8 
Land & Water 
June 6, 191 8 
behind the battle cruisers, they would have had the enemy 
under fire at ranges diminishing from 12,000 yards to 8,000, 
from 6.10, say, till (1.40, and this in extraordinarily favour- 
able gunnery conditions. As it was, by the time they did 
get into action — that is, after 6.30— the conditions were all 
against effective gunnery. " The mist, " said the Commander- 
in-Chief, " rendered range-taking a difficult, matter." "Ow- 
ing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was 
possible to see only a few ships at a time in tlie enemy's battle 
line. Towards the van, only some four or five ships were 
ever visible at once. More could be seen from the rear 
sfjuadron, but never more than eight to twelve." 
Further, it was not till nearly 7.0, when the leading 
ships of the Fleet turned south, that the Germans, having 
us now behind them, began the great torpedo attacks which 
were decisive. At any rate it was at 6.54 that Marlborough, 
tiie only ship touched by a torpedo, was hit. From the 
wording of the Commander-in-Chief's dispatch, it would 
api^car certain that it was now that the enemy's plans of 
evasion — torpedo ^'olleys and smoke screens — were put in 
force. "After the arrival of the British battle fleet, " says 
the Commander-in-Chief, "the enemy's tactics were of a 
nature generally to evade further action, in which they were 
favoured by the conditions of visibility." "(He) constantly- 
turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer 
attacks and smoke screens, as the effect of the British fire 
was felt." 
There was evidently something, then, in the situation, 
or in the way it was met, that saved the German fleet from 
our gunfire, just at the one period when it could have been 
made really destructive. That tlie rear got into action before 
the van is in itself an extraordinarj' circumstance, and it 
seems plain that, to take a numerous fleet into action in 
single line, presents difficulties to-day as acute as they were 
in the era of masts and sails. This fact is worth emphasis 
because the evolution of the Nelsonian battle is easily traced. 
The things that distinguish it from so heart-breaking a 
fiasco as .Mathews' action, Byng's, or the Battle of the Saints, 
on the one hand, and the "Glorious F'irst of June" on the 
other, were twofold. First, the tactical plan was made 
with the single object of bringing the force into battle with 
the utmost rapidity, which involved it being directed straight 
at the points chosen for attack without preliminary man- 
ceuvTcs ; and, secortdly, the execution of the plan, after 
the Commander-in-Chief had made absolutely certain that 
his second in command and every subordinlate' had mastered 
his intentions completely, was left to the untrammelled 
discretion of these responsible for the separate divisions. 
Battle Cruisers in Action 
The fact that Sir David Beatty was not supported at this 
ciitical period does not, of course, give rise to the assumption 
that he might and should have been. Until all the circum- 
stances are known, any such inference from the bare facts 
would be unwarranted. But it remains a poignant regret 
that the support could not be given, for, viewed as a move 
taken with the expectation of such support, the Vice- Admiral's 
tactical decision at 6.0 was of an exceptionally brilliant 
order. When the battle-cruiser type was first designed, 
its purpose was announced to be twofold. It was to be a 
ship that would combine such force and speed as would 
enable any enemy's scouting screen to be both driven off 
and pierced ; conversely, it would itself protect the screen 
of which it was part, from disturbance. Its second purpose 
was to be a superlative unit in the protection or attack on 
%■■ 
the lines of sea supply. The dispatch of Inuincible and 
Inflexible to the Falkland Islands was an example of the 
latter form of strategy, and the German raids on the East 
Coast exemplified yet a third purpose to which such vessels 
could be put. Both sides employed them as advanced 
scouting ftjrces on the 3rst May. 
It was reserved for Sir David Beatty to employ tlic 
difference in speed between his squadron and that of the 
enemy to create a tactical situation in a fleet action which, 
could it have been improved, would have led to the enemy's 
annihilation. So to employ these vessels called, it is 
needless to say, not only for that "correct strategical insight 
and appreciation of situations," with which the Commander- 
in-Chief duly credited him, but for a firmness of resolution 
and a grasp of right war-Uke principle of a very exceptional 
order. Two of his vessels had been lost earlier in the day, 
and it is not known whether or not he knew at the time 
that it was accidental shots and not the wholesale piercing 
of their thinly protected sides that accounted for their 
destruction. In any event, having lost two ships out of 
six when the range was 14,000 yards, it might well have 
been supposed that he was likely to lose a far higher proportion 
when he decided to close, first to 12,000 and then to 8,000. 
But there are two things that must be remembered. iMrst, 
in closing the range materially he did the best thing possible 
for the defence of his ships ; for he added, perhaps, incal- 
culabl}/ to the efficiency of his Own gimfire. Secondly, 
while--even with this point in his favour — he took an immense 
risk, it was incurred for the sake of bringing about the crushing 
decision which he, no doubt, realised must be obtained in 
the next haH hour or probably not at all. 
To those who are conversant with the discussion that followed, 
the two knot increase in speed which Dreadnought possessed over 
the King Edwarih, this episode of crumpling the head of 
the German line is exceedingly interesting. It was made 
possible by the possession, not of a 10 per cent., but of a 
30 or 40 per cent, superiority in speed over the opposing 
force. For a parallel to it we should have to go a long way 
back in history. Possibly there would be no precedent 
at all until we come to the work of the high speed triremes 
of the Athenians and the victories which their superior 
oarsmanship obtained in the Peloponnesian war. In strict 
analysis this startling use of the battle-cruisers was a 
containing movement. It was the essence of the Beatty 
stroke that it created the opportunitv for the main fleet. 
Indeed, is not the revolution at Wliitehall itself the most 
astonishing of all the things the Navy has done ? It was 
effected at the most critical period of the war, despite ex 
hortations not to swap horses in mid-stream. It is not our least 
conspicuous nationahty to fear theory, to dislike order, and to 
distrust system. And this is seemingly an old trait. Shake- 
speare must have had the opponents of the staff system in 
mind in writing Ulysses' speech in Troilus and Cressida : 
They tax our policy and call it cowardice ; 
Count wisdom as no member oi the war; 
Forestall prescience and esteem no act 
But that of hand : the still and mental parts — 
That do contrive how many hands shall strike. 
When fitness calls them on ; and know by measure 
Of their observant toil the enemies' weight, — 
Why, this hath not a finger's dignity : 
They call this "bed-work," "mappery," " closet- war " : 
So that the ram, that batters down the wall. 
For the great s\ving and rudeness of his poise. 
They place before his hand that made the engine ; 
Or those, that with the fineness ol their souls. 
By reason guide his execution. 
4^ > * 
ijL ^ ,afe 
* •» s 
The Fifth Battle Squadron at "Windy Corner," Jutland, May 31st, 19 16 
By H. E. Frecker, R.N.R. [From details supplied by eye-tciinasei.) 
