12 
Land & Water 
May 30, 1918 
made this sea arm useless for its purpose The parallel 
ceases when we come to the situation on land ; for here, 
undoubtedly, the extinction of Russia and Germany's recent 
successes in the West have put the prestige of her armies 
amongst her people higher than they have ever been. But 
against this the straits of the people are many times more 
severe than they were two years ago. Five ounces of meat 
a week, and a bread ration recently reduced to a j^oint that 
would seem to us below the limits of subsistence, with a 
grinding scarcity of fats and sugar, and, indeed, of every 
comfort of life, call for something more than mere prestige, 
if they are to be patiently endured. The situation 
seems to demand continuous bids for victor}^. All observers 
seem to agree that another attack will be made on land. 
Must not the same conditions that make this necessary, 
added to the changed conditions at sea, make an effort by 
the German Fleet not improbable also ? 
We should be deceiving ourselves if we concluded from 
the enemy's conduct of the sea war up to May 31st two 
years ago, and from his conduct on that day, that he was 
exceedingly averse from risking an engagement between 
the main fleets, or determined, if one came about, to conduct 
it on principles that would make a decision unlikely. It is 
a sounder 'view to assume that he is acting on the principles 
he professed so lucidly before the war. These, stated briefly, 
were to reduce British numbers by recognised methods of 
attrition^torpedoes from submarines, mines, and bombs 
from aircraft ; to create some diversion that would divide 
our forces ; then to overwhelm one or other portion of our 
Fleet with as near the whole of his as could be mustered. 
The process of attrition since August, 19x4, must have been 
disappointing. At most two capital units have been lost 
from the British Fleet by accident or enemy action of this 
sort. Three others were sunk at Jutland. The enemy, it is 
supposed, has lost at least two modern units — if not three — 
in the meantime. On balance, then, we are very little to 
the bad in losses, and our additions since the declaration of 
war have been great in number, and even more remarkable 
in size, speed, and armament. And, for more than six 
months now, this greatly enlarged force has been strengthened 
by a division of American battleships. It is against reason 
to suppose that the enemy can have added even half as 
many new ships to his fleet as have we in the last four years. 
His only ally possessing battleships, Austria, cannot help 
him in this matter, for no Austrian fleet could ever get from 
Pola to Kiel. But, on the other hand, there is grave reason 
to fear that the Russian Baltic Fleet is either already or 
must shortly be in German hands. 
This possibility was discussed some weeks ago in these 
columns. We saw then how greatly four fast dreadnoughts, 
each with a broadside of twelve 12-inch guns, and foui- battle 
cruisers, each with a broadside of eight, would add, not only 
to the main battle force, but to the scouting power of the 
German Fleet. These eight vessels would not, of course, 
bring the enemy to equality with Sir David Beatty's force 
in the North Sea, nor anywhere near equality. But, if he is 
contemplating action by diversion, this increase of his num- 
bers must add greatly to his capacity in this direction. That 
the enemy has built light cruisers of a new type, ver>' power- 
fully armed and exceptionally fast, is already known. Of 
destroyers he has always possessed an ample supply, and to 
this he has probably added many more than he has 
lost. But when all is said, it is the Russian .ships, if he gets 
them, that will be his main factor c f reinforcement. 
There is, however, another which is far from being 
negligible. It was supposed early in 1915 that the Tirpitz 
submarine building programme contemplated a production 
of three U-boats a week, and that a delivery at this rate 
would begin at latest by the end of the year.' It is hardly 
to be supposed that tliis rate was maintained throughout 
1916 and 1917, or is being maintained now. But we have 
it on the best authority that it was not until the end of 
October last that we were destroying submarines as fast as 
the enemy could build them. From January, 1916, then, 
for eighty weeks, the net gain in underwater boats must 
have been very great. These boats, as we know to our cost, 
were built for the specific purpose of attacking our trade. 
What would be their value employed in battle ? 
In the combined sweep of the Bight of Heligoland in 
August 1914, the enemy's submarines effected nothing. 
We hear of them in the 'affair of the Dogger Bank twice. 
Sir David Beatty mentions their presence shortly after 
eleven, and records the destroyer attacks made on them 
and the squadron's change of course The dispatch of the 
Rear Admiral who succeeded to the command when Sir 
David's ship was disabled, has never been published. 
Two statements were issued by the Admiralty — one saying 
that action was broken off because of submarines ; " the 
second that it was the presence of mines and submarines 
that caused Sir .-Vrchiljald Moore to recall the ships 
from tl)e pursuit. The bare statement was astounding 
enough, and it was tantalising that no more light 
was thrown upon the matter. At Jutland, not only 
were submarines seen but it was mentioned in the 
dispatch that one was destroyed, though the manner of 
its destruction was not recorded. 
Quite recently, however, we have heard a good deal of what 
our own submarines have done in the Baltic^ on the occasion 
of the German -invasion of Finland. These incidents suggest 
great possibilities of underwater boats, if they were employed 
in great numbers, and used with skill and resolution. But 
German U-boats are certain to be numerous, and there is 
everv reason to expect both skill and resolution from their 
commanders. And, as the initiative in seeking action rests 
entirely with the German fleet, their submarines would have 
an advantage which British submarines in the Baltic 
certainly did not possess. It seems, then, to be far from 
fanciful to suppose that Germany, devoting all her under- 
water force to the purpose, might plan to achieve almost 
on the day of battle itself the full toll of attrition which her 
pre-war writers assumed would be a long, but continuous 
process. It does not follow, then, that because to-day our 
nimibers are actually greatly superior to the enemy's that 
this fact alone makes it even probable that he will regard 
a sea battle as a quite desperate adventure. 
Russian Reinforcements. 
Just as the enemy seems bound to get the Riissian Baltic 
Fleet, so it seems almost certain that he is either already in 
possession of the Black Sea Fleet, or must shortly be so. 
The Russian Black Sea Fleet, so far as we know, consists of 
ships similar in type to the Gangoot, though not quite so 
fast. They are three in number, and so have a broadside 
fire of thirty-six 12-inch guns. If the Goeben is fit for service, 
and these ships are oflicered and manned by Germans, they 
would constitute an exceedingly formidable squadron. If 
the four fast cruisers, laid down just before or at the very 
beginning of the war at the Nikolaieff 'works, have been 
completed, the value of the battleship force would be very 
greatly enhanced. The Black Sea Fleet included also nine 
modern destroj'ers. Put the whole together, and there is 
clearly a unit of sea-power which could create a very 
awkward situation in the Mediterranean — if once it got to 
sea. For, according to the latest edition of that invaluable 
work, Jane's Fighting Ships, the Austrians laid the keels 
of two new battleships immediately after the declaration of 
war, and two more 'a year later. There has been ample time 
to finish all four. Before the war, Austria had four dread- 
noughts finished, and if these could join forces with the 
former Black Sea Fleet and the Goeben, a single fleet more 
powerful than any Allied fleet in the Mediterranean would 
be constituted. 
The question, of course, is : can the Black Sea Fleet clear 
the Dardanelles ? We know that the Goeben did so a- few 
months ago, though she lost her consort in a minefield 
on her return, and was thought to have struck a mine herself. 
But the fact remains that she was npt destroyed, and that, 
unless means of closing the Dardanelles have since been 
found, the sortie may be repeated. 
The situation to-day, then, seems to possess for the Germans 
many of the characteristics of that of two years ago. They 
have suffered a reverse at sea far more serious than the 
surrender to Washington, because it puts a final stop to 
every hope of victory by submarine. If in 1916 they were 
impelled to seek a fleet action to restore their credit, the 
elements of compulsion in the same direction are, therefore, 
ten times stronger than they were. If thev possess the eight 
powerful fast vessels that Russia built or was building in the 
Baltic and have added, to the limit of their own building 
capacity, to their fleet since Jutland was fought, they are 
probably relatively stronger than thev were, in spite of the 
Grand Fleet having been strengthened by the new vessels 
we have constructed and by the American division which 
has joined us. The Germans certainly possess a vastly 
greater number of submarines than two years ago, and must 
have learned something of how to use them in battle. In 
the Black Sea, if they have the Russian ships— dreadnoughts 
and fast cruisers— they have a force which, if it could join 
hands with the Austrian Fleet, would create an entirely new 
situation in the Mediterranean, one which might call for the 
diversion of English or American battleships to that sea to 
secure an adequate supremacy. It is, take it for all in all, 
a situation full of potentialities, and it may well happen 
that, before many weeks have passed, the centre of interest 
will pass once more from the war on land to the war at sea 
