Land & Water 
June 6, 191 8 
very lieavy loss. The other corner, Rheinis, was not carried 
by the enemy, the defence, largely British, and under the 
general command of Gouraud, who had led the French in 
the Dardanelles, was maintained outside the town, and 
though it lost some ground, thoroughly maintained through 
out all the three days of tremendous pressure its task of 
keeping the corner firm. 
The result was that, with the opening of the fourth day 
—Thursday, May 30th— the large German body, amounting 
by this time to something like 40 divisions, found itself 
pinned into what was too narrow a sahent for safety. Now. 
on the west the boundary of the salient was, roughly, the 
high road from Soissons to Chateau Thierry. It was the 
business of the German command to use their vastly superior 
numbers for the purpose of getting an extension of room 
on this side. 
A strong movement westward here would have the double 
effect of removing the perilously narrow character of the 
salient, and, if it were pressed right home, of compelling the 
French to fall back' from the neighbourhood of Soissons 
lest they should be turned. 
The German higher command therefore regrouped its units 
in the course of the Thursday, and spent Friday, Saturday, 
and Sunday in throwing their weight at right angles to the 
direction hitherto pursued and striking westward upon either 
side of the Ourcq Valley. They started, as I have said, 
from the line of the road, and in the course of the three 
days they created a new big western bulge rather more than 
six miles deep. By the night of Sunday, June 2nd, they 
stood in a great bow from a point about four miles south of 
Soissons to the Marne at Chateau Thierry, with their most 
advanced units fighting hard for the following points, reading 
from north to south : Longpont, Corey, Faverolles, Troesnes, 
Passy (and Hill 163), Torcy. 
If the reader will look at the sketch-map appended he will 
see that the French have here a certain line which their 
reserves continually reaching the line of battle could hope 
to defend. It is the Hne of a profound ravine with steep sides, 
through which runs a small brook, the Savieres,- j ust east of 
the edge of the great forest of Villiers Cottcrets. This brook 
falls into the little River Ourcq at Troesnes, the bow to the 
south of Troesnes is continued by a not very clearly defined 
line of heights, including Hill 163 just in front of Passy, 
and rather a steep bank in front of Torcy. It was here that 
the stand was being made all during the course of Sunday 
last, June 2nd, upon the dispatches of wliich day is based the 
present description. The names of places just mentioned 
mark a line on which the battle fluctuated for 24 hours, 
some of the villages being taken and re-taken several times 
— a fact which shows the arrival of fresh forces upon the 
Allied side in this neighbourhood— but by Sunday night, 
although nearly the whole of the line had been re-occupied 
by the French after having been completely lost upon the 
Saturday, one point of vantage remained which was of some 
value to the enemy. ' It was the point of Faverolles, which 
stands above the deep ravine in open agricultural land just 
outside the forest. Thus holding Faverolles, the enemy had 
a bastion thrust out beyond the obstacle which the French 
were holding. 
Such was the situation at the moment when that phase 
of the battle which terminates with the night of Svmda\- 
was concluded. 
We may now recapitulate and summarise the whole. 
In seven days of fighting the enemy had thrown in at least 
50 divisions, which is rather more than half the strength 
he has available for shock. Those seven days are divided 
into two clear chapters, the first three days in which he begins 
with a great unexpected success due to an element of surprise 
for which he must have full credit, and which carry him to 
the Marne ; the last three days in which he faces round 
at right angles to his former direction, and throws all his 
weight westward down the Valley of the Ourcq. The fourth 
day, Thursday, which separates these two chapters, was the 
day on which he was re-arranging his units and converting 
his direction. That is the geographical description of the 
action during its first week. 
Now let us turn to the more practical, but far more difficult , 
business of estimating his intention and its result. For this 
purpose we must go back to the very beginning of the 
enemy's great offensive nearly two and a half months ago, 
and see how the events will probably have affected his 
judgment. 
On March 21st, the date he had fixed for opening his main 
attack in the west, the enemy had against the Allies, three 
great advantages. He had superior numbers, he had interior 
lines, he had a perfectly united force. The Allies were of 
different nationahties, in commands mainly separated (I mean 
separated in situation not in authority), they were less in 
numbers, and to reinforce at any point they, had to swinj; 
troops on their exterior lines further than the enemy had 
to swing his on his interior lines. 
These advantages further gave the enemy the capital 
advantage of initiative. He could strike at his own time 
and place. 
These advantages alone would not account for what 
followed ; he added to them a further element, which is tlie 
new tactic he has developed in the present campaign. It 
is composed of many elements combined, and it has proved 
exceedingly successful. Its chief point is a power of surprise 
due to the study of secret concentration after a fashion 
which no belligerent had yet attained. To this must be 
added deep formation so that he could use fresh units very 
quickly to support an advance, intensive training to get the 
furthest possible forward movement out of his men, the 
