it presented, before the Germans arrived, 1 have 
always regarded as portraying the condition of the whole 
Empire. When I issued invitations for my first official 
reception a large number of Turkish clfi;ers asked to be 
permitted to come in evening clothes ; they said that they had 
no uniforms and no money with which to purchase or to 
hire. them. They had not received their salaries for three 
and a half months. As the Grand Vizier who regulates 
the etiquette of such functions, still insisted on full military 
dress, many of these officials had to absent themselves. 
About the same time the new German Mission asked the 
Commander of the second army corps to exercise his men ; 
tlie latter replied that he could not do so as his men had no 
shoes ! 
Desperate and wiclied as Talaat subsequently showed 
himself to be, I still think that he at least was "not then 
a willing tool of Germany. An episode that involved myself 
bears out this view. In describing the relations of the great 
powers to Turkey I have said nothing about the United 
States. In fact we had no particular business relations 
at that time. The Turks regarded us a country of idealists 
and altruists; the fact that we spent millions building 
wonderful educational institutions in their country purely 
from philanthropic motives aroused their astrmishment and 
possibly their admiration. They liked Americans aid 
regarded us as about the only disinterested friends they had 
among the nations. But our interest in Turkey was small ; 
removed was Chukri Pasha, who had defended Adrianople the Standard Oil Company did a growing business, the 
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