May 30, 19 1 8 Land & Water 
May 3 I St, I 9 I 6- 1 9 I 7- 1 9 I 8 : By A. Pollen 
1 1 
THE observance of anniversaries is a wholesome 
habit, if we are led thereby to commemorate the 
great things done in the past and from them to 
draw the courage needed for the tasks that lie 
before us. It adds to the value of such exercises 
if the retrospect is dispassionate and crttical and events 
retraced to their causes, for then something may be added 
to the general stock of wisdom, some principle of action made 
clear, and so the past made, nut only an encouragement, 
but a guide and inspiration for the future. The last days of 
Mav and the "Glorious" First of June are dates traditionally 
famous in our naval history. It is May 31st that saw the 
greatest naval c\-ent in this our present war. Two years 
ha\e passed since Jutland, and it is perhaps worth asking 
what that battle and these years have taught us, and in 
what respects and how the situation at sea has altered in 
the interval. 
The month of May, 1916, saw the close of the enemy's 
first systematic attempt at a ruthless submarine blockade of 
these islands. \\'hen the threat was first made by yon 
Tirpitz, as a reply to Sir Doveton Sturdee's annihilating 
victorj' off the Falkland Islands, it was couched in very 
tmcompromising terms. A month or six weeks later the 
German purpose was expressed in an official document, 
which made it clear that the enemy held himself bound by 
no limitations of humanity, and would sink on sight when- 
ever, in the judgment of the U-boat commander, it should 
seem desirable to do so. America protested before the 
actual campaign began, but Berlin's reply set all doubts at 
rest. German necessity would be the only rule. No tender- 
ness as to risking the lives of neutrals or civilians, no scruples 
as to the agreed obligation of The Hague rules, were to stand 
in the way. Yet, as a matter of fact, after the Litsitania 
was sunk there was comparatively little ruthlesstiess. And 
the reason for this was obvious enough. It was clear that 
the people of the United States would not permit it. It was 
also clear that without ruthlessness the submarine campaign 
could never achieve its purpose. 
" Thorough " 
Already, in the autumn of 1915, tVvo groups were fighting 
for the control of German naval policy. The Tirpitz party 
were for a policy of Thorough, their opponents either for 
stopping the submarine attack altogether, or at least for 
limiting its conduct to standards the neutral world could 
tolerate. The strength of the latter's case lay in this : that 
the whole-hoggers had not boats enough with which to win. 
But, by the end of the year, the Almost frenzied building 
efforts inaugurated when the threat was first made, were 
already coming to fruition. A considerable number of sub- 
marines had been finished in 1915 — many more,, in all pro- 
bability, than had been lost. An ample reserve of officers 
and men had been trained to the work, so that when new 
boats began coming to hand at the rate of three a week 
with satisfactory regiilarity, the advocates of "Thorough" 
felt positive that these new forces — sent regularly into the 
field in increasing numbers, and ordered to strike on sight 
witliout pause or parley — must certainly succeed. 
The military situation at the time was critical. The 
German victories in Rassia had seemingly left the power of- 
that Empire almost unimpaired ; the land forces of Great 
Britain were daily increasing in numbers, in efficiency, and 
in armament ; the people of Austria and Germany were 
getting restless under the beginnings of our stricter sea 
siege. To forestall the dangers ahead a great military attack 
on the French was in contemplation. What could be more 
opportune than to strike a blow at England, which was sure 
to produce panic even if it did not produce famine ? So 
sanguine was the Grand Admiral himself, that he announced 
the date of his sea attack on England almost as the great 
battle of Verdun began. How his plan vfas overborne and 
he himself dismissed, and then, in response to agitation, the 
plan revived, is a familiar story. 
The frightfulness lasted from the last week of March till 
Mav the ist. It was President Wilson's "Sussex" note that 
ended it. An ultimatum backed by Congress ended any 
uncertainty as to America's attitude on the sink at sight 
policy. Berlin of course had to surrender. The hot-heads 
who thought that the "idiotic Yankees" would never fight 
were distippointed that their prophec}- had miscarried, but 
the believers in the U-boat blockade must have been more 
disappointed still, for the results had not justified the risks. 
The maximum number of ships sunk in any week was 
less than 30, the average over the period hardly half. It was 
not a rate of destruction that could put Great Britain out 
of business with sufficient speed. Germany withdrew from 
the game. It was a great humiliation and naval prestige 
had to be restored. It was this necessity that brought out 
von Hipper and Scheer to seek action with the Vice-.\dmiral 
of the battle cruiser fleet. 
The resulting battle, in effect, served the enemy fur his 
main purpose. When the German fleet returned to harbour 
it was possible to tell the people that it had fought against 
a fleet of twice its strength and had inflicted heavjer losses 
than it had suffered. The overwhelming numbers under 
the British Commander-in-Chief's orders had not been able 
to overwhelm. Dexterous and determined torpedo attacks 
had diverted the British main forces from coming to decisive 
range, and at the long range thus made inevitable, poor 
light and smoke screens favoured the. German tactics of 
evasion. Unquestionably to have escaped destruction could 
be, and was, represented as an achievement in every way 
praiseworthy and remarkable. But it was followed by no 
immediately favourable result to Germany , and the extravagant 
claims to a victory led to a reaction. , 
Unrestricted Submarine War 
It was this resentment that the (ierman navy turned to 
account nine months later. For during all this period new 
submarines of an improved type were being added weekly 
to the underwater force, and from August until January 
more and more of them were brought into use, partly to 
obtain a maximum of sinkings within the rules laid down 
by Washington, partly to train a still further reserve of 
officers and crews for the task in view. ?\eptember, Octol)er 
and November showed an enormous increase, in submarine 
efficiency, even when the boats were employed under the 
severe restrictions of the "Sussex" ultimatum. With very 
little frightfulness the record of the previous April was easily 
passed. What might not be expected if all restrictions 
were withdrawn? On February rst withdrawn they were 
— and the results obtained in March and April and May,' 
but especially in April, seemed amply to justify those who 
had told Berlin that the certainty of Great Britain's defeat 
at sea made America's belligerency a negligible price. 
A year ago then, Germany's navaK prestige was not only 
at its highest point, but at a point so high that no rea.sonable 
person could have doubted that, vmless some vast improvement 
was made in our counter measures, our days of belligerency 
were numbered. 
It was, indeed, an astonishing change from the situation 
of a year before. Then we were all in full cry over the flight 
of the German fleet from Jutland, and its unwillingness 
and incapacity to dispute with us the supremacy' of the sea. 
Now the supremacy in surface ships seemed suddenly to have 
become valueless. At no period of the war had either side 
seemed nearer to an early defeat than did the Allies a bare 
year ago. But, as if by a miracle, we were saved, but only 
just saved. The Admiralty house was put in order. A 
civilian who, however little he knew about the Navy, knew 
much of war and almost all there is to know about organ- 
isation, was put at its head. A new spirit re-animated the 
command, reserves of unused brain-power were drawn upcm. 
.\nd synchronously with these great reforms, representatives 
of the American navy were domiciled in London anc^ a singu- 
larly efficient American force was quartered at the critical 
point at Queenstown. The convoy principle, so persistently 
urged and so obstinately neglected, was adopted. 
\ year has passed since then. Once more the situation' 
at sea has undergone a complete revolution. The efficiency 
of the submarine, measured by the present rate at which the 
world is losing tonnage compared with the rate for the second 
((uarter of last year, has been reduced by no less than f)o per 
cent. And as the world is building tonnage faster than it 
is losing it, the efficiency of the submarine as an engine 
of victory has vanished altogether. What effect is this change 
likely to have upon Germany's -sea policy? 
There is obviously a fairly close analogy between the 
situation to-day and that of two years ago. Now, as then, 
the sea arm on which our enemy chiefly relied has been 
brought to nothingj In iqid it was fear of America, not the 
strength of our counter-attack, that defeated him. To-day 
it is the combined military and shi]ibuilding efforts of all the 
Allies, but chiefly of Great Britain and .-\merica. which have 
