June 6, 19 I 8 
Land & Water 
The Jutland Anniversary : By A. Pollen 
IN dealing with the anniversaries that fell last week, 
I intended — but space forbade — touching on an 
aspect of the Battle of Jutland which has not yet, 
I think, been discussed, and, in making notes for 
it, read through with great interest Mr. Hurd's chapter 
on the battle in his recently published work. The author 
writes with enthusiasm and a literary skill which makes 
it contagious. It is refreshing and comforting to have the 
story of the sea war re-told to us with the ring of victory 
in cvefy line. And behind it all there is an apostolic purpose 
worthy of the theme. Mr. Hurd's motive in writing is to 
make the world's debt to the British Fleet so patent an 
affair that, when all is over, we may ever continue to hold 
the navy's work in grateful memory. But, greatly as I 
desire the end this very engaging wnter has in view, I am 
far from sure that, in adopting the method of indiscrim- 
inating praise, he has chosen an effective means for securing it. 
For really, when it comes to our North Sea strategy, 
to Jutland, to the submarine campaign, and for that matter 
every other aspect of our naval policy, our author will have 
it that, from 1914 till IQ17, our course was a continuous 
miracle of perfection. The author clearly has no doubts 
at all. There is nothing Lord Fisher planned that Nelson 
would not have endorsed ; there was no course of Lord 
Jellicoe's that the greatest of all seamen would not have 
been proud to follow. Some critics, he tells us, have asserted 
that had true doctrine been acted on, the German fleet 
would have been destroyed and the submarine perjl removed. 
"It may be argued," he sa3'S, "that Nelson would have 
•gone into the German ports in spite of all risks and attacked 
the German fleet in its nests." Heaven forbid that anyone 
should prescribe limits to the nonseaise that "may" be 
argued. But surely it is a simple fact that no one of sense 
ever has so argued, and that the lament over the survival 
of the German Fleet was occasioned, not by failure to attack 
it at anchor, but by its unfortunate escape on May 31st 
two years ago. Curiously enough, while Mr. Hurd mentions 
six comments on the famous battle — none of which he tells 
us has stood the test of time — he entirely omits to mention 
the master issues raised. First, does the threat of torpedo 
attack constitute that superior force in the presence of 
which alone a British Admiral is justified in retreating ? 
Secondly, why, as the rear battle squadron got into action 
at 6.17, did not the leading divisions open fire before 6.30 ? 
Policy and Organisation 
The book, it seems to me. would have been more useful 
if it had dealt with these and other naval issues with greater 
frankness. Every one who writes about war during war is 
necessarily in a dilemma. He must be on his guard not 
to' help the enemy. It is his duty to encourage as well as 
to inform his readers. With the splendid spectacle which 
the valour, the self-sacrifice, and the devotion to duty which 
the British on the sea have shown in the last four years, 
he would have to be a poor spirited creature indeed, not 
to be in a constant temptation to dwell only on the greatness 
of what he describes, and to deal with the men and the 
measures they adopt in terms of praise alone, and of super- 
lative praise at that. But surely those who have made 
a special study of naval war are at times justified in pointing 
out where policy is weak, or preparations inadequate, or 
organisation defective. Our government which runs the war is, 
after ail, civilian. It is civil opinion in the end that alone can 
secure right military action. "The fact that we have completely 
changed our naval policy, by changing the organisation that 
creates and controls it, seems bj' itself to prove that criticism 
has been neither merely destructive nor altogether without 
valuable results. And to acknowledge our great defects of 
organisation does not belittle but enhances the great things 
the seamen have done. 
A Problem in Deployment 
f If the views set out above are sound, it is no disservice to 
the general cause to make, from time to time, a careful and 
dispassionate examination of past events because, though it 
is exceedingly unhkely that the conditions arising in one 
action will be reproduced, even approximately, in another, 
still an inquiry may exhibit a principle in working that will 
a,ssist towards its better future application. With thi.i object 
in view I propose to examine one of the two main issues 
arising out of the battle fought two years ago. The first of 
them, which may be called the torpedo problem, has per- 
haps been as adequately discussed as the information at our 
disposal makes possible. But the second raises questions to 
which much less consideration has been given. Let me re- 
call the broad facts of the situation between 6.0 and 6.50 p.m., 
of which a rough indication is set out in the diagram. 
We know from the dispatch that the Grand Fleet was com- 
ing down to the battlefield on a S.E. b}' S. course, in six 
divisions, with the first squadron, under Admiral Burney, on 
'3umey 
a£€h. 
liearof 
atS'-XI. 
1) 
fire at b-3Cr. 
l&n cfGeandTlat' 
^< or Sr30 
3 
ato-2> 
'^im of Grand 
ketatr6rS> 
J Cernuut ^/7 
*^ at. ^.30 
the western flank. About a mile would separate the divisions 
from each other. At four minutes to six, Limi and Marl- 
horough saw each other at a distance of between ten to eleven 
thousand yards. At that time the head of the German line 
was 14,000 yards from Sir David Beatty, bearing approx- 
imately as indicated. BeattVrJt will be remembered, changed 
course to the east and went full speed. He sighted Admit al 
Hood with three battle cruisers at 6.20, ordered Hood to take 
station ahead of him, and changed course at 6.25 in support. 
Hood was then closing on to the German van, and firing at 
a range of 8,000 yards. Beatty apparently kept this course 
until approximately 6.50, having thrown the head of the enemy 
hne into complete confusion. 
In the meantime at 6.17 the western divisions of the 
Grand Fleet- — which were to become the rear when the single 
, Une was formed — had come into action at a range of 11,000 
yards. These ships must, therel'ore,; have crossed Sir David 
Beatty's track at a point about three and a half to four miles 
astern of him. They accordingly got into action at once, 
probably with the German centre. The rest of the Grand 
Fleet did not open fire on the main force until 6.30, by which 
time, if the line was formed, they would have been approx- 
mately in the position shown in the sketch. For at 6.50, 
Sir David Beatty tells us, the battle cruisers were clear of 
the Grand Fleet, the leading ships of which "bore N.N.W. 
frgm him at a distance of about three miles." In the sketch 
I hav6 shown Beatty's course "AA," the German course 
"CC," and have indicated the line "BB" to show successive 
known positions of the Grand Fleet. 
Now the point on which we are absolutely ignorant is how 
the Grand Fleet got from its original position at six o'clock, 
into one which it apparently held at 6.30, when it opened 
fire. What seems to be quite clear is that, though the rear 
of the line must have crossed Sir David Beatty's track, it 
was not on the battle cruisers, nor the enemy's van, that the 
Fleet deployed. The result was that ' between 6.10, when 
Sir David had closed the range to 12,000 yards, until bad 
light made gunnery impossible, he was unsupported, except 
by whatever period of fire Marlborough and her consorts had 
been able to maintain between 6.17 and breaking off to keep 
station with the divisions ahead. At 6.30, as at 6.50, the 
leading battleships were at least 3,000 yards away from the 
battle cruisers, and, consequently, at nearly that much 
greater range from the enemy. 
Certain things should be noted in regard to these 
events. By 6.50 the visibility. Sir David Beatty tells us in 
his dispatch, "at this time was very indifferent, not more 
than four miles, and the cnenn- ships were temporarily lost 
sight of. It is interesting to note that, after 6.0 p.m., al- 
though the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly 
more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals 
their ships showed up clearly." Had it been possible, there- 
fore, for any squadron of the Grand Fleet to have fallen" in 
