8 
Land & Water 
July 4, 19 1 8 
sents the check to the south of Douaumont. And the 
alternate blows on April gth on the Lys and on May 27th 
on the Ailettc represent the alternate blows dehvcrcd by 
the Crown Prince upon Vaux to the cast and the Mort 
Homme to the west. 
These tactics of alternate btows upon the flanks might be 
a doctrine of the Crown Prince, who had employed them 
before in the Argonne. It is poor strategy, and has never 
achieved it-s object. In any case it is the e.xact antithesis of 
the method of Hindenburg who, adopting the grand style of 
Napoleon and Moltke, delivers a heavy blow with all his 
concentrated strength, and does not scatter his attacks. 
Thus the battle of March 21st was absolutely different in 
principle from the battles that succeeded it. The battle of 
March 21st was a direct blow, delivered with formidable 
force and the superior weight of 75 divisions, and intended 
to break the adversary's Une, as Mackensen broke the Russian 
line at Gorlitz on April 30th, 1915. It was a typical Hinden- 
burg battle. The subsequent operations, engaged in with 
greater economy of forces and with more limited objectives, 
were of the nature of demonstrations and manoeuvres, 
partial, but concurrent and interdependent assaults, whose 
ultimate purpose was the tiring out of the enemy. They 
were Crown Prince battles. 
• . » » 
Applying this principle, the German High Command pro- 
ceeded, the day after its check on March 28th, with rapid 
preparations for an attack on the right extremity of the 
line in Flanders. In front of the Aubers Kidge there was a 
sector of the front tactically dominated by the enemy, the 
lines running to the western foot of the slope which he 
occupied. Tliis sector was held by Portuguese troops, 
behind which were British troops in rest billets. The enemy 
assembled divisions, some of which he stealthily moved from 
the north, from the region between Ypres and the sea, and 
some from the south, from the neighbourhood of Douai, and 
on April 9th he attacked. The Portuguese troops were 
dispersed, with the result that at ten o'clock in the morning 
the British troops in the second line were attacked. 
The German Offensive crossed the Lys and rushed into the 
funnel formed on its left by La Bassee Canal, in front by 
Nieppe Forest, and on its right by the chain of hills in 
Flanders. On the 26th it succeeded; in overleaping the > 
eastern point of the range of hills, carrying Mont Kemmel. 
Then it seems the enemy believed that he had for the second 
time come within reach of a great strategic success. The 
attack in Flanders, begun merely as a diversion, might be 
converted into a main attack. The plans of 1914 might be 
picked up once more and the sea might be reached. With 
that objective in view, the front of the attack must be 
changed ; instead of being developed between La Bassee 
Canal and the hills, opposite the Hazebrouck gap, it must 
be developed further to the right, between the hills and 
Ypres, opposite Poperinghe. It took place on April 29th, 
and resulted in a complete check. 
Thus in this battle of the Lys we see the enemy dispersing 
his forces instead of concentrating them, changing his 
strategic design, wliich is always a serious matter in a 
campaign, marching off to carry out an eccentric attack at 
a distance, which is always dangerous — Napoleon always 
forbade too widely extended attacks — and in the end left 
with two enterprises, both of them failures, upon his hands : 
one directed against Amiens, the other against Ypres. It is 
probable that future historians will pass very severe judg- 
ment upon the German command in this battle of the Lys, 
which was conducted as badly as a battle can be. 
Confronting the Germans thus scattered. Marshal Foch 
stood concentrated, with his reserves deeply disposed behind 
the Picardy front, as advantageously as the restricted space 
at his command permitted, ready to bear down upon the 
Flanders front on his left, upon the Amiens frorkt before him, 
or upon the Aisne and Champagne front to his right. What 
would the enemy do ? At any rate, he remained immovable, 
and no better proof could have been forthcoming of his 
disorder. He had, however, massed large forces before 
Amiens. There lay the real point of danger for the 
.\llies, between whose armies the twenty-five mile wide 
Isthmus between Amiens and Abbeville was the only means 
of communication. It was there Hindenburg might hope to 
achieve great results by one powerful blow. Besides, the 
possession of Amiens was absolutely necessary to him for a 
further operation directed upon Paris. But, on the other 
hand, the very fact that the node of the battle was there, 
and that he was expected there, was an inducement to him 
not to attack at that point, where preparations were made 
to receive him, but to endeavour to effect a surprise at some 
other point of the field of battle. 
Now, since his advance to Montdidier his left flank had 
been com'presscd by the F'rench positions upon the plateau 
of the Chemin des Dames, definitely conquered at the end of 
October, 1917. The German High Command had always 
feared a laench attack delivered from the Soissons-Rheims 
front in the general direction of Laon, and the recent exten- 
sion of von Hutier's army to the Amiens-Noyon line rendered 
su61i an attack much more dangerous. The German High 
Command therefore determined to free itself from this 
menace and to carry the plateau of the Chemin des Dames 
by surprise, the more so as it was weakly held by a small 
number of tired divisipns. In two days it rapidly collected 
six army corps, and on May 27th hurled them between 
Soissons and Rheims. Here, as on the Lys, the operation 
was a limited one, in the nature of an active defensive. 
Fall of Soissons 
The result was very different. In a few hours the plateau 
of the Chemin des Dames was reconquered. The Aisne was 
crossed b}' means of the French Army's own bridges, and at 
the end of the day the Veslc was reached by von Conta's 
corps, which had made an advance of nearly twelve miles. 
From the Vesle the enemy continued his southward move- 
ment, and reached the Marne. It is true that he was con- 
tained on his two flanks, on his right by Soissons and on his 
left by Rheims.^ And his situation was the more precarious 
because General Foch, profiting by this situation, was pre- 
paring a great counter-attack upon his right flank. So, 
leaving von Below's army to watch Rheims, von Boehm's 
army cl^anged front, facing to its right in order to receive 
upon its front the blow which Foch was preparing to deliver 
on its flank. Having marched southwards up to this point, 
it now turned westwards, resting its right upon Soissons, 
which had been taken on the 29th, and its left upon the 
Marne. It was thus turned towards Paris ; but, as will be 
recognised, this movement was much more defensive than 
offensive. It was rendered possible by the fall of Soissons. 
If that town could have held out a few days longer, von 
Boehm's army, not having that point d'appui upon its right, 
would have been in a most critical situation. 
A regular battle was thus joined between Foch and von 
Boehm on the ground between the Oise and the Aisne. The 
German General had succeeded in effecting his change of 
front in time not only to receive the shock, but to anticipate 
it. But he himself was contained a httle way in front of 
Soissons, with his right on the Ambleuy ravine, his centre 
on .the edge of the forest of Villers-Cotterets, and his left on 
the high ground between the Ourcq and the Marne. Defini- 
tively, the battle of May 27th thus assumed two phases : an 
initial, very rapid advance to the southward, in which voi) 
Boehm's army scored an indisputable success ; and a wheeling 
movement to the westward, in which this army fought with 
the reserves of Genera] Foch, that had at once' been hurried 
up, a bloody and indecisive battle Which checked it in front 
of the forest of Villers-Cotterets. 
Despite the successes obtained, von Boehm's tactical 
situation remained but mediocre. In front of him, to the 
west, was a menacing forest region ; his right was in danger 
of being thrown back upon the Oise ; his left was very poorly 
protected by the Marne, of whose southern bank he was not 
in occupation ; and behind him there was a mere barrage to 
protect his rear between Rheims and Soissons. 
The two neighbouring armies then essayed to aid' von 
Boehm, by two partial operations intended to release his 
two flanks. On June 9th von Hutier's army, on his right, 
attacked between Montdidier and Noyon, his object being 
to penetrate to Cdmpiegne. On June i8th Fritz von Below's 
army, on his left, attacked the point d'appui of Rheims, 
which, although encircled on three sides, still held out. 
Neither of these two movements was crowned with success. 
Von Hutier subceeded, indeed, in carrying on his left the 
massif .of Lassigny on the right bank of the Oise, and by a 
counter-blow he compelled the French to evacuate the wood 
of Carlepont and the forest of Ourscamp on the left bank ; 
but, being himself counter-attacked on his right, to the 
south of Montdidier, he was brought to a halt, and could not 
get within six miles of Compiegne, which he should ^lave 
reached on the second day. As for von Below, the attempt 
which he made wiih thr^^e divisions upon Rheims was a 
complete failure. 
Such is the general outhne of the strategic situation in 
France. No one can fail to be struck by the lack of coher- 
ence in the German operations since the end of March ; one 
plan has succeeded to another, each one induced by the last ; 
their forces are being scattered, in divergent operations of 
which the magnitude steadily grows less. But in the general 
military situation there are still some other elements which 
we will examine in anoth r articleT 
