June 2 0, 19 1 8 
Land & Water 
5 
Let us be clear as to what tliis phrase "every available 
point" means. 
In the open plain against the Piave, north of the marshes 
at least — that is, at and north of St. Dona — attack is possible 
anywhere, though a special concentration was, of course, to be 
found at the three points where the roads and railways lead 
to the three crossings of the river, and here the enemy estab- 
lished a bridge-head on the first day at each of the points. It 
is not clear in what state the river was, whether it was deeper 
than usual through a freshet or through the melting of the 
snows, or whether it was in its usual summer condition of a 
mere gravel-bed with insignificant streams of water trickling 
through it. 
The enemy dispatch talks of it as being "swollen" ; but 
this probably only means that it has enough water to make 
fording somewhat difficult. It is very unlikely that it was 
deep enough for the use of pontoons, except possibly at the 
southernmost crossing, for when it is deep enough for pontoons 
in its central reaches the Piave is such a torrent that they 
could hardly be thrown across. . 
On this sector, then — that of the Piave proper — crossings 
were made and bridge-heads were established on the Saturday 
and Sunday. The enemy claim here about 10,000 prisoners. 
But by the last dispatches — those of Monday morning — 
these bridge-heads '^ere closely contained by the Italian 
reaction, and do not seem to have enlarged at all. 
In the sector next west — between the Piave and Lake 
Garda, which we have seen to be far the most critical one — 
the position at the end of the second day was satisfactory. 
The main enemy effort was made on the Asiago Platpau, for 
reasons which have already been given. It fell with great 
weight upon the forces holding the • extreme west of this 
district, which were British, effected the advance of about 
a mile, but was then thoroughly beaten back. It entirely 
failed to reach the rim of the plateau, which overlo( ks the 
plain, or to debouch from the gaps in it upon the West. The 
enemy here suffered a very decided check. He suffered a 
similar check in his efforts east of both sides of the Brenta. 
He advanced, but could not keep what he had overrun, and x, 
was beaten back by the Italians. Further to the east again, 
between the immediate neighbourhood of the Brenta and 
Montello, he achieved nothing. The eastern ends of Montello, 
just on the Piave, he carried, probably. as part of his successful 
crossing at Nervesa. By the Monday noon, he seems to have 
reached the summit ; an important success, because it gives 
him his only point of observation over the plain. 
With this very insufficient result, our news stops. We 
have yet to learn whether it is a definite check for the enemy 
or no. Since the. whole plan is German, and its conduct 
obviously designed by officers from the Prussian staff, the 
test of its failure or success will simply be its continuance. 
If the batile is broken off, as was the battle of the Matz (a 
little too late) the other day, it will be a confession of failure. 
If it is continued, no matter what we may be told about 
heavy enemy losses in the West, we may take it as evidence 
that those who are directing the enemy feel themselves to 
be succeeding. 
So much has been written throughout the Press of the 
political effect of an enemy failure here that I will not add 
to it, especially as we do not yet know what the chances of 
the battle are. 
But it must be carefully borne in mind that the attempt 
is being . made by a Power which is thoroughly tired 
of the war, and which has now nothing to gain from the 
continuance of the war. It is being made by a Pgwer which 
would not be specially punished as a result of unsuccessful 
war, and it is being made by a Power which is suffering from 
the most grievous internal instability. 
True Value of Numerical Superiority 
WE cannot understand this critical phase of the war 
unless we begin upon the very largest lines and go 
down to details afterwards. To go the other way 
about, to make maps showing how far the enemy is from 
this or that point, is to put the cart before the horse, and to 
stop at those very simple insufficiencies is to be ridiculously 
failing in judgment. 
The Central Empires and their dependents had for the 
European field alone (counting Salonika as eastern and eUm- 
inating Syria, Persia, and Mesopotamia) more than eight and 
less than nine million men drawing rations, in uniform, and 
on, the military strength. Of these, roughly three-fifths or a 
Uttle more were organised in fighting units and of these 
again more than one-half, but not two-thirds, were the in- 
fantry which was, of course, the force chiefly subject to attri- 
tion. 
That is the first foundational point to seize and remember. 
Those who neglect it or ignore it marvel at the enemy's pre- 
sent superiority, fail to understand, and fall into the error of 
thinking it due to some hidden power of surprise. 
I repeat : More than eight million all told, neATly five under 
arms in the field, not far short of three in infantry alone. That 
was the state of affairs from the moment when the whole 
machine had come to full working. 
With the exception of a great falling off in quality and 
possibly some falling off in numbers among the Austro- 
Hungarians, it is the state of things to-day. The Turkish 
forces were badly hit by lack of organisation, insufficient 
industrial power, etc., but that was felt in Asia, not in Europe. 
The Turkish Divisions in Europe upqh the fighting fronts, 
though few, have been kept up to strength. The Bulgarian 
divisions have suffered little. Of this eight — five and i/iree — 
million, the German Army counts for five-eighths in each 
category. 
Against so formidable a mass were arrayed the Russians, 
the French, the British and the Italians. These four main 
AlUes were sufiicient to " contain " (as the phrase goes) the 
Central Empires between them. The Allies never had any 
formidable superiority even in mere numbers, against the' 
Central Empires. How the idea got about that they had 
I do not know. They had a superiority, but no formidable 
superiority ; and that superiortiy, such as it was, depended 
entirely upon the huge recruiting field of Russia^ 
Between the late autumn of 1916 and the early summer of. 
1917 the Russian part of this combination went to pieces. 
The enemy may legitimately claim that this result was the 
fruit of his heavy blows in 1915 ; but it may also be urged 
that this fruit would not have been garnered but for political 
propaganda and the action of the detestable international 
gang that captured the Russian Capital and still holds it. 
These discussions are, however, of no value to a present 
judgment of the war. The Russian forces as a fact dis- 
appeared. The process might be compared to the break- 
down of a massive wall under bombardment. The final 
collapse came suddenly, and almost up to the moment of 
that final collapse the wall was standing up and visible to 
every one and apparently still intact. 
With the disappearance of the Russian forces went the 
necessary elimination of the Rumanian Army, just at the 
moment when it had learnt modern war-,and was beginning 
to re-act very usefully in our favour. The whole field was 
left open for a duel in the west. Into that duel the Central 
Empires could now bring their united and preponderant 
strength. Take them all in line from the Adriatic to the 
North Sea it was a struggle opening between two forces 
which stood as about 21 to 16. 
The first evidence of the change was Caporetto in the 
late autumn of 1917. It was explained in many ways. The 
Germans, of course, made the most of the fact that it occurred 
just after German divisions had joined the Austrian forces ■ 
but the underlying cause even of that first surprise and bad 
defeat was new power which the Russian toUapse had given 
the enemy to concentrate against the west. * f' ^ 
Here let me point out that numerical preponderance does 
not only mean the power to bring up, say, ten men against 
seven : It means much more than that. It means the power 
to withdraw divisions and give them special training. It 
means the power to give long periods of rest. It means 
the power to resume the initiative — that is, the vast advantage 
of striking where you will and compelling your opponent 
to conform his plan to yours. 
It should further be pointed out that a great numerical 
superiority enables you to play for exhaustion with a margin 
in hand. You can risk heavy losses without fear for the 
immediate future. Your numerically inferior opponent bv 
his superior skill in the art of war may compel you to heavier 
losses than he himself suffers, and yet you may be the gainer 
in the long run because there is a certain niinimum beyond 
which he cannot hold and you may fairly hope that he will 
reach that breaking point before you wiU. 
If 100 men are fighting 70, the 70 can, perhaps, make 
the 100 lose 25 men where they lose only 20. But at the end 
of the process they are worse off than at the beginning. They 
stand, only 50 against 75 : and the process goes on. More- 
